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INTRODUCTION
The independent agencies of the United States government occupy a
special, although perhaps ambiguous, constitutional place in the federal
establishment. These multi-member boards and commissions, which are
the prototype independent agencies, bring together individuals of diverse
views, expertise, and backgrounds to tackle legally difficult, technically
complex, and often politically sensitive issues. Many multi-member agen-
cies have the full range of regulatory authority, i.e., they can issue regula-
tions, take administrative action to enforce their statutes and regulations,
and decide cases through administrative adjudication. They oversee either
INDEPENDENT FEDERAL AGENCIES
a specific area of the economyl or have substantive responsibilities that cut
across industry lines.2 In traditional theory, their stock-in-trade is the ex-
pert, apolitical resolution of regulatory issues. They are "independent" of
the political will exemplified by the executive branch, yet they are also
multi-member organizations, a fact that tends toward accommodation of
diverse or extreme views through the compromise inherent in the process
of collegial decisionmaking.
Justice Sutherland conceived of the independent, multi-member com-
mission (at least in the 1930s) as follows:
The commission is to be non-partisan; and it must, from the very nature of its duties,
act with entire impartiality. It is charged with the enforcement of no policy except
the policy of the law. Its duties are neither political nor executive, but predominantly
quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative. Like the Interstate Commerce Commission, its
members are called upon to exercise the trained judgment of a body of experts ap-
pointed by law and informed by experience.
[It is] a body of experts who shall gain experience by length of service-a body
which shall be independent of executive authority, except in its selection, and free to
exercise its judgment without the leave or hindrance of any other official or any de-
partment of the government.
3
The Brownlow Commission described independent agencies less charitably
as a "headless 'fourth branch' of the Government, a haphazard deposit of
irresponsible agencies and uncoordinated powers.' 4
Over the years numerous articles have surveyed the indicia of independ-
ence and the place of independent agencies within a separation of powers
framework.5 In this article, we review the structure and internal operations
I. For example, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) regulates inter-
state aspects of the electric power, natural gas, oil pipeline, and hydroelectric industries. See
42 U.S.C. § 7172(a)(1) (1994); see also Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, §§
1801-1804, 106 Stat. 3010, 3011-12.
2. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) enforces a variety of federal antitrust and
consumer protection statutes. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a), 46(d), 53(a) (1994).
3. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 624, 625-26 (1935) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis omitted).
4. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE WITH STUDIES OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
(1937), reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON SEPARATION OF POWERS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE INDEPENDENT AGENCIES: CASES AND SELECTED
READINGS, S. Doc. No. 91-49, at 346 (1969).
5. See, e.g., Symposium: The Independence of Independent Agencies, 1988 DUKE L.J.
215; A Symposium on Administrative Law: The Uneasy Constitutional Status of the Admin-
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of independent agencies, note several similarities and differences among
them, and address various recurring issues affecting them. We further con-
sider the future of this regulatory form as we enter the new millennium.
We focus on agencies-whether multi-member or not-where at least one
individual is appointed by the President to a full-time, fixed-term position
with the advice and consent of the Senate and has protection against sum-
mary removal by some form of "for cause" restriction on the President's
authority.
6
istrative Agencies, 36 Am. U. L. REV. 277 (1987); Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Contempo-
rary Debate About Legislative-Executive Separation of Powers, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 430
(1987); Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SuP. CT. REV. 41; Peter L. Strauss,
The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984).
6. A highly preliminary survey of the structure and workings of independent agencies
was published in monograph form by the Administrative Conference of the United States
(Conference) in 1991. -The Conference received numerous requests for copies because it
contained comparative information that was immediately useful to agency officials and ad-
ministrative practitioners. Now that the Conference has been abolished, we receive tele-
phone inquiries about these subjects from agency members, staff, and private practice law-
yers. So, we have prepared a new survey of 32 independent agencies, including two that sit
squarely in the executive branch. In the Appendix, we have attempted to be inclusive but
the lack of comprehensive information makes the task difficult. We may have inadvertently
omitted some agencies -that qualify under our definition. Some agencies have been deliber-
ately omitted. For example, some boards' have members appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate but the statute provides some mechanism for removal other than
presidential removal for cause. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 1622 (1994) (providing that members
of Foreign Claims Settlement Commission appointed by President and subject to Senate
confirmation do not have statutory term and may be removed by Secretary of State). Others
have members appointed by the President but not confirmed by the Senate. For instance,
members of the United States Commission on Civil Rights are appointed by the President,
the President pro tempore of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1975(b) (1994). Numerous boards and other components within agencies
are staffed by career civil servants and empowered to undertake a wide range of agency
functions affecting the public. The Departmental Grant Appeals Board of the Department of
Health and Human Services, for instance, is composed of members appointed by the Secre-
tary. See 45 C.F.R. § 16.5(a) (1999). The Board was originally created by regulation but
later given added authority by Congress. See Pennsylvania v. HHS, 80 F.3d 796, 800 (3d
Cir. 1996). Although members of employee boards frequently have decisional independ-
ence as a matter of agency practice, see John H. Frye, Ill, Survey of Non-ALJ Hearing Pro-
grams in the Federal Government, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 261, 343-44 (1992), they are not
technically "independent" because their members ordinarily can be removed without cause
by the appointing official, see Kalaris v. Donovan, 697 F.2d 376, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
Moreover, we do not include advisory boards that are components of agencies, such as the
Social Security Advisory Board, see 42 U.S.C. § 903 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998), or other spe-
cialized government institutions, such as government corporations, government-sponsored
enterprises, or congressional agencies, some or all of whose members may be appointed by
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate and removable only for cause. See,
1114 [52:4
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Each agency is different because its procedures and practices have
evolved to facilitate the agency's substantive mission.7 Yet some generali-
ties about agency operations can be gleaned. Moreover, we believe that
tradition matters. Lore can be as important as law. On one level, tradition
matters because the evolution of agency custom, and its culmination in es-
tablished practice, manifests a pragmatic adaptation of law to the needs of
individualized administration. On another level, it matters because it re-
flects the integration of accountability and efficiency. Generally speaking,
an evolving practice reflects a consensus (or at least an acceptance) among
agency members and staffs, the private sector, and the politically account-
able branches of government, of reasonable ways of doing business. Often,
agency practice becomes embodied in law.
8
In order to understand the importance of the independent agency, it is
imperative to examine how it developed. We begin this article with a re-
view of the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), and
focus on how the independent agency form evolved, not from institutional
logic, but from historical contingency.9 Contrary to common belief, the
ICC was not devised to be a new independent form of government located
outside the tripartite system. Its resultant form was the product of political
e.g., 39 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (describing Postal Service Board of Gov-
ernors); Mail Order Ass'n of Am. v. United States Postal Serv., 986 F.2d 509, 512-13 (D.C.
Cir. 1993) (stating that nine members of Postal Service Board of Governors are appointed
by the President with advice and consent of Senate, and can be removed only for cause).
The information contained in the Appendix was reviewed in preliminary form by the Office
of General Counsel, or other staff office, within each agency. However, responsibility for
the accuracy of the material rests entirely with the authors.
7. Indeed, one multi-member entity, the Railroad Retirement Board, is statutorily de-
fined as an "independent agency," 45 U.S.C. § 231f(a) (1994), although it is not an
"agency" within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). See Administra-
tive Procedure Act § 2(a), 5 U.S.C. § 551(l)(E) (1994) (providing that an "agency" under
the Act does not include "agencies composed of representatives of the parties or of repre-
sentatives of organizations of the parties to the disputes determined by them").
8. We undertake this article and survey for two reasons. First, these matters are the
grist of the day-to-day operations of federal agencies. Second, these issues do not appear to
command quite the same academic attention as doctrinal issues, and comparative data are
often unknown to agency and private practitioners. We share Professor Cass Sunstein's
view that the next generation of administrative law scholarship should shift its focus from its
"traditional preoccupation with the judiciary to a focus on congressional and bureaucratic
processes[,] ... [which] remain ill-understood despite the fact that they have far more im-
portant roles in government regulation." Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 1991
DUKE L.J. 607, 642.
9. "[T]he independent commission as an organizational form did not emerge full-
blown with the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act. Rather, it evolved over the course
of several decades, coming to maturity late in the Progressive Era." MARC ALLEN EISNER,
REGULATORY POLITICS IN TRANSITION 48 (1993).
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negotiations responding to the need for efficient regulation of the railroad
industry. In his authoritative work on independent agencies, Professor
Robert E. Cushman stated:
In the thinking of those responsible for the Act, independence, if it meant anything,
appears to have meant bipartisanship, as a guarantee of impartiality. Independence of
executive domination seems not to have been thought of and was certainly not dis-
cussed, but independence of one-sided partisan control was a matter of great mo-
ment. 1o
Cushman also notes:
There was virtually no discussion of the commission's relation to Congress. Con-
gress was, of course, creating the commission and assigning its powers, but there is
nothing to suggest that the legislative leaders looked upon the commission as having
a relation to Congress different from that of any other administrative agency .... It
was assumed that the commission would aid Congress directly by giving it expert in-
formation on railroad problems, and it was also assumed that the commission would
remain under the supervision of Congress in the sense that its status and duties would
be subject to legislative revision from time to time."
It was not until many years after the establishment of the ICC that the
notion of independence developed. 12  In the 1930s, Professor Isaiah L.
Sharfman, describing the agency form as manifested in the ICC, noted that
"[t]he Commission is no more a part of the national administration-in the
sense of being an instrument for furthering the particular political ends of
the party in power-than is the Supreme Court, and executive influence is
as manifestly out of place in the one case as it would be in the other."'1
3
Throughout the Progressive Era and the New Deal, a multitude of new
agencies were established using the ICC as their prototype. 14 As the inde-
pendent agency form began to flourish, its constitutionality became an is-
sue of considerable debate, and disputes over the issue of separation of
10. ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 61 (1972).
This notion, reflected in a cap on the number of members from one political party on most
boards and commissions, has endured. See also infra, Appendix.
1I. ld. at 60.
12. "[T]he ICC was not independent, nor had Congress intended to give it complete
independence.... Congress placed the ICC under direct supervision of the secretary of the
interior .. " EISNER, supra note 9, at 48.
13. 2 I.L. SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION: A STUDY IN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE 454 (193 1).
14. These include the Federal Reserve Board (1913), Federal Trade Commission
(1914), Federal Radio Commission (1927), Federal Power Commission (1930), Securities
and Exchange Commission (1934), Federal Communications Commission (1934), National




powers have continued since that time.
Our review convinces us that Justice Sutherland's characterization of the
genus independent agency is overly romanticized or, at least, outdated. On
the other hand, the Brownlow Committee's comments are equally wide off
the mark. The administrative process is not as unprincipled as the Com-
mittee portrays it. In our view, structural and organizational elements,
along with agency traditions and practices, have evolved together to permit
independent agencies to conduct their business fairly and effectively while
keeping them somewhat above the political fray. Agency structures, pro-
cedures and practices have grown up pragmatically rather than theoretically
to provide a reasonably impartial playing field for the resolution of factual
and policy issues in discrete areas of government activity. They reflect the
resolution of a tug-of-war between agency factions or the political branches
and allow policy warfare to be waged subtly, away from "center court,"
where affected interests can jockey for dominance. The actual operations
of independent agencies, if not the theory, are in effect, a sort of Marquis of
Queensbury rules of engagement, and their continued future existence in
one form or another will be necessary.
I. How DID THE INDEPENDENT AGENCY DEVELOP: THE CASE OF THE
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
A. Introduction
The emergence of the modem independent regulatory agency at the fed-
eral level began in the late 19th century when Congress established the ICC
to regulate the railroads. As a result, independence has come to be inextri-
cably associated with multi-member tribunals. However, prior to the es-
tablishment of the ICC, the regulatory commission structure had been util-
ized by many states in their attempts to regulate the railroad industry.1
5
Furthermore, the concept of independence did not originate with the
ICC. 16 When Congress established the Department of the Treasury in
1789, the department possessed indicia of independence from the executive
15. "Regulatory commissions were ... the normal outgrowth of a broader state com-
mission movement which dated back to the early nineteenth century." CUSHMAN, supra
note 10, at 19. ;'[I]n 1887, ten states had set up ;strong' commissions ... possessing actual
rate-making powers." Id. at 26.
16. During the period before the Constitution, when there was no President, the Treas-
ury was controlled by a series of congressional committees and was accountable exclusively
to Congress. In 1784, Congress even experimented with a three-member Board of Treasury.
See MARK WALSTON, THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY 29 (1989).
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and indeed "was not referred to as an 'executive' department." 7 For ex-
ample, Congress required the Secretary to report to Congress" and re-
stricted the President's power to remove the comptroller of the depart-
ment. 19
Recent commentators have also made clear the extent to which district
attorneys (now called United States Attorneys) initially enjoyed some inde-
pendence from the executive branch.20 The early Attorneys General under-
stood the opinions clause of the Judiciary Act of 178921 to be a limitation
on their authority, "rather than [the basis for] a general power to control le-
gal opinions throughout the executive branch. 22 These Attorneys General
used the limitation as a justification for refusing to advise the district attor-
neys in their prosecutions, which gave the attorneys a level of independ-
ence. This practice is evident in a letter from Attorney General Wirt writ-
ten to President Monroe, dated October 20, 1823, in which Wirt expressed
his opinion after being asked to review the merits of a particular case. 23 In
this letter, Wirt stated:
17. GERHARD CASPER, SEPARATING POWER: ESSAYS ON THE FOUNDING PERIOD 42
(1997). "in the Congress, the Secretary of Treasury was seen as an indispensable, direct
arm of the House in the regard to its responsibilities for revenues and appropriations." Id. at
44. But see Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the
First Half-Century, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1451, 1480-81 (1997) (describing President
Washington's firm control over Treasury Department during his presidency). The Calabresi
and Yoo four-part history of "unitariness" promises to help reconceptualize the historical
record and we look forward to the remaining "parts."
18. See Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, § 2, 1 Stat. 65, 66.
19. See I KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 2.5, at 45 (3d ed. 1994); see also Lawrence Lessig, Readings by Our Unitary
Executive, 15 CARDOzO L. REV. 175, 183-84 (1993). Although he did retain the power to
remove the comptroller, the President did not have dominion over the comptroller's deci-
sions regarding enforcement of payment of debts due to the federal fisc. See id. at 184-85.
20. See Lessig, supra note 19, at 183 (quoting Charles Tiefer, The Constitutionality of
Independent Officers as Checks on Abuses of Executive Power, 63 B.U. L. REV. 59, 74-75
(1983)). The district attorneys conducted federal prosecution free from the control and ju-
risdiction of the Attorney General, whose "function was merely to advise the President and
the Cabinet." Lessig, supra note 19, at 183 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
21. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 93 (authorizing Attorney General
to provide legal opinions and advice to President and department heads).
22. Lessig, supra note 19, at 188 (emphasis omitted).
23. Wirt believed that the President could not review the decisions of the accounting
officers of the Treasury Department without express authorization from Congress. See I
Op. Att'y Gen. 624, 625-30 (1823). But in response to a request made by President Andrew
Jackson's Secretary of State, Attorney General Roger B. Taney determined that the Presi-
dent could order a district attorney to terminate a prosecution. See 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 482,
491-92 (1831). Taney reasoned that this was a proper use of the President's power to exe-
cute the laws. For an alternative view of Wirt see Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 17, at 1520.
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To interpret [the Take Care] clause of the constitution so as to throw upon the Presi-
dent the duty of a personal interference in every specific case of an alleged or defec-
tive execution of the laws, and to call upon him to perform such duties himself,
would be not only to require him to perform an impossibility himself, but to take
upon himself the responsibility of all the subordinate executive officers of the gov-
ernment-a construction too absurd to be seriously contended for.
24
The antebellum administrative state only fitfully recognized the need for
executive direction and control. At the same time, it found little use for ju-
dicial review of administrative action, believing that executive direction
was a largely unreviewable act.25
The post-Civil War administrative state was a different matter entirely.
It faced the challenge of regulating potential economic monopolies, in par-
ticular the railroads, which were "a central, if not the major, element in the
political, economic, and social development of the United States. ' 26 The
administrative commission form of regulation had earlier been employed in
Britain 27 and at the state level in the United States. 28 The creation of the
Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887 was the natural derivation of
these experiments. These earlier predecessors explain the historical context
in which the independent agency developed.
B. Regulation in Britain
The House of Commons took its first comprehensive look at railroads as
early as 1839, in response to shipper complaints of monopoly practices. A
24. 1 Op. Att'y Gen. at 625.
25. See discussion in BREGER, ET AL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY
POLICY 825-27 (4th ed. Aspen 1989); see also Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497
(1840).
26. GABRIEL KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION 1877-1916 1 (W.W. Norton & Co.
1970) (1965).
27. In discussing regulation in Britain, we have relied on three principal sources. The
first is a book by historian Henry Parris. HENRY PARRIS, GOVERNMENT AND THE RAILWAYS
IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN (1965). The book is a revised version of Dr. Parris's
Ph.D. thesis at the University of Leicester. At the time of writing, he was a Lecturer in
Politics at the University of Durham. The second is a book by economist C.D. Foster. C.D.
FOSTER, PRIVATIZATION, PUBLIC OWNERSHIP AND THE REGULATION OF NATURAL MONOPOLY
(1992). Sir Christopher Foster held a chair at the London School of Economics, was a Brit-
ish civil servant, and is a senior partner of Coopers and Lybrand. At the time of writing
during John Major's Administration, he was special adviser to the U.K. Secretary of State
for Transport on railway privatization. The third source is an 1886 report by the Senate
Committee on Interstate Commerce that preceded passage of the Act to Regulate Commerce
of 1887. S. REP. No. 49-46, pt. 1 (1886).




select committee was appointed to investigate the veracity of the allega-
tions. The committee became convinced that competition. was-and would
be-insufficient to protect the public, and that intermittent remedial legis-
lation (such as laws that required rate reductions if railroad profits ex-
ceeded a fixed amount) could be easily evaded. Therefore, the select
committee proposed that Britain adopt some form of railroad regulation.
29
Parliament followed that recommendation and in 1840 enacted the Rail-
way Regulation Bill that delegated to a government department, the Board
of Trade, powers that were the forerunner of modern railroad regulation.30
The board immediately created a Railway Department, which was an early
effort to establish a regulatory bureaucracy. 3' Given that its power was
limited, the board proved to be ineffectural.32
In 1844, when a parliamentary committee again reviewed railroad regu-
lation, it proposed that the government acquire the railroads, and recom-
mended a twenty-one-year transition period.33 The board's powers were
substantially reduced and the void was filled, to some extent, by the Rail-
way Department, which was now under the personal direction of the Presi-
dent of the Board of Trade.34 When the Whigs came to power in 1846,
Parliament enacted new legislation that established, for the first time, an
29. See PARRIS, supra note 27, at 8-9.
30. See id. at 28, 30.
31. See id. at 31-35 (describing the early staffing and duties of department).
32. Railroads had to submit copies of their existing and future bylaws. The Board had
the discretion to disapprove them if it wished. See id. at 30. Although the bill also required
that railroads give the Board of Trade notice before opening a new line it lacked power to
prevent operation. See id. at 30, 37. The Board entertained complaints against railroads but
lacked power to act on them. See id at 42. Perhaps the most important power was the right
to comment on private bills, PARRIS, supra note 27, at 57-60 (describing Department's par-
ticipation in legislative process), which were Parliament's principal method of regulation
until the latter part of the nineteenth century. See FOSTER, supra note 27, at 17-18, 20 (de-
scribing use of private bills as regulatory devices). Private bills are advanced by groups or
bodies that seek special powers or authority above and beyond that conferred by the general
law. See DONALD SHELL, THE HouSE OF LORDs 176 (1988). Each new railway line or ex-
tension was the subject of a separate bill in Parliament, FOSTER, supra note 27, at 17-18, 20,
and these bills, also called "parliamentary contracts," were effectively licenses, conferring
operational rights on railways, with conditions, such as a limit on dividends. Id. at 18. As
contracts involving private property, they were generally immune from subsequent legisla-
tion. See id. at 18. Overall, Parris describes the Board's powers as "neither numerous nor
extensive," PARRIS, supra note 27, at 30, and concludes that the private bill system "did
more to protect private interests than to promote the public interest." Id. at 57. Foster
agrees that, until the 1880s, Parliament resisted any attempt to appoint commissioners with
significant power and status. See FOSTER, supra note 27, at 21.
33. See S. REP. No. 49-46, pt. 1, at 55 (1886).
34. See PARRIS, supra note 27, at 89.
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independent tribunal (which was independent of the Board of Trade)
known as the Commissioners of Railways. 3 This Whig reform responded
to the criticism that the Board of Trade had lacked sufficient stature and
that its work had been performed essentially by clerks.36 Under the new
system, however, effective control of the commission rested with Parlia-
ment.37 As it turned out, the Commissioners of Railways were no more ef-
fective than the Board of Trade and, when the President left and was re-
placed by the former President of the Board of Trade, even the
independence of the Commissioners soon flagged. 38 In 1851, in an econ-
omy move, Parliament shifted responsibility for the railroads back to the
Board of Trade.39 In Parris's view, "[t]he transfer of responsibility to the
Commissioners was an experiment which failed. ' 40
In 1872, Parliament established yet another committee-a Joint Com-
mittee on Railways-to undertake a thorough study of the past forty years
of government regulation.4' As had its predecessors, the Joint Committee
concluded that competition had resulted in monopolies and required legis-
lative regulation. What it saw as the chief anti-competitive evils were dis-
criminatory prices between long-haul and short-haul traffic and unduly
high rates. But it concluded that a statutory remedy for these perceived
abuses was impracticable. Its solution was a new tribunal "to take supervi-
sion of the transportation interests of the kingdom ... with authority to en-
force the laws relating to railways and canals, to hear complaints and adjust
differences, and to advise Parliament upon questions of railway legisla-
,,42tion. In response to the committee's recommendations, Parliament
35. See id at 103.
36. See id. at 107 ("One of the criticisms had been that the policy of the Board was de-
cided by mere clerks.").
37. See id. at 103. The Commission was to have five members, but only three of them
would be paid. It was assumed that the Commission's President and the unpaid members
would be members of Parliament. Quorum requirements reflected parliamentary control-
only two members were required to constitute a quorum for the conduct of business. The
powers earlier exercised by the Board of Trade were transferred to the Commission but the
1846 legislation gave the commissioners no new powers.
38. See id. at 105-06.
39. See id at 129. The Board continued to superintend the railroads until 1873. See S.
REP. No. 49-46, pt. 1, at 58 (1886) (stating that new railway Commission was created in
1873).
40. PARRIS, supra note 27, at 112. In 1865, a royal commission recommended against
government acquisition. See S. REP. No. 49-46, pt. 1, at 56 ("[I]t is not expedient for the
Government to avail itself of its reserved right to purchase railways.").
4 1. See S. REP. No. 49-46, pt. i, at 57; see also PARRIS, supra note 27, at 22 1.
42. S. REP. No. 49-46, pt. 1, at 58.
20001 1121
ADMINISTRATIVE LA W REVIEW
transferred the board's powers to a newly created Railway Commission,
with the additional power to deal with complaints from the public.
43
The commission scheme emerged from several, essentially practical
considerations. The joint committee believed that the courts, although
lacking in expertise, had historically coped reasonably well with issues sur-
rounding the reasonableness of rates, but were simply too expensive a fo-
rum. On the other hand, the Board of Trade had the expertise but was seen
as insufficiently "judicial." Committees of Parliament were ruled out as an
effective regulatory mechanism because their membership was constantly
shifting. 4  Thus, the solution was an expert, relatively permanent body
with the adjudicatory power.45
The new railway commission's initial charter was for five years.46 But,
in 1886, Parliament introduced legislation that renamed the agency the
Railways and Canal Commission, made it permanent, required railroads to
submit certain traffic tables and tariffs, 47 and gave the Commission addi-
tional power to control rates.4 8 The bill passed in 1888. 49 It was the result
of nearly a half century of various efforts in Britain to develop a workable
regulatory framework.
43. See id. (stating that new Commission had "jurisdiction over all matters in relation
to the interchange of traffic, and to all contracts between railway companies, as well as
complaints of undue preferences and other violations of railway laws").
44. See FOSTER, supra note 27, at 46 (quoting the joint committee as saying that "a
committee of the Houses of Parliament would have no permanence").
45. See id. at 46. The new Commission was to be made up of at least three members,
including "an eminent lawyer," and another "acquainted with railway management." Id. at
46. There was little parliamentary discussion about the procedures the Commission was to
employ. The Commission's procedures were to be "as simple and inexpensive as is consis-
tent with giving due notice and hearing questions openly and fairly." Id. at 46 (internal
quotation marks omitted). When established, the Railway and Canal Commission was actu-
ally composed of a judge and two non-lawyer assessors. See id. at 48. It adopted legal pro-
cedures and rules of evidence, and its cases were presented by barristers. See id.
46. See S. REP. No. 49-46, pt. I, at 58. The Commission was continued beyond this
initial charter period. See id.
47. See PARRIS, supra note 27, at 223-24; FOSTER, supra note 27, at 47-48.
48. See FOSTER, supra note 27, at 48 (stating that new Commission "had the authority
of a high court").
49. See PARRIS, supra note 27, at 223; FOSTER, supra note 27, at 47. By and large, the
Board of Trade had attempted to regulate by encouraging railroads to lower rates in ex-
change for protection from competition. The Commission, in contrast, was essentially an
expert, adjudicatory tribunal that simply decided complaints brought before it. See FOSTER,
supra note 27, at 48.
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C. State Regulation in America
Railroad regulation in the United States emerged at about the same time
as in Britain. The intellectual impetus for government oversight, including
the form that it should take, was the brainchild of Charles Francis Adams,
Jr., the latest in a distinguished family line that included two U.S. Presi-
dents.50 Between 1866 and 1878, Adams wrote several influential articles
about the economics of railroad operation.5 He argued that the railroads, if
unsupervised, would become natural monopolies, but at the same time be-
lieved that government operation or regulation would stifle efficiency and
innovation. In his view, the state legislatures were ill-equipped to effec-
tively regulate the industry because politicians lacked the market knowl-
edge required. Legislatures also made political decisions to appease con-
stituents that stifled the market. By contrast, industry experts who
understood the economics of the industry would render efficient regula-
tion.52 His proposal was the creation of a so-called "sunshine commis-
sion," i.e., an impartial body of experts that would investigate, examine,
53and report on railroad activities but would not have enforcement power.
The Massachusetts Board of Railroad Commissioners, established in
1869, reflected Adams' influence. It had three well-paid, nonpartisan
50. Adams' father served as Minister, i.e., Ambassador, to Great Britain during the
Civil War. Raymond Seitz, appointed by President Bush as the only career diplomat ever to
serve as U.S. ambassador to Britain, considers Adams, Sr., the best U.S. ambassador to Brit-
ain in history. "Largely through his own wits, Adams stopped the British from recognizing
the Southern Confederacy. Had London done so, transatlantic history would have been pro-
foundly and permanently transformed." RAYMOND SEITZ, OVER HERE 61 (1998).
51. The most famous of which is his muckraking book entitled CHAPTERS OF ERIE AND
OTHER ESSAYS (1871), which he co-authored with Henry Adams. See also CHARLES
FRANCIS ADAMS, JR., RAILROADS: THEIR ORIGIN AND PROBLEMS (1878).
52. "The legislative branch could not do the job of intelligent regulation. 'Knowledge
cannot possibly creep into the legislature, because no one remains in the legislature long
enough to learn.' In order to close the gap between public and private interests, analytical
expertise must somehow be made a permanent part of the government." THOMAS K.
McCRAw, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 15 (1984) (quoting and summarizing argument of
Charles Francis Adams, Jr.).
53. See RICHARD J. STILLMAN, 11, CREATING THE AMERICAN STATE: THE MORAL
REFORMERS AND THE MODERN ADMINISTRATIVE WORLD THEY MADE 54-55 (1998) ("Adams
understood the importance of the application of long-term expertise to public issues ....
Nonetheless, he distrusted giving too much authority to a permanent set of government offi-
cials who could, in the long run, abuse their power by operating beyond the boundaries of
community control or accountability."). Adams carefully evaluated Britain's inability-as
of the mid-1870s-to create a commission with effective power. See FOSTER, supra note
27, at 227-28.
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members with overlapping terms.54 It had the right to investigate high rates
and publicize its findings, but had no enforcement power.55 The Illinois
Railroad and Warehouse Commission, established in 1871, was the first
commission with the power to establish reasonable maximum rates. 6
By 1886, state railroad regulation in general, and the commission form
of regulation in particular, were widespread. Of the thirty-eight states then
in existence, twenty-eight had some form of railroad regulation." Of these,
twenty-four states had adopted a commission form. 8 Only four relied on
judicial enforcement.59 Despite the prevalence of regulation at the state
level, the constitutional and geographic limitations on state agencies pre-
vented their regulatory control of large, interstate railroads. 60 A consensus
on the need for a federal approach began to emerge.
Between 1868 and 1886, more than 150 railroad regulation bills were
introduced into Congress. 61 Two competing approaches emerged. The
House, led by Representative John H. Reagan of Texas, viewed the com-
mission structure as a substitute for action rather than an effective remedy
62
and urged legislation that provided for judicial enforcement.63 In contrast,
54. See STILLMAN, supra note 53, at 57. Indeed, Adams served as one of the first three
Massachusetts commissioners. See id. at 57.
55. See 1 I.L. SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION: A STUDY IN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE 15 (1931). New Hampshire had established the first
railroad commission in 1844. See S. REP. No. 49-46, pt. 1, at 65 (1886). However, until
1884 it lacked the power to establish rates and, in this respect, was typical of other New
England commissions of the era that followed the Adams model. See id. at 116.
56. See S. REP. No. 49-46, at 71-72. The rate fixed was prima facie evidence of rea-
sonableness in court actions for overcharges, and the burden of proof was on the railroad to
demonstrate that any higher rate was reasonable. See id The Illinois model was followed
by several Midwestern states. See id. at 71; SHARFMAN, supra note 55, at 15.
57. See S. REP. No. 49-46, at 65.
58. See id. at 64.
59. See id at 65.
60. See Angel Manuel Moreno, Presidential Coordination of the Independent Regula-
tory Process, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 461, 463 n.2 (1994) ("The growth of interstate railways
transportation promptly surpassed the operational resources and constitutional powers of the
states, especially after Wabash St. Louis & Pac. Ry. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886).").
61. See BUREAU OF STATISTICS, INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, INTERSTATE
COMMERCE COMMISSION ACTIVITIES 1887-1937 29-30 (1937) [hereinafter ICC BUREAU OF
STATISTICS REPORT]; CUSHMAN, supra note 10, at 40-41.
62. See LEWIS H. HANEY, A CONGRESSIONAL HISTORY OF RAILWAYS IN THE UNITED
STATES 308 (Augustus M. Kelley Pubs 1968) (1908 & 1910).
63. See id at 292, 308 (citing prohibition of pooling of revenues and long-haul/short-
haul discrimination). Railroad companies frequently entered into pooling agreements to di-
vide the existing railway market and to prescribe rates, which stymied competition. Many
shippers and merchants, especially those competing in their local markets, complained of
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the Senate legislation, sponsored by Shelby M. Cullom, a Republican from
Illinois, provided for the establishment of an administrative oversight
commission.64  Through the early 1880s, Congress was deadlocked be-
tween these structural options.65 Ultimately, on March 17, 1885, Senator
Cullom effectively wrested congressional leadership from the House.66
The Senate established a select committee of five senators to investigate
and report on the subject of railroad regulation.67
Less than a year later, the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce,
chaired by Senator Cullom, issued a 216-page report covering virtually all
issues affecting transportation regulation. The committee examined the
long-haul/short-haul discrimination. Railroad companies often charged disproportionally
more for short conveyances than for longer hauls on the same line.
64. See Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 Stan. L.
Rev. 1189, 1207 (1986).
65. Congressman Reagan introduced a bill that passed the House in 1878, but it failed
to make it out of a Senate committee. See I THE ECONOMIC REGULATION OF BUSINESS AND
INDUSTRY: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF U.S. REGULATORY AGENCIES 18 (Bernard Schwartz
ed., 1973). Senator Cullom introduced a bill that passed the Senate in 1885 but did not pass
in the House. See id.
66. See SHELBY M. CULLOM, FIFTY YEARS OF PUBLIC SERVICE: PERSONAL
RECOLLECTIONS OF SHELBY M. CULLOM 314 (Da Capo Press 1969) (1911) (describing intro-
duction of Cullom's resolution providing for establishment of Senate committee to study
and report on railroad regulation). Shelby Moore Cullom had a lengthy, if not distin-
guished, political career. He was a Republican from the earliest days of the party's found-
ing, and was proud to observe that "at the opening of the Congressional campaign of 1858, I
followed [Abraham Lincoln] firmly and without mental reservation into the ranks of the Re-
publican party." Id. at 28. He was elected to the first of three terms in the U.S. House of
Representatives in 1865, became a member of the Illinois House of Representatives in 187 1,
was elected Speaker of the House in 1873, and, as speaker, appointed the committee that
drafted the legislation creating the Illinois Railroad and Warehouse Commission in 1871.
See 2 APPLETONS' CYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 27 (James Grant Wilson & John
Fiske eds., 1898). That commission was the first in the country to possess effective rate-
setting power. See S. REP. No. 49-46, pt. I, at 71-73 (1886) (describing and analyzing
Commission). He served as governor of Illinois before coming to the U.S. Senate in 1883.
APPLETONS' CYCLOPEDIA, supra. Following passage of the Act to Regulate Commerce in
1887, the Senate established a permanent Committee on Interstate Commerce. Senator
Cullom chaired that committee for many years. See CULLOM, supra, at 327-28. He also
chaired the Illinois delegation to the Republican national conventions in 1872, 1884, 1892
and 1908. See 4 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 589 (Allen Johnson & Dumas
Malone eds., 1930).
67. See CULLOM, supra note 66, at 314-15. As Senator Cullom tells it, one of his Sen-
ate colleagues suggested that the lack of detailed information about the railroad industry
hampered the Senate's consideration of Cullom's legislation to regulate interstate com-
merce. See id. at 314.
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British history of regulation 68 and provided a state-by-state summary of
state statutes and the work of state commissions: 9
With the release of the Committee Report on January 18, 1886, the Sen-
ate was now armed with the necessary intellectual firepower to command
the debate. ° In the same year, the Supreme Court decided the Wabash
case,7' holding that a state regulatory agency could not regulate the rates of
interstate railroads, 72 a decision that encouraged the burgeoning demand for
federal legislation.'.
By 1886, establishment of a commission form of federal regulation
seemed inevitable. First, as the Committee had found, with justification,
efforts by individual states to control railroads by statute or court enforce-
ment had been hampered by constitutional and geographic constraints.
Breyer and Stewart pointed out:
In the 1840s and 1850s[,] the states attempted to control railroads through detailed
statutory specification of rates and practices. But this proved impractical, and the
states resorted to creation of administrative commissions to investigate and make rec-
ommendations to the legislature (the model in Massachusetts and many eastern
states), or themselves regulate the railroads (the model in .many Midwestern states).
74
Congress was also familiar with the similar experience in Britain that led
to the establishment of a permanent railway commission pursuant to the
68. See S. REP. No. 49-46, pt. I, at 54-63 (1886).
69. See id. at 63-137.
70. Senator Cullom notes that the railroads declined to participate in the committee's
investigation. In his view, they did not consider that legislation would be forthcoming.
However, once it appeared that a bill was likely to pass, they registered their complaint that
the railroads had not been adequately consulted. But it was too late. See CULLOM, supra
note 66, at 319.
71. Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886).
72. See Wasbash, 118 U.S. at 577 (effectively overruling Peik v. Chicago & North-
western Ry., 94 U.S. 164 (1877), which had sanctioned state action over intrastate shipments
that incidentally affected interstate commerce until such time as Congress sought to estab-
lish uniform, interstate regulation).
73. See KOLKO, supra note 26, at 33. Professor Kolko asserts that, by the time the Wa-
bash decision was handed down in October 1886, Congress had already determined that
regulation was needed. See id. at 33.. The Senate had approved a revised version of the
Cullom bill (S. 1532) in May 1886, and although there was still debate between the House
and Senate over certain provisions, the decision to regulate was foreordained. See id. at 33.
Although Professor Cushman alludes to this as well, he surmises that the decision did have
some effect upon Congress's efforts to enact the legislation. The Wabash decision's "pre-
cise and immediate effect upon Congressional leaders remains in doubt; but it made federal
regulation clearly imperative, and the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 was passed within a
few months." CUSHMAN, supra note 10, at 38.
74. STEPHEN G. BREVER & RICHARD B. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
REGULATORY POLICY: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 17 n. 16 (3d ed. 1992).
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Regulation of Railways Act of 1873. 7' Although there was some concern
in Congress over conferring direct authority on the President to regulate
what was, at the time, the most significant aspect of the American econ-
omy, 76 bipartisan control of the commission was the main concern of the
members of Congress. 77 A minority of members in the House also seemed
prepared to accept the commission approach because they envisioned any
new legislation as experimental. 7
The railroads' support for, or at least acquiescence in, national regulation
by a commission as a matter of self-protection eliminated any remaining
obstacle.79 Even Senator Cullom, long the advocate of the commission ap-
proach, acknowledged: "Every one knows that the railroad companies
75. See 17 CONG. REc. 7292 (1886) (statement of Rep. Caldwell) (discussing British
commission). There were clearly some members of Congress who believed that Britain's
efforts at railroad regulation had been ineffectual. See id. ("England has passed many hun-
dred statutes in the abortive attempt to regulate these matters, and the greatest failure of all
the thirty-three hundred has been her commission."). Cushman argues, however, that the
British Railway Commission of 1873 influenced the movement toward creation of the ICC
but had "a much better American reputation than it deserved." CUSHMAN, supra note 10, at
512.
76. See RICHARD D. STONE, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION AND THE
RAILROAD INDUSTRY: A HISTORY OF REGULATORY POLICY 23 n.25 (1991) (noting Congress'
fear of allowing the President to directly influence railroad regulation).
77. The limitation that not more than three members of the Commission could be from
the same political party evidenced their concern. Cushman states that "[i]mpartiality, or at
least neutrality, was looked upon as more important than expertness." CUSHMAN, supra
note 10, at 63.
78. See, e.g., 19 CONG. REC. 8576 (1888) (statement of Rep. Crisp) (stating that some
members considered the law establishing the ICC to be "largely experimental"). However,
the minority of the House committee that was prepared to accept a Commission form of
regulation preferred a regulatory entity within an existing cabinet department. See 17 CONG.
REC. 7285 (1886) (statement of Rep. O'Neill) (quoting from the minority report).
79. Kolko claims that the railroads desired regulation to stop the rate wars that had
drastically driven rates down over the years and to regulate those companies who refused to
enter into, or abide by, pooling agreements. See KOLKO, supra note 26, at 30-31. Senator
Van Wyck of Nebraska argued that corporations sought national commissions as a lawful
method of self-protection. See 17 CONG. REC. 3825 (1886) (statement of Sen. Van Wyck)
("[C]orporations are becoming earnest advocates for a national commission, expecting it to
prevent them from being too severely squeezed in the tender embraces of each other . . ").
Congressman Reagan had a similar view. "The Senate bill is ... preferred by the railroad
corporations," he claimed, "because under it they see greater chances for trickery and eva-
sion; with whatever chances there may be for their controlling ... the commission .... ." 17
CONG. REC. 7283 (1886) (statement of Rep. Reagan). "Indeed, the railroads, not the farmers
and shippers, were the most important single advocates of federal regulation from 1877 to
1916. Even when they frequently disagreed with the details of specific legislation, they al-
ways supported the principle of federal regulation as such." KOLKO, supra note 26, at 3.
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themselves have finally become reconciled to some national legislation,
because they have not been able to protect themselves, one from another
.... ,80 Ultimately, the final product was a typical legislative compromise
containing provisions from both the Cullom and Reagan bills.8
D. Place in the Executive Branch
Review of the original structure of the ICC helps to debunk the myth
that there was a tie between the commission form and independence Sec-
tions 18 and 21 of the original ICC Act placed the agency within the con-
trol of the Secretary of the Interior. 82 ICC staff hires, salaries, and expen-
ditures were subject to the Secretary's approval; the Secretary was also
responsible for furnishing the Commission with suitable offices and neces-
sary office supplies.8 3 The Commission's annual report had to be submit-
ted to the Secretary who was, in turn, required to transmit it to Congress. 4
80. 18 CONG. REc. 171 (1886) (statement of Sen. Cullom).
81. See KOLKO, supra note 26, at 44. Congress opted for a multi-member commission
within the Department of the Interior. Professor Kolko observes that the Senate had long
been an obstacle to railroad regulation and that, during the House-Senate conference, Con-
gressman Reagan was successful in retaining the central element of the House bill, namely
the anti-pooling provision (the Senate bill had no comparable provision). See id. at 43.
However, in doing so, he was forced to concede substantially to Senator Cullom's views on
other matters. See id at 43; see also CULLOM, supra note 66, at 321-22 (noting that Reagan
yielded on nearly everything but the anti-pooling provision). Senator Cullom notes that
"[tihere was a great fight in the Senate to secure the adoption of the conference report."
CULLOM, supra note 66, at 322.
82. See Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, §§ 18, 21, 24 Stat. 379, 386-87. The nineteenth
century Interior Department has been called "the Department of the Great Miscellany."
LEONARD D. WHITE, THE REPUBLICAN ERA: 1869-1901, 175 (1958).
83. See Act of Feb. 4, 1887, § 18. The office space provision was not unusual. The
Act of June 22, 1870, establishing the Department of Justice, required the superintendent of
the Treasury building to provide office space for the new department. See Act of June 22,
1870, ch. 150, § 13, 16 Stat. 162, 164. That arrangement lasted until the present Justice De-
partment building was constructed. See Susan Low Bloch, The Early Role of the Attorney
General in Our Constitutional Scheme: In the Beginning There Was Pragmatism, 1989
DUKE L.J. 561, 620 n.188. Even today, such arrangements are used. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §
7412(r)(6)(P) (1994) (requiring EPA Administrator to "provide... such support and facili-
ties as may be necessary for operation of the [Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation]
Board."). The original ICC initially, and briefly, had two rooms in a building also occupied
by the Geological Survey, but the Commission was soon given more substantial quarters in
what was then the tallest privately owned building in Washington and one of the first to
have an elevator. The Commission moved again in 1917 as its need for space increased, and
moved again in 1934 into the building it occupied until the agency's demise. See FRANK N.
WILNER, COMES Now THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE PRACTITIONER 58-59 (1993).
84. See Act of Feb. 4, 1887, § 21.
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There appears to have been little concern expressed over this arrangement
by the members of Congress, and "whatever independence the new com-
mission was supposed to have was not incompatible with the location of
the commission in the Department of the Interior. ' 5
Two years later, the Secretary's authority over the commission was
eliminated by statute and the commission became functionally independent
of the executive branch.86 That decision was not without controversy. Al-
though supported by both the commission and the Secretary of the Inte-
rior, several members of the House and Senate opposed the change.8
The statute was enacted two days before the inauguration of President
Benjamin Harrison, a Republican, and it has been argued that it was passed
by a Democratic Congress, in part, to free the commission from presiden-
tial influence.89 However, the initiative to separate the ICC from the Inte-
rior Department was prompted by both the commission, where Republican
85. CUSHMAN, supra note 10, at 62. Cushman observes that placement of the ICC in
the Interior Department was essentially for housekeeping purposes, "a sort of carry-over
from earlier proposals and a reflection of the idea that the new agency ought not to be left in
a vacuum." Id.
86. Section 7 of the 1889 Act eliminated the requirement that the Secretary approve
salaries and expenses, and Section 8 authorized the Commission to submit reports directly to
Congress. See Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 382, §§ 7-8, 25 Stat. 855, 861-62.
87. See 19 CONG. REc. 6001 (1888) (statement of Sen. Cullom) (noting that both
Commission and Secretary supported removal of ICC from Interior Department); see also
H.R. EXEC. Doc. No. 50-1, pt. 5, at 57 (1887) (Report of Secretary of Interior) (requesting
removal of the ICC).
88. See, e.g., 19 CONG. REc. 6001 (1888) (statement of Sen. Teller). Senator Teller
voiced concern that removing the Commission from the Department of the Interior would
bestow some independence upon it:
I do not think the objection that supervision is an annoyance to the Secretary of the
Interior or anything of that kind is sufficient. I do not think a body of this kind
should make its report to Congress. I think the report should be made to some De-
partment of the Government, and by it be transmitted to Congress.
Id.
89. Brownlow states that "Mr. Reagan of Texas, the author of the interstate commerce
bill, said that since a railroad lawyer named Ben Harrison had been elected President, he did
not trust the President any more with this matter, so he invented the idea of an independent
commission." Establishment of a Commission on Ethics in Government: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. to Study Senate Concurrent Resolution 21 of the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Pub. Welfare, 82d Cong. 213 (1951) (statement of Louis Brownlow); MARVER H.
BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 23 (Greenwood Press
1977) (1955) (quoting Brownlow); see also Paul R. Verkuil, The Purposes and Limits of
Independent Agencies, 1988 DUKE L.J. 257, 259 & n.7 (describing argument that Congress
created independent agencies to expand its own influence while diminishing presidential
influence) (citing I SENATE COMM. ON Gov'T AFFAIRS, STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION:
REGULATORY ORGANIZATION, S. Doc. No. 95-91, at 31 (1977)).
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Thomas Cooley was chairman and its most influential member, and the
Secretary of the Interior. Moreover, it was supported by Senator Cullom, a
Republican, and a chief architect of both the original statute and the 1889
changes. He argued that the Interior Secretary's oversight was "purely
formal," and subjected both the commission and the Secretary to unneces-
sary administrative burdens without any countervailing benefits. 90 Al-
though the change may have accorded with railroad objectives, it is un-
likely to have been prompted by partisan considerations. Such a significant
structural change could not have taken place without Senator Cullom's
consent or at least acquiescence. Regardless, the intent was not to make the
commission independent and thereby vest it with authority to wield power
outside the domain of the executive branch.91
In 1906, influenced by the Progressive movement, Congress passed the
Hepburn Act, which empowered the ICC with rate-making authority,
making it a very powerful agency. Until this time, the agency, with little
discretionary power, had been rather weak and ineffectual, but the Progres-
sives saw the value in an entity removed from politics and promoted the in-
dependent form.
The Progressive movement emerged at the turn of the century. In re-
sponse to the growing number of corporate trusts and conglomerations, and
increasing distrust in government, 92 legislation was enacted to "eliminate or
90. 19 CONG. REC. 5150 (1888) (statement of Sen. Cullom).
91. It is worth noting that like Sherlock Holmes' "curious incident of the dog in the
night-time" none of the recent histories of the ICC that we have reviewed discuss this
structural change-one that to our modem understanding would be very significant indeed.
A. CONAN DOYLE, THE MEMOIRS OF SHERLOCK HOLMES 34 (1902) ("'The dog did nothing
in the night-time.' 'That was the curious incident,' remarked Sherlock Holmes"). See, as
but one example, Au & OLIVE HOOGENBOOM, A HISTORY OF THE ICC: FROM PANACEA TO
PALLIATIVE 17-31 (1976). Among those who point it out, when discussing independent
agencies in general, are Paul R. Verkuil, The Status of Independent Agencies After Bowsher
v. Synar, 1986 DUKE L.J. 779, 780 n.7, and Strauss, supra note 5, at 609 n.140. Professor
Strauss notes that the ICC's evolution reflects "efforts to improve its practical workability
after the lessons of experience, not the result of a new theory about the proper ordering of
executive (or administrative) government; that came later." Strauss, supra note 5, at 609
n. 140 (citations omitted).
92. Some commentators believe that this distrust in government encompassed the judi-
cial system as well. See MORTON J. HORWITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW
1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 225 (1992) ("As the Progressive disenchant-
ment with the competence of courts to perform social engineering tasks combined with a
loss of faith in the sensitivity of judges to questions of social justice, the effort to replace
courts with administrative experts became more pronounced."). Others suggest that the re-
form movement's focus on expertise reflected the conquest and assertion of social status by
collectively self-defined experts. See MAGALI SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF
PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 138-47 (1977). In her view, the ideology of
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prevent those forms of industrial organization and corporate behavior,
which threatened to undermine market mechanisms .... The new regula-
tory regime was, in essence, market-corrective. 93 The Progressives saw
the independent regulatory commission as an important conduit through
which market correction was administered. It was essential that the inde-
pendent regulatory commissions be staffed by expert administrators with
technical competence in the various areas of regulation. "It was envisioned
as an institution capable of compensating for the shortcomings of the 'po-
litical' institutions of American government." 94 As one commentator has
noted about the Progressive movement, "they honestly believed in the al-
most unlimited potential of science and administration." 95  Reliance on
these experts coupled with independence from the political melee was
thought to safeguard the commissions from partisan politics, which would
enable the experts to make logical decisions based on empirical data.
96
the new managerial class required neutrality, expertise and independence in government of-
ficials. See also Magali Sarfatti Larson, The Production of Expertise and the Constitution of
Expert Power, in THE AUTHORITY OF EXPERTS: STUDIES IN HISTORY AND THEORY 28 (Tho-
mas L. Haskell ed., 1984).
93. EISNER, supra note 9, at 27-28; see also WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE ROOTS OF
AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY, 1830-1900 82 (1982) ("Reformers in the last third of the nine-
teenth century turned to science to accomplish their reconstructive task.").
94. EISNER, supra note 9, at 44. The use of expertise as a neutral contrast to the 'politi-
cal' was most advanced in municipal politics, as with the Bureau of Municipal Research in
New York. See KENNETH FINEGOLD, EXPERTS AND POLITICIANS: REFORM CHALLENGES TO
MACHINE POLITICS IN NEW YORK, CLEVELAND, AND CHICAGO 22-24 (1995).
95. RICHARD L. MCCORMICK, THE PARTY PERIOD AND PUBLIC POLICY: AMERICAN
POLITICS FROM THE AGE OF JACKSON TO THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 287 (1986). See also STEVEN
1. DINER, A VERY DIFFERENT AGE: AMERICANS OF THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 201 (1998) ("The
activist government envisioned by reformers relied upon scientific experts to staff new, im-
partial administrative agencies.").
96. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 89, at 36 ("The Progressives had an abiding faith in
regulation, expertness, and the capacity of American government to make rational decisions
provided experts in the administrative agencies could remain free from partisan political
considerations."). They believed that one can find "harmony through technological order."
DAVID W. NOBLE, THE PROGRESSIVE MIND 1890-1917 37 (rev. ed. 1981). Cf RICHARD
ABRAMS, THE ISSUE OF FEDERAL REGULATION IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 50 (Richard Abrams
ed., 1963) (asserting that concern for resource conservation "grew out of the political impli-
cations of applied science"). Conservation was considered an issue better left for experts to
address rather than politicians. Id.
Since resource matters were basically technical in nature, conservationists argued,
technicians, rather than legislators, should deal with them.... Pressure group action,
logrolling in Congress, or partisan debate could not guarantee rational and scientific
decisions.... Conservationists envisaged.., a political system guided by the ideal of




This belief in apolitical expertise provided the justification for independ-
ence and was embodied in the establishment of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion (FTC). Discussions concerning the need for an antitrust commission
abounded. Prior to the creation of the FTC, the Senate Committee on Inter-
state Commerce clearly outlined the duties it believed an antitrust commis-
sion would need to perform. 97 These duties were adopted and actually ex-
panded by the Federal Trade Commission Act. Proponents believed that
the commission should be quasi-judicial in character, and focused on this
concept as the basis for creating the new independent agency.98 It was also
believed that the FTC needed to be independent in order to correct "the
partisan and pressure-controlled administration of the antitrust laws by the
Department of Justice." 99 Senator Newlands, a strong supporter of the in-
dependent agency concept, stated that "we want a body of administrative
law built up. This can not [sic] be well done by the single occupant of an
office .... Such work must be done by a board or commission of dignity,
permanence, and ability, independent of executive authority .... too
Finally, the FTC was created in 1914.101 It was assigned the task of de-
termining and preventing "unfair methods of competition,"',0 2 and had the
authority to issue "cease and desist" orders'0 3 against offenders-duties that
afforded the new agency far more power than the 1887 ICC. The FTC was
modeled after the ICC primarily for "its independent power and author-
ity. ' 1°4  Many believed that the only way to achieve effective business
regulation was to establish a trade commission completely removed from
97. See CUSHMAN, supra note 10, at 183 ("The duties that such a commission would
perform were outlined by the committee: first, extensive activities in the field of investiga-
tion; second, the administration of some system of licensing corporations engaged in inter-
state commerce; and third, the rendering of expert aid to the courts and to the Department of
Justice in the dissolution of trusts and other unlawful combinations.").
98. See id. at 190-91 (discussing view of supporters that independence from the execu-
tive was necessary because of quasi-judicial nature of new Commission's work).
99. Id. at 189. Some senators and congressmen did stress independence from the ex-
ecutive branch. Senator Newlands expressed the importance of a committee "independent
of executive authority except in its selection, and independent in character." Id. at 190 (cit-
ing 51 CONG. REc. 11,092 (1914) (statement of Sen. Newlands)).
100. 51 CONG. REc. 11,092 (1914) (statement of Sen. Newlands).
101. See Act of Sept. 26, 1914, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717.
102. Id. § 5. The phrase "unfair methods of competition" proved to be very ambiguous
and the Commission's authority to define it was challenged repeatedly in the courts. The
enabling statute allowed the courts to fetter the Commission for several years. For a de-
scription of how the Commission was hobbled, see THOMAS C. BLAISDELL, JR., THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: AN EXPERIMENT IN THE CONTROL OF BUSINESS 17-104 (1932).
103. Act of Sept. 26, 1914, § 5.
104. CUSHMAN, supra note 10, at 189.
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the political fray.105 Another important consideration for the Commission's
independence was the need to "secure a body of experts" capable of re-
solving problems of a highly complicated and technical nature.10 6 Congres-
sional supporters of the act believed that the FTC, with its independent
qualities of expertise and nonpartisanship, would instill confidence in the
public.'1 7
As noted above, a cornerstone of Progressive ideology was scientific
analysis, and during this era, a new type of administrative expert
emerged-the scientific management expert.'0 8 One cognate corollary of
this thrust was the increased focus on credentials. 10 9 Progressives heralded
the skills of efficiency experts who could find ways to maximize utility and
reduce the waste and inconsistency that plagued the government and ad-
ministrative state through the application of scientific evaluation and analy-
sis." I0 These new experts required independence from political and corpo-
rate pressure to efficiently regulate industry."' Influential scholars and
105. Senator Morgan stressed this point repeatedly, stating that "[w]hatever we do in
regulating business should be removed as far as possible from political influence." Id. at
190 (quoting 51 CONG. REc. 8857 (1914) (statement of Sen. Morgan)).
106. Id. at 191.
107. Id. at 192 ("This confidence, particularly upon the part of the business world, was
felt to be of vital importance. Sound policy with respect to business regulation could hardly
emerge in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust.").
108. The scientific expert was seen as one removed from partisan politics. While ends
were to be decided by the political branches, means were better chosen by impartial admin-
istrative experts. Commentators of the time described the scientific-expert as the man who
"knows how and why." See SAMUEL HABER, EFFICIENCY AND UPLIFT: SCIENTIFIC
MANAGEMENT IN THE PROGESSIVE ERA 1890-1920 105 (1964) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted) (emphasis omitted). Haber claims that the "scientific expert became the
prototype of all administrators." Id. at 104. The notion that expertness is essential for ef-
fective regulation has endured. New Deal theorist James Landis asserted that "[w]ith the
rise of regulation, the need for expertness became dominant." JAMES M. LANDIS, THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 23 (1938). He articulated the advantages to be gained by reliance
on a specialized group with the skill, experience, and time to dedicate to the resolution of
regulatory issues. See id. at 23-26.
109. See BURTON J. BLEDSTEIN, THE CULTURE OF PROFESSIONALISM: THE MIDDLE CLASS
AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN AMERICA 38, 126-28 (1976) (discussing
expanded use of titles such as "doctor" or "engineer," and increased emphasis on higher
education).
110. See HABER, supra note 108, at 107-08 (describing Frederick W. Taylor's proposal
in the early 1900s to place efficiency experts in high government posts to direct the intro-
duction of efficiency measures throughout government departments - a concept actually
adopted at one point for the Navy yards and Army arsenals).
I ll. This notion was pioneered by such men as Professor Frank J. Goodnow who wrote
several influential articles around the turn of the century espousing the importance of sepa-
rating politics from administration. "Many of the progressive reformers who seized upon
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politicians such as Louis D. Brandeis' 12 and Woodrow Wilson' 13 advanced
the cause of scientific management.
With the creation of the FTC, it was clear that the ICC would serve as
the template for a multitude of new independent regulatory commissions in
the early twentieth century. As Professor Cushman has pointed out, "[a]
controlling force moving legislative leaders to create the independent Fed-
eral Trade Commission was the model of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission.",1 4 As the number of commissions grew, the indicia of independ-
ence were defined by replication."'
Goodnow's formula did so with the intent of creating an honored and important profession
of administrators having special skills and a special ethic." Id. at 103.
112. See McCRAw, supra note 52, at 92 (noting Brandeis' support for "scientific man-
agement" techniques to improve efficiency). Brandeis used scientific management as a tool
with which to club monopolies. In 1910, he represented shippers' interests before the ICC
in the Advance Rate Case. The railroads sought an across-the-board rate increase for freight
hauls which was vehemently opposed by the shipping industry. Brandeis successfully ar-
gued that the solution for the railroad companies was efficiency rather than a rate increase.
The rate increase was denied. As one commentator concluded, "[t]he Brandeis view of sci-
entific management allowed a politically insecure and institutionally limited ICC to take
refuge in a strong disciplinary posture in administrative regulation." STEPHEN SKOWRONEK,
BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE
CAPACITIES, 1877-1920 269-70 (1982).
113. See Woodrow Wilson, Democracy and Efficiency, 87 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 289,
299 (1901) (expressing support for "a trained and thoroughly organized administrative
service instead of administration by men privately nominated and blindly elected"). As an
academic, Wilson had written approvingly of the independent expert agency. See Woodrow
Wilson, The Study of Administration, POL. SCI. Q., Dec. 1941, at 481, 500-01 (explaining
relationship between public opinion and administration, and expressing the ideal of "a civil
service cultured and self-sufficient enough to act with sense and vigor," but one "intimately
connected with the popular thought"); see also Marshall J. Breger, Thoughts on Account-
ability and the Administrative Process, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 399, 399-402 (1987) (discussing
Wilson's views on separation of politics from administration).
114. CUSHMAN, supra note 10, at 188.
115. The ICC remained a free-standing agency from 1889 until its abolition on Decem-
ber 31, 1995. See Stroke of Clinton's Pen Fells ICC, Oldest Regulatory Agency, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 31, 1995, at A13; David S. Broder, Rebels Without a Pause, WASH. POST MAG.,
Dec. 31, 1995, at 13. Coming full circle, Congress returned the ICC's successor agency-
the Surface Transportation Board-to a cabinet department, this time the Department of
Transportation. The new Board describes itself as a "bipartisan, decisionally independent,
adjudicatory body, organizationally housed within the Department of Transportation."
SURFACE TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 1996/1997 ANNUAL REPORT I (1998).
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1I. THE MODERN INDEPENDENT AGENCY
A. Which Agencies are Independent
Section II of the Act to Regulate Commerce of 18871 16 set out the basic
organizational model for the modem multi-member independent agency.'
17
It provided:
An uneven number of commissioners (5) appointed to staggered terms of a fixed pe-
riod extending beyond the term of the President (6 years); Commissioners can only
be removed by the President for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in of-
fice;" No more than a bare majority can come from the same political party; Indi-
viduals appointed to fill a vacancy can only fill the unexpired term, but there is no
prohibition on reappointment; No professional qualifications for office set out in the
statute; Federal service is full time and agency members cannot hold any financial
interest in a member of the regulated sector; Combination of rule-making, enforce-
ment and adjudication functions." 8
Section 17 provided that a majority of the Commission would constitute
a quorum for the conduct of agency business and Section 11 provided that
no vacancy in the commission would impair the right of the remaining
members to conduct the agency's business.' 19
There is no general, all-purpose statutory or judicial definition of "inde-
pendent agency." Professor Bernard Schwartz notes that "[t]he key to inde-
pendence is security of tenure."'120 While this may be the baseline defini-
tion, notions of what constitutes independence expand easily. Thus, it is
not surprising that Professors Kenneth Culp Davis and Richard Pierce de-
fine independent agencies as those that are "insulated from presidential
control in one or more ways."'' 2 1  And this notion of "tenure-plus" leads
116. Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, § 11, 24 Stat. 379, 383.
117. The ICC served as the prototype for agencies such as the Federal Reserve Board
(created in 1913), the FTC (created in 1914), the United States Shipping Board (created in
1916), the Federal Radio Commission (created in 1927), and the Federal Power Commission
(created in 1930). See Morton Rosenberg, Congress's Prerogative Over Agencies and
Agency Decisionmakers: The Rise and Demise of the Reagan Administration's Theorv of the
Unitary Executive, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 627, 657 (1989); see also MCCRAw. supra note
52, at 62 ("Most of the later federal commissions were patterned on the Interstate Com-
merce Commission, in appointment and tenure of members and in relationships with the
existing branches of government-legislative, executive, and judicial. In fact, one measure
of the success that the ICC was perceived as having in its first fifty years was its imitation in
the creation of later agencies.").
118. ActofFeb. 4, 1887§§ 11-13, 15,20.
119. See id.§§ 11, 17.
120. BERNARD SCHWARTZ. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 1. 10, at 20 (3d ed. 1991).
121. DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 19, § 2.5, at 46.
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some to more extreme notions that independence means bi-partisanship,1
22
non-partisanship,' 23 rule by experts, 124 or freedom from executive influ-
ence.125 Most extreme is the notion that independent agencies should be
completely free or independent of both the legislative and executive
branches. 126 William Gould, former chairman of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board (NLRB) under President Clinton, in a dispute with Congress
over striker replacement legislation, wrote: "I am sure you agree that it is
vital that independent administrative agencies remain free of interference
from both the legislative and executive branches of government. 127 As can
122. See id. § 2.5, at 46 (noting that most independent agencies have "statutory limits on
the number of members that can be of the same political party.").
123. Thus, Senator Francis Newlands of Nevada, on early sponsor of the Federal Trade
Commission, in congressional debate, stated "We have found in the Interstate Commerce
Commission a non-partisan organization . ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT
REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 189 (1941).
124. See LANDIS, supra note 108, at 23-24 (arguing need for experts corresponds with
the increase in regulation because "the art of regulating an industry requires knowledge of
the details of its operation, [and the] ability to shift requirements as the condition of the in-
dustry may dictate"); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civil Republican Justification for the Administra-
tive State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1516, 1518 (1992) ("[Tlhe New Deal contemplated that Con-
gress should identify an area in need of regulatory control and turn the expert agency loose
to regulate."); see also id at 519.
125. See SHARFMAN, supra note 13, at 454 and accompanying text. "We may ask what
lawmakers meant concretely when they talked about an independent commmission? In the
first place, it seems clear that Congress intended the new commission to be free from the
pressure and control of the president." ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT
REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 193 (1941).
126. Strangely, notions of independence often go together with notions of congressional
control. For example, Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn once said to President Kennedy's
FCC chairman Newton Minow: "Your agency is an arm of the Congress [and] you belong
to us." Neal Devins, Congress, the FCC, and the Search for the Public Trustee, 56 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 145, 148-49 (1993) (quoting Speaker Rayburn) (citation omitted). And
Senator Robert Packwood said to Reagan FCC chairman Mark Fowler that "[y]ou are a
creature of Congress and you attempt to administer ... [the] laws in accordance with what
you think Congress has intended." Id. (quoting Sen. Packwood) (citation omitted) (alterna-
tions in original).
127. Joan Flynn, "Expertness for What?": The Gould Years at the NLRB and the Irre-
pressible Myth of the "Independent" Agency, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 465, 512 n. 193 (2000)
(quoting Letter by NLRB Chairman Gould to Republican Members of House Economic and
Educational Opportunities Committee April 19, 1995, 1995 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 76,
at E-1, E-2 (Apr. 20, 1995) (emphasis omitted)). But see JAMES A. GROSS, THE RESHAPING
OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD: NATIONAL LABOR POLICY IN TRANSITION 1937-
1947 261 (1981) ("[The board] is in many ways ... a creature of Congress and the execu-
tive."). For an example of a Clinton independent agency chair who understood fully that the
FCC was a political entity, see REED E. HUNDT, YOU SAY YOU WANT A REVOLUTION: A
STORY OF INFORMATION AGE POLITICS 19 (2000) ("Another revelation on day one was the
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be readily seen, notions of independence have varied considerably and in-
deed have often transmigrated substantially from the core concept devel-
oped from the history of the ICC.
In 1980, Congress set out a statutory listing of "independent" agencies
for the purposes of the Paperwork Reduction Act, but declined to provide a
definition. Rather, the act listed sixteen agencies as "independent," all of
them of the multi-member variety.
The list included: Commodity Futures Trading Commission, FTC, Con-
sumer Product Safety Commission, ICC, Federal Communications Com-
mission, National Labor Relations Board, Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Federal Mine Safety and Health
Review Commission, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Review Commission, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, Federal Housing Finance Board, Postal Rate
Commission, Federal Maritime Commission, and Securities and Exchange
Commission. The Act also included, generically, "any other similar agency




The organization of modern multi-member agencies follows the pattern
established in the 1887 ICC statute, and the commission form has become
synonymous with independence. Agencies usually have an odd number of
members, with no more than a bare majority from the same political party.
Members serve fixed, staggered terms (often, but not always, for an odd
number of years) that typically extend beyond the four-year presidential
term. This organizational structure is intended to dilute the effect of tran-
sitory political events on agency policy, which underscores the agencies'
independent role.
omnipresence of congressional influence on the commission's work."). See also id. at 13
("As a matter of law, the White House could not tell the FCC chairman or the commission-
ers how to vote. But naturally 1, and any agency head, preferred the White House to ap-
prove of my agenda. Few are successful in any endeavor without learning the value of part-
nership. Moreover, the power of the White House to drive or block any agenda was,
especially in the midst of the Gingrich Revolution, my primary source of support.").
128. 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5) (Supp. IV 1998). The Carter administration had earlier at-
tempted a listing of independent agencies as part of its executive order dealing with the
regulatory analysis of proposed rules. Apart from the agencies enumerated in the Paper-
work Reduction Act of 1980, the Carter list also included the Federal Election Commission.
See Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 152 (1978); see also Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3
C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601, at 557 (1994) (adopting the Paperwork Re-
duction Act definition).
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A requirement that members serve a fixed term of years is an essential
element of independence, but alone is not sufficient. 129 The critical element
of independence is .the protection-conferred explicitly by statute or rea-
sonably implied-against removal except "for cause." The protection
against summary removal originally received constitutional approval in the
leading case of Humphrey's Executor v. United States130 and, indeed, this
protection continues to be the critical criterion by which scholars typically
distinguish between "independent" and executive branch agencies. 13 1
Finally, independent, multi-member agencies, in common in this respect
with agencies in the executive branch, typically possess a combination of
rulemaking, enforcement and adjudication powers and functions.'
32
129. See, e.g., Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324, 343 (1897) (concluding that U.S.
Attorney is removable by President through appointment of new U.S. Attorney despite the
existence of four-year term of office); Chabal v. Reagan, 841 F.2d 1216, 1219, 1222-23 (3d
Cir. 1988) (concluding that U.S. Marshal is removable by President even though marshal is
appointed to four-year term). The court in Chabal rested its decision in part on the mar-
shal's status as a "purely executive" officer, Chabal, 841 F.2d at 1218-19, a ground under-
mined by the Supreme Court's 1988 decision in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689
(1988). However, it found, alternatively, that the statute does not manifest a congressional
intent to confer "for cause" removal protection, a consideration that remains relevant. See
Chabal, 841 F.2d at 1222-23 (contrasting statute with that at issue in Humphrey's Executor).
130. 295 U.S. 602 (1935). See generally William E. Leuchtenburg, The Case of the
Contentious Commissioner: Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States., in FREEDOM AND REFORM:
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HENRY STEELE COMMAGER 276, 278-312 (Harold M. Hyman & Leon-
ard W. Levy eds., 1967) (providing history of and analysis of Humphrey's Executor).
13 1. See, e.g., DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 19, § 2.5, at 46 ("The characteristic that most
sharply distinguishes independent agencies is the existence of a statutory limit on the Presi-
dent's power to remove the head (or members) of an agency."); PETER L. STRAUSS, AN
INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 15 (1989) ("Because [in-
dependent commission] members are appointed for fixed terms from which they cannot be
dismissed without formal cause, they are more remote from presidential influence and con-
trol than the more usual 'executive' agency.").
132. See generally STRAUSS, supra note 131, at 14-18 (discussing rulemaking, enforce-
ment, and adjudicatory authorities of independent agencies). From time to time when regu-
latory powers are conferred on cabinet departments, Congress decides to place the adjudica-
tion of cases in the hands of a separate, multi-member Board in what has come to be known
as the split-enforcement model. For example, employers opposed the traditional arrange-
ment when Congress created the Occupational Safety and Health Administration as part of
the Department of Labor. So, Congress placed adjudication responsibilities in the hands of
the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission. See George Robert Johnson, Jr.,
The Split-Enforcement Model: Some Conclusions from the OSHA and MSHA Experiences,




Members of independent, multi-member agencies are generally ap-
pointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate,133 but
not always. For example, the chairman of the National Indian Gaming
Commission is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of
the Senate, but the other two members are appointed by the Secretary of the
Interior.'3' All members serve three-year terms and can only be removed
from office for good cause.135  At the Board of Veterans' Appeals, the
chairman is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate to a six-year term, but other board members are appointed by the
Secretary of Veterans' Affairs, with the approval of the President, based on
a recommendation by the board chairman.'
36
Appointments to regulatory boards and commissions reflect a variety of
considerations. Typically, agency statutes require political balance, i.e., no
more than a bare majority of members of multi-member agencies may
come from the same political party, but there are exceptions. The statutes
governing the National Labor Relations Board, the Occupational Safety
and Health Review Commission, and the Federal Mine Safety and Health
Review Commission, among others, contain no requirements pertaining to
political balance.13 ' Geography can also play a role. For example, no more
than one member of the Federal Reserve Board may be appointed from any
one Federal Reserve District.'
38
The original Act to Regulate Commerce did not require professional or
other specific qualifications for agency membership. Most contemporary
statutes follow that model. Some, however, do require certain qualifica-
tions.139 Apparent congressional inattention to detail creates some anoma-
133. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 241 (1994) (Federal Reserve Board); 47 U.S.C. § 154(a)
(1994) (Federal Communications Commission).
134. See 25 U.S.C. § 2704(b)(1) (1994). Those appointed by the Secretary of the Inte-
rior are known as "associate members." Id. § 2704(b)(1)(B).
135. See id. §§ 2704(b)(4)(A), 2704(b)(6).
136. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 7101(b)(1), 7101A(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). There is no con-
stitutional prohibition on presidential appointees serving on decisional bodies with members
whom they can appoint and remove. See Silver v. United States Postal Serv., 951 F.2d
1033, 1040-41 (9th Cir. 1991).
137. See 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1994) (NLRB); 29 U.S.C. § 661(a) (1994) (OSHRC); 30
U.S.C. § 823(a) (1994) (FMSHRC). By tradition, two of the five seats on the NLRB have
been reserved for individuals who are not members of the President's party. See infra Ap-
pendix.
138. See 12 U.S.C. § 241 (1994).
139. The statute establishing the Surface Transportation Board as the successor to the
ICC requires that two of the three members have a professional background in transporta-
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lies. The members of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board must be
experts in nuclear safety 40 but members of the Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission need not.1 41 Some statutes contain precatory language without
genuinely circumscribing the President's choices in any significant way.
For example, members of the Postal Rate Commission "shall be chosen on
the basis of their professional qualifications."'' 42 Members of the Federal
Reserve Board must be selected with "due regard to a fair representation of
the financial, agricultural, industrial, and commercial interests, and geo-
graphical divisions of the country.' 43
Some multi-member agencies have a tradition of members being se-
lected from the ranks of the agency staff. According to a major study of
regulatory agencies by the Senate Government Operations Committee in
1977, four of the nineteen appointments to the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) between 1961 and 1977 were career staff employees.
14
Not surprisingly, many regulatory commission appointments are made
from among individuals closely associated with the regulated industry. In-
deed, leading representatives of the regulated sector are often consulted on
agency appointments.145 Moreover, many agency appointees have the sup-
port of a key member of Congress. The Senate Government Operations
Committee found that no less than a third of the appointments to the FTC
and the FCC during the period studied were almost entirely the result of
congressional sponsorship, 46 which is evidence that partisan considerations
can override issues of expertise, experience, or even regulatory philoso-
phy.
147
tion. Moreover, at least one member must have professional or business experience in the
private sector. See 49 U.S.C. § 701(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1998). At least two of the three mem-
bers of the National Indian Gaming Commission must be enrolled in an Indian tribe. See 25
U.S.C. § 2704(b)(3).
140. See 42 U.S.C. § 2286(b)(1) (1994).
141. See 42 U.S.C. § 5841(a)-(b) (1994).
142. 39 U.S.C. § 3601(a) (1994).
143. 12 U.S.C. §241.
144. See SENATE COMM. ON Gov'T OPERATIONS, STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, S.
Doc. No. 95-25, at 129 (1977).
145. See id. at 127.
146. See id. at 154. The committee also found that in a much larger number of cases,
support from Congress was one of several major factors involved in the appointment deci-
sion. See id.
147. See, e.g., SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., APPOINTMENTS TO THE
REGULATORY AGENCIES: THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND THE FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION (1949-1974) 391 (Comm. Print 1976) (stating the extent to which parti-
san political considerations dominated Commission appointment process was "alarming"
given that "other factors-such as competence, experience, and even, on occasion, regula-
tory philosophy-are only secondary considerations").
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Article II, section 2, clause 3 of the Constitution authorizes the President
to fill vacancies while the Senate is in recess regardless of whether a va-
cancy was unfilled when the recess began or arose during the recess.148 As
a practical matter, Congress has confined the President's recess appoint-
ment powers through the appropriations process. Section 5503 of Title 5 of
the U.S. Code prohibits payment to recess appointees except in three cir-
cumstances: if (1) the vacancy occurred within thirty days of the end of a
congressional session; (2) a nomination was pending when the Senate re-
cessed; or (3) a nomination was rejected within thirty days before a recess
and another individual receives the recess appointment.149 Therefore, there
may be some situations where the President has the constitutional power to
make a recess appointment but must find a recess appointee willing to work
without receiving monetary compensation.
3. Removalfrom Office
The Constitution does not address, in express terms, the respective roles
of the President and Congress with respect to the removal of federal offi-
cers. Whether Congress may, by legislative enactment, limit or restrict the
President's removal power grew to be the subject of great debate and the
148. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3; United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008, 1012-
13 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (holding that President has authority to "fill all vacancies that
exist during a recess of Senate"); 3 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 314, 314 (1979) (stating that re-
cess appointment power applies to vacancies that occur during a recess regardless of when
vacancies arose). Whether brief, intra-session breaks constitute a "recess" for constitutional
purposes is a difficult question. The Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC),
whose most recent pronouncement on the subject is The Constitutional Separation of Pow-
ers Between the President and Congress, 1996 OLC LEXIS 6, at * 122 (May 7, 1996), ar-
gues that the term "recess" must be given a practical construction and the President is enti-
tled to make a good-faith determination of whether a given recess is sufficient to trigger his
recess appointment powers. Recess appointees have the same powers while in office that
they would have if appointed with Senate confirmation. The President may use his recess
appointment power to fill vacant positions or replace agency members who are continuing
to serve beyond their ordinary statutory term (so-called "holdover" members). See Swan v.
Clinton, 100 F.3d 973, 988 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (upholding recess appointment to replace
holdover member of National Credit Union Administration); Staebler v. Carter, 464 F.
Supp. 585, 598 (D.D.C. 1979) (upholding in case of first impression President's power to
replace a holdover member of Federal Election Commission with recess appointee). But see
Wilkinson v. Legal Servs. Corp., 80 F.3d 535, 537 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (noting division among
district courts).
149. See Memorandum to the Chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission, 52
Comp. Gen. 556, 556-58 (1973).
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source of the conflict that led to the impeachment trial of President Andrew
Johnson. 150
Several early cases upheld the authority of the President to remove sub-
ordinates. The Supreme Court in Parsons v. United States determined that
the President could remove a district attorney for the good of the country
although he was appointed to a four year term.' 51 In Shurtleff v. United
States, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the President's removal of
a member of a board of appraisers that was established by Congress.
152
Congress had provided for removal only for inefficiency, neglect of duty,
or malfeasance in office but the court reasoned that the President's general
power of appointment provided justification for removal of the officer.
53
These cases forecasted the court's later decision in Myers v. United
States. '54
The issue of removal received judicial examination in a trilogy of well-
known 20th century Supreme Court decisions. In the first, Myers v. United
States, the Court concluded that the President's power to appoint carries
with it the power to remove. 55 Chief Justice Taft's opinion for the major-
ity, and the dissenting opinions, extensively reviewed the history of the is-
sue. The majority concluded that the removal power is "incident to the
power of appointment" and therefore resides exclusively with the Presi-
dent. 156 It interpreted the "take care" clause of the Constitution broadly and
resolved that the President's power to remove officials was plenary so
Congress was proscribed from implementing changes to or limiting the
power. Several years later, however, in Humphrey's Executor v. United
States, the Court limited the broad scope of the Myers decision by con-
cluding that the President's removal power constitutionally could be condi-
tioned by Congress in certain circumstances and upholding a statutory "for
150. Interestingly, congressional debates over the establishment of the ICC contain very
little discussion about removal power and the influence the executive branch would have
over the agency. Rather, the removal clause contained in the 1887 Act to Regulate Com-
merce was included as a safeguard against unwanted commissioners. See CUSHMAN, supra
note 10, at 61-62.
151. 167 U.S. 324, 343 (1897); see also Bruce Y. Curry, Note, President's Power of
Removal-Consent of United States Senate: Myers v. United States, 6 OR. L. REv. 165, 166-
67 (1926-1927) (citing Parsons in a piece analyzing then recently decided case of Myers).
152. 189 U.S. 311, 318-19 (1903) (holding that President had power to remove official
on grounds other than those specifically mentioned in Customs Administrative Act).
153. See id.
154. 272 U.S. 52 (1926); see also Curry, supra note 151, at 166.
155. Myers, 272 U.S. at 176 (holding invalid a statute that prevented the President from
removing executive officers who had been appointed by him).
156. Id. at 119.
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cause" limitation on the President's removal power over a commissioner of
the Federal Trade Commission.' 57 The Court distinguished between an
"administrative body" that performed "quasi-legislative" and "quasi-
judicial" functions, where such limitation was found permissible, and agen-
cies that were "an arm or an eye of the executive," where such limitation
was not permissible.' 58 It concluded that an official who performed "purely
executive" duties was subject to the President's unqualified removal power,
but an official whose duties were commingled between the branches en-
joyed a measure of independence which was provided by restricting the
President's removal power.159  The Court, however, did not explain
whether a position was "purely executive" because of its placement within
the executive branch or because of the nature of the position.
Finally, in Wiener v. United States, the court invalidated President
Eisenhower's removal of a member of the War Claims Commission on the
ground that there existed a "for cause" limitation on the President's re-
moval power despite the lack of an explicit statutory condition.' 60  The
court determined that Congress had intended the commission to perform
adjudicative functions, not "purely executive" functions, and that therefore
the President was precluded from exercising unfettered removal power.'
6 1
The more recent decision in Morrison v. Olson,162 involving the inde-
pendent counsel statute, has modified the analysis. The Court re-examined
the underpinnings of Myers and Humphrey's Executor and made it clear
157. 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935).
158. Id. at 628-29.
159. Id. at 627-29.
160. 357 U.S. 349, 356 (1958).
161. See id at 352, 354-55; see also Swan v. Clinton, 100 F.3d 973, 983 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (relying on Wiener, 357 U.S. at 353, for proposition that court may be able to infer
congressional intent regarding presidential removal power from nature of the function
vested in agency by Congress); FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821, 826 (D.C.
Cir. 1993) (agreeing that good cause limitation may be implied by agency's structure and
mission and presence of statutory term of office); SEC v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 855
F.2d 677, 681-82 (10th Cir. 1988) (concluding that Congress can limit the grounds for
presidential removal of a member of a multi-member regulatory agency to inefficiency, ne-
glect of duty, or malfeasance in office); SEC v. Bilzerian, 750 F. Supp. 14, 16 (D.D.C.
1990) ("While the Act does not expressly give the President the power to remove a commis-
sioner, it is generally accepted that the President may remove a commissioner for ineffi-
ciency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.") (citation omitted). A Congressional Re-
search Service official suggests that there are at least 13 "independent" agencies without a
removal provision in their statutes. See Reviewing the Performance of the Social Security
Administration as an Independent Agency: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Social Security
of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 104th Cong. 12 & n. 19 (1996) (testimony of Ro-
gelio Garcia, Congressional Research Service) [hereinafter SSA Hearing].
162. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
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that neither the organizational structure and placement of the agency nor
the duties of an agency official per se affect Congress ability to confer
some measure of independence by restricting removal power functions.1
63
Rather, the issue is whether "the removal restrictions are of such a nature
that they impede the President's ability to perform his constitutional duty"
to see that the laws are faithfully executed.1
64
After Morrison, the fact that a presidential appointee performs any ex-
ecutive functions no longer automatically immunizes that official from
congressional efforts to restrict the President's removal power. 65 Nor is it
critical that such appointee serves on a multi-member board "outside" the
executive branch-which is logical since the first "independent" official of
government, after all, was the Comptroller of the Treasury Department.
66
Although Morrison dealt with an "inferior" officer, i.e., one not appointed
by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, both Hum-
phrey's Executor and Wiener dealt with the President's removal power
over officers appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.
Thus, there are issues that will be argued in the future, but for now, the le-
gitimacy of the independent agency has been validated.
67
There are other issues concerning removal power other than the scope of
the President's authority. Agency statutes are typically silent as to (a) a
definition of the statutory grounds for removal or (b) what procedures must
be followed before a President may remove a member of an independent
agency for cause.
a. Grounds for Removal
The Act to Regulate Commerce of 1887 contained the prototype removal
provision that has been used in most agency enabling statutes. It provides
that agency members can only be removed by the President for "ineffi-
163. See id. at 690-93. After Morrison, a threshold question remains whether Congress
intended to confer some form of statutory protection on government officials. In Morrison,
the congressional intent clearly was to do so.
164. Id. at 691.
165. As Justice White indicated in his dissent in Bowsher v. Synar, the FTC, even at the
time of the Humphrey's Executor case, performed what would now be considered executive
functions. 478 U.S. 714, 761 n.3 (1986) (White, J., dissenting).
166. See DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 19, § 2.5, at 45.
167. Individuals whose terms have expired and are serving as "holdovers" may not
claim the protection of the "for cause" removal provision. See Swan v. Clinton, 100 F.3d
973, 988 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (ruling that holdover member of National Credit Union Admini-
stration Board was not entitled to removal protection, even if such protection were available
to Board members during their appointed terms).
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ciency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office."'' 68 There is no accepted
definition of these statutory terms. 69 Nonetheless, it now seems clear that
the ICC Act, and those successor statutes that used it as a model, constrain
to some degree the President's power to remove officials without either
reason or explanation. 7 0
The precise contours of the President's power in this regard are less than
clear. In its Wiener decision, the court suggested that removal for cause
had to involve "the rectitude" of the government official.' 71 In Humphrey's
Executor, the President had expressly requested Humphrey's resignation
because the commissioner's views did not coincide with those of the Presi-
dent on "either the policies or the administering of the Federal Trade
Commission."' 7 2 The court at least impliedly concluded that such ground
was not embraced within a "for cause" standard. However, in Bowsher v.
Synar, the Supreme Court noted that the terms are "very broad.' Profes-
sors Lessig and Sunstein suggest that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the
"for cause" provisions can be interpreted to allow a President to remove an
independent agency member under a broad array of circumstances, includ-
ing a commissioner's frequent or important failure to follow the President's
wishes with respect to what is required by sound policy. 74 Professor Peter
Strauss argues that the President's request for Humphrey's resignation was
"founded in failure of trust, not breach of discipline," so the case does not
fully answer the question of what consequences might follow from a com-
missioner's failure to honor specific presidential policy directives. 75 He
168. Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, § 11, 24 Stat. 379, 383.
169. See Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94
COLUtM. L. REv. 1, 110 (1994) (noting that the Supreme Court has failed to define "ineffi-
ciency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office").
170. See Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 619 (1935) (quoting Presi-
dent telling FTC commissioner whom he wanted to remove that "I do not feel that your
mind and my mind go along together on either the policies or the administering of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission, and ... I think it best for the people of this country that I should
have a full confidence."). The President may plainly remove certain officials, such as Cabi-
net secretaries, for no reason and without explanation. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52,
134 (1926). See generally SCHWARTZ, supra note 120, § 1.9, at 19 ("The President has ab-
solute removal power over the executive departments .....
171. Wiener, 357 U.S. at 356.
172. Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. at 619 (internal quotations omitted).
173. 478 U.S. 714, 729 (1986).
174. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 169, at I 10-11.
175. Strauss, supra note 5, at 615. Strauss appears prepared to concede that Congress
may "forbid unilateral presidential removal for 'no reason at all"' if the official is "princi-
pally an adjudicator." Id. at 615-16. Plainly, the nature of an official's duties affect whether
a President may remove him summarily. See Wiener, 357 U.S. at 354-56 (ruling that adju-
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suggests that a court might sustain removal of an independent agency
member for a refusal to follow certain presidential directives, such as a di-
rective to perform a requested economic analysis of a proposed regula-
tion. 76 Professor Laurence Tribe observes that:
Statutes that permit removal of agency officers for such "causes" as "neglect of duty"
might... be construed to "sustain removal ... for any number of actual or perceived
transgressions of the [removing authority's] will," ... thereby avoiding the question
whether Congress could constitutionally insulate such officers from all political ac-
countability by making them removable only for such politically "neutral" causes as
dishonesty. 177
Occasionally, Congress departs from using the archetypal removal
clause and uses slightly different formulations without any apparent intent
to alter the fundamental criteria for removal. For example, the statute gov-
erning the National Indian Gaming Commission employs the language
"neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office, or for other good cause
shown"178-a hint, at least, that Congress sees neglect of duty and malfea-
sance in office as illustrations of a generic "good cause" ground for re-
moval. Some agency statutes are silent with regard to the President's
power to remove agency members from office. 179 But since the cotirt in
Wiener read into a silent statute a limitation on the President's removal
power because of the agency's intrinsic adjudicatory character, 18 it can be
fairly assumed that the absence of "for cause" removal language does not
automatically preclude the imposition of such a limitation.
dicatory purpose of War Claims Commisson precluded President's removal of commis-
sioner at will). Cf Power of the President to Remove Presidential Appointees from the Na-
tional Capital Planning Commission, 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 191, 196 (1982) (stating that
nature of functions, coupled with statutory silence on subject of removal, permits President
to remove officials summarily).
176. See Strauss, supra note 5, at 667 n.402. Moreover, a President's inability to re-
move a member of an independent agency need not imply, as Strauss points out, that "total
removal of the FTC as a policymaking organ of government from presidential oversight or
control would be within [Congress's] power." Strauss, supra note 5, at 616. The Adminis-
trative Conference of the United States endorsed the notion of presidential review of rule-
making initiatives of independent agencies. See Recommendation 88-9, Presidential Re-
view of Agency Rulemaking, 54 Fed. Reg. 5207 (1989).
177. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4-10, at 254 n.45 (2d ed.
1988) (quoting Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 728).
178. 25 U.S.C. § 2704(b)(6) (1994) (emphasis added).
179. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 4a (1994) (Commodity Futures Trading Commission); 12
U.S.C. § 1752a (1994) (National Credit Union Administration); 47 U.S.C. § 154 (1994 &
Supp. IV 1998) (Federal Communications Commission).
180. See Wiener, 357 U.S. at 354-56.
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b. Procedures for Removal
Most agency statutes are silent on what procedures (if any) the President
must follow before removing an agency member from office for good
cause.18' However, as early as the turn of the century, the Supreme Court
indicated that "for cause" appointees were entitled to notice and hearing be-
fore they could be removed from office. 82 The Supreme Court's due proc-
ess jurisprudence of the 1970s does nothing to undermine this conclusion.
An agency member's constitutional claim depends on having a property
right in continuing employment. 83 Job security created by statute has been
held to be a property right. 84 Thus, if the member has a statutory right to
continued employment, he or she cannot be deprived of the job without due
process. 85 However, that jurisprudence also teaches that due process re-
quires only "such procedural protections as the particular situation de-
mands."' 8 6  Generally, something less than a full APA-style evidentiary
hearing is sufficient to satisfy constitutional requirements.
8 7
181. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 5841(e) (1994) (Nuclear Regulatory Commission).
182. See Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311, 313-14 (1903) (concluding that where
removal is sought pursuant to statute for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in
office... the officer is entitled to notice and a hearing"); Reagan v. United States, 182 U.S.
419, 425 (1901) (stating that where causes of removal are specified by Constitution or stat-
ute, "notice and hearing are essential"). In Shurtleff the court also determined that inclusion
of explicit causes for removal did not, in the context of that statute, prevent the President
from removing the individual for other reasons. However, the court hinged that aspect of its
decision on the lack of any fixed term of office. A different construction of the statute, Jus-
tice Peckham observed, would "give an ... [official] the right to hold that office during his
life or until he shall be found guilty of some act specified in the statute. If this be true, a
complete revolution in the general tenure of office is effected... " Shurtleff 189 U.S. at
316. That is no longer an issue under modem statutes. Members of independent agencies
all serve for a fixed term.
183. See Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1972).
184. See Cleveland Bd. ofEduc. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1985) (ruling that
persons classified as civil servants under state law who could only be terminated for cause
possessed a property right in job security); cf Shurtleff, 189 U.S. at 314 (stating that an in-
dividual appointed by the President with advice and consent of the Senate who may only be
removed for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office" qualifies for due proc-
ess protections).
185. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573 (1975) ("[A] state employee who under state
law . . . has a legitimate claim of entitlement to continued employment absent sufficient
cause for discharge may demand the procedural protections of due process.") (citations
omitted).
186. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). Under the now-familiar test set
out in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the Court determined that the specific
procedures due process requires is a balancing of three factors: (1) the private interest that
will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest
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The National Labor Relations Act, and the Federal Labor Relations Act
(FLRA) which was modeled after it, expressly provide that agency mem-
bers of the NLRB and FLRA may be removed only "upon notice and
hearing."'' 88 The statute governing the Board of Veterans' Appeals is also
an anomaly. It creates different procedural requirements depending on
which member is sought to be removed. The chairman may only be re-
moved by the President for specified cause, while other members of the
board may be removed by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs for poor per-
formance or other causes. The chairman may be removed only "after no-
tice and opportunity for hearing,"' 9 while other board members may be
removed either following a specific set of statutorily-delineated procedures,
if removal is based on performance, or after an Administrative Procedure
Act (APA) hearing, if removal is based on other causes. 
9 0
Neither the "notice and hearing" requirement contained in the NLRB,
FLRA, and Board of Veterans' Appeals statutes, nor due process consid-
erations require the President to follow the strictures contained within the
APA. The APA is applicable only when an adjudication is "required by
statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency
hearing.',' 9' None of the agency statutes that provide for "notice and hear-
ing" uses the talismanic "on the record" formulation, and the Supreme
Court attaches some significance to it.' 92 Although the lack of the "on the
record" language is not dispositive, 93 the omission of the phrase may be
construed as evidence that Congress intended for something other than an
APA hearing.194 In fact, in the Board of Veterans' Appeals statute, Con-
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute pro-
cedural safeguards; and (3) the government's interest, including the administrative and fi-
nancial burdens to the government of additional or substitute procedures. See id. at 335.
187. See Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 17 (1979) (citing Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S.
105, 113 (1977)); see also Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 311 (1955) (upholding consti-
tutionality of deportation proceeding that did not fully comply with APA hearing standards).
188. 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1994) (National Labor Relations Board); 5 U.S.C. § 7104(b)
(1994) (Federal Labor Relations Authority).
189. 38 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(2) (1994).
190. See id. § 7101A(e).
191. 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1994).
192. See United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742, 757 (1972) (ob-
serving in a case involving a rulemaking proceeding that APA hearing requirements apply
"only where the agency statute, in addition to providing a hearing, prescribes explicitly that
it be on the record") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
193. See Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 96 n.13 (1981) (requiring APA hearing despite
lack of "on the record" language); United States v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S.
224, 238 (1973) (stating that lack of magic words is not determinative if the statute contains
"other... language having the same meaning").
194. See Railroad Comm'n ofTex. v. United States, 765 F.2d 221, 227 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
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gress used the term "notice and opportunity for a hearing" with respect to
the board's chairman, but specifically provided for an "APA hearing" for
other board members in certain circumstances-which is some evidence, at
least, that the requirement of "notice and hearing" probably means some-
thing different than an APA hearing. 95 Perhaps more important from a
constitutional perspective, the Supreme Court has determined that, absent
some express statement by Congress, the President is not to be considered
an "agency" for purposes of the APA, 196 so APA procedures are presump-
tively inapplicable.
Few examples of appropriate procedures are available, in large part be-
cause regulatory commissioners generally acquiesce to a President's re-
quest that they resign, fail to challenge their removal, or negotiate some
("Formal proceedings do not attach to a requirement of a 'hearing;' such proceedings would
obtain only on the requirement of a 'hearing on the record."'); see also City of W. Chicago
v. Nuclear Reg. Comm'n, 701 F.2d 632, 641 (7th Cir. 1983) (stating that "in the absence of
these magic words ... Congress must clearly indicate its intent to trigger the formal, on-the-
record hearing provisions of the APA") (citations omitted); Independent U.S. Tanker Own-
ers Comm. v. Lewis, 690 F.2d 908, 922 n.63 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (ruling that adjudication was
informal because there was no requirement of hearing "on the record" in statute and such
requirement could not be reasonably inferred from legislative history); see generally Keith
Werhan, Delegalizing Administrative Law, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 423, 445-47 (noting un-
willingness of courts to infer formal hearing requirement absent "on the record" language).
195. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 7101(b)(2), 7101A(e)(2) (1994); see also Duquesne Light Co. v.
EPA, 698 F.2d 456, 481-82 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (determining use of term "public hearing" in
one place in statute and hearing "on the record" in another evinces a congressional intent
that less formal procedures suffice under public hearing requirement). At least one court
has interpreted "opportunity for" language to require an APA hearing. See Seacoast Anti-
Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872, 876 (lst Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824
(1978). But the more recent trend is to examine the type of hearing right Congress intended
to create in each situation. See Friends of the Earth v. Reilly, 966 F.2d 690, 693 (D.C. Cir.
1992); see also Patricia M. Wald, Judicial Review in Midpassage: The Uneasy Partnership
Between Courts and Agencies Plays On, 32 TULSA L.J. 221, 232 n.70 (1996) ("[T]he occa-
sions where an evidentiary hearing is required seem to be steadily diminishing."), William
Funk, Close Enough for Government Work?-Using Informal Procedures for Imposing Ad-
ministrative Penalties, 24 SETON IHALL L. REv. 1, 20-21 (1993) (stating that statutory "no-
tice and opportunity for hearing" language need not necessarily trigger a formal hearing be-
fore an administrative law judge). Given the circumstances, especially the distinction
between the method of removal of the Chairman and other Board members, it seems almost
certain that Congress intended to accord the Board Chairman hearing rights akin to those
provided other independent agency officials across the government.
196. See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800-01 (1992) ("As the APA does not
expressly allow review of the President's actions, we must presume that his actions are not
subject to its requirements."). Cf. Public Citizen v. DOJ, 491 U.S. 440, 465-67 (1989) (ap-
plying Federal Advisory Committee Act to committee that advises President in connection




face-saving exit.' 97 Former Civil Aeronautics Board chairman Robert
Timm was advised that the White House Counsel's Office was planning to
hold a "hearing" on his activities while in office for the purpose of deter-
mining whether he should be removed from office for cause. The hearing
was characterized as an "evidence-gathering inquiry" to be presided over
by the counsel to the President. Mr. Timm thereafter resigned)
98
The procedures proposed in the Timm case satisfy due process prerequi-
sites. In Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill,199 due process was
satisfied where a dismissed public employee received notice of the charges
against him, an explanation of the supporting evidence, and a chance to
present his side of the story.200 The fact that a senior subordinate official-
here the Counsel to the President-actually hears the evidence, does not
violate due process.20'
197. See, e.g., Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts
by the White House, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 943, 955 & n.74 (1980) (noting that threat of re-
moval is effective method of obtaining resignations from commissioners, and speculating
that Presidents have in past and might in future require commissioner to provide signed
resignation in advance of appointment as means of circumventing for cause removal restric-
tions). President Nixon removed Raymond Lapin from his post on the Federal National
Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) at a time when Fannie Mae was part of the Treasury
Department and directors could only be removed by the President for cause. Lapin briefly
challenged his ouster in court but dropped the suit two months later. See Eric Pace, Ray-
mond H. Lapin, 67, Dead; Fought Nixon at Fannie Mae, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1986, at A38.
198. See In re Robert D. Timm, 223 Ct. Cl. 639, 639 (1980); see also Timm Resigns,
Hits White House Staff, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Dec. 15, 1975, at 28. President
Franklin Roosevelt actually met personally with the members of the Tennessee Valley
Authority (TVA) before removing one of its members. TVA members were appointed by
the President to a fixed term, with the advice and consent of the Senate, but did not have
"for cause" protection and were removable by the President summarily. See Morgan v.
TVA, 115 F.2d 990, 991, 992-94 (6th Cir. 1940).
199. 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
200. See id. at 546; cf Duke Power Co. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 770 F.2d 386,
389 (4th Cir. 1985) (stating that for informal agency adjudication, Commission did not have
to hold formal hearing with trial-type procedures but could rely on informal hearing in
which written factual and legal materials were submitted); Independent U.S. Tanker Owners
Comm. v. Lewis, 690 F.2d 908, 922-23 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (requiring agencies in informal ad-
judications to provide "some opportunity for interested parties to be informed of and com-
ment upon the relevant evidence before the agency"); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 582
(1975) (holding in case involving student's ten-day suspension from school that student had
to be "given an opportunity to explain his version of the facts" after being told "what he is
accused of doing and what the basis of the accusation is").
201. See Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 481-82 (1936) (stating that evidence
need not be taken by deciding official but may be received and analyzed by "competent
subordinates," provided that deciding official considers that evidence in making final deci-
sion); cf Duke Power Co., 770 F.2d at 390 (approving informal presentation to staff which
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A final and intriguing question is what remedy lies if an independent
agency member is removed improperly. Can he or she sue the President
for reinstatement? In Franklin v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court held
that the President is not ordinarily considered an "agency" for purposes of
the APA so that statute does not serve to waive general principles of sover-
eign immunity.20 2 However, there may be other statutory avenues. The
D.C. Circuit has concluded that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1361, it can exer-
cise mandamus jurisdiction over the President "to compel an officer or em-
ployee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed
to the plaintiff.,
20 3
4. Submissions to Congress
Since the 1920s, the executive branch, through the Bureau of the Budget
(which was succeeded by the Office of Management and Budget, or OMB)
has asserted the authority to review legislation proposed by agencies, testi-
mony and comments to be offered by agencies regarding pending legisla-
tion, and agencies' budgetary proposals. 204  The clearance process, al-
though lacking a direct statutory basis, has evolved, in the words of
Professor Richard Neustadt, as "a long series of 'accidental,' unforeseen
accretions. 20 5 The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 created the Bureau
of the Budget and directed executive branch agencies to transmit their
makes recommendation to decisional official).
202. See 505 U.S. 788, 800-01 (1992).
203. National Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587, 592 n.4, 616 (D.C.
Cir. 1974); see also Jonathan R. Siegel, Suing the President: Nonstatutory Review Revisited,
97 COLUM. L. REV. 1612, 1614-15 (1997). "Nonstatutory review" as used by Professor Sie-
gel refers to cases in which a plaintiff sues a government official in his or her individual ca-
pacity to avoid the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See id Siegel argues that the approach
has its antecedents in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See Siegel, su-
pra, at 1614. See generally Laura Krugman Ray, From Prerogative to Accountability: The
Amenability of the President to Suit, 80 Ky. L.J. 739 (1991-1992) (examining precedent al-
lowing suits against President and rationale, or lack thereof, for such suits).
204. The history of the development of the clearance process is reviewed in an article by
Professor Richard E. Neustadt entitled Presidency and Legislation: The Growth of Central
Clearance, 48 AM. POL. Scl. REV. 641, 642-50 (1954). Immediately following passage of
the Budget and Accounting Act, the Budget Bureau required agencies to submit for clear-
ance proposals for legislation or expressions of views on pending legislation that had budget
or appropriations implications. See id. at 644. During the Roosevelt Administration, the
Budget Bureau issued Budget Circular 336, which affirmatively required "by direction of
the President" that "all agency proposals for legislation and all reports on pending legisla-
tion be cleared through the Budget Bureau." Id at 649-50 (emphasis added). Legislative
proposals and testimony had to contain a statement, still used to this day, indicating
"whether the proposal was or was not in accord with the President's program." Id. at 650.
205. Id. at 668.
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budget estimates to the President for inclusion in an overall federal budget
request.20 6 Prior to passage of the Act, all agencies, including the ICC,
submitted their budgets directly to Congress, 207 and the independent agen-
cies resisted the executive's attempts to review their proposals. 20 ' Even af-
ter its passage, independent agencies continued to submit their budget re-
quests directly to Congress until statutory amendments enacted in 1939
made it clear that independent agencies were included within the purview
of the Act.
209
By the 1970s, Congress, presumably desirous of giving independent
agencies additional statutory bases for their resistance, changed its strategy.
Thereafter, provisions were placed in specific acts that allowed selected
agencies to submit their budget proposals, legislative proposals, or views
on legislation directly to Congress without clearance. 2'0  This authority
prevents OMB from demanding changes in the agency's proposals, but al-
lows the administration to comment subsequently on the agency's presen-
tation. Other statutes require that an agency's legislative proposals be
transmitted simultaneously to Congress and the President.2I' The concur-
rent submission provision does not, on its face, prohibit OMB from sug-
gesting (or even requiring) changes, but ensures that Congress will be ap-
prised of the agency's original position. Some statutes have a mix of these
procedures. 212 Five agencies, although lacking express statutory authority,
send communications to Congress without submitting them first to OMB.
They appear to assert their historic status as independent regulatory agen-
206. See Act of June 10, 1921, ch. 18, §§ 207, 213, 42 Stat. 20, 22-23 (codified as
amended at 31 U.S.C. § 1108 (1994)).
207. See Neustadt, supra note 204, at 643.
208. Robert L. Calhoun, former legislative counsel to the ICC, notes that during the
1930s, President Roosevelt, following a meeting with ICC Chairman Eastman, simply re-
quested the ICC's cooperation in the clearance process. By the time Calhoun became leg-
islative counsel, the practice was for the ICC simply to provide a copy of its legislative
views immediately after it submitted them to Congress. See Robert L. Calhoun, The Inter-
state Commerce Commission, 1912-1937, 16 TRANSP. L.J. 59, 67 (1987-1988).
209. See Reorganization Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-19, § 201, 53 Stat. 565.
210. See, e.g., Trade Act of 1974, ch. 36, § 175(a)(1), 88 Stat. 1978, 2011 (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2232 (1994)) (requiring President to submit budget request of Inter-
national Trade Commission to Congress without revision); Act of Oct. 28, 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-495, § III, 88 Stat. 1500, 1506 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 250 (1994)) (ex-
empting SEC and various agencies regulating financial institutions from the requirement of
clearance for their legislative proposals, testimony, and comments).
211. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 71710) (1994) (establishing Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission).




cies as justification for this action.21 3 The Social Security Administration,
despite its unique "independent" status within the executive branch, has de-
clined to assert any independence from the OMB clearance process.
214
5. Litigation Authority
Currently, except as otherwise authorized by statute, the conduct of the
federal government's litigation rests with the Attorney General. 215 How-
ever, Professor Neal Devins has correctly observed that "[t]he reach of the
Department of Justice control in general and Solicitor General control in
particular is ill-suited to generalization. 21 6 Congress has authorized vari-
ous independent agencies to represent themselves in court in certain situa-
tions. As Professor Moreno points out, control over litigation was a much
debated issue when the ICC was created. 217 The original Act to Regulate
Commerce placed the enforcement of ICC orders in the hands of the fed-
eral district attorneys, under the direction of the Attorney General.21 8 The
1889 amendments left the ICC's litigation relationship with the Justice De-
partment unchanged. 219 But statutory changes in 1906 divided litigation
responsibility between the agency and the executive branch. The Justice
Department retained responsibility for ICC orders involving the payment of
money, while the commission obtained authority "in its own name" to seek
enforcement of all other orders.22° Under the currently effective Adminis-
213. See SSA Hearing, supra note 161, at 14 & n.32 (1996) (testimony of Rogelio Gar-
cia, Congressional Research Service) (listing five agencies as the Federal Maritime Com-
mission (FMC), FTC, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), STB, and U.S. International
Trade Commission); see also Appendix, infra.
214. See id. at 14 & nn.33-34.
215. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 516-519 (1994).
216. Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor General Control Over Inde-
pendent Agency Litigation, 82 CAL. L. REv. 255, 278 (1994).
217. See Moreno, supra note 60, at 502-03.
218. See Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, § 16,24 Stat. 379, 384.
219. See Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 382, §§ 3, 5, 25 Stat. 855, 858-60 (amending sections
12 and 16 of the 1887 act, respectively, but maintaining role of federal district attorneys in
enforcement of Commission actions).
220. See Act of June 29, 1906, ch. 3591, § 5, 34 Stat. 584, 591 (amending section 16 of
the 1887 act). Changes to the statute governing the courts in 1911 created some ambiguity
over the ICC's overall litigation authority. The changes enacted clearly gave the Attorney
General litigation authority over cases in the Commerce Court (which then included en-
forcement of all ICC orders other than those for the payment of money), but it gave the ICC
the right to appear as a party through its own lawyers in all cases involving the validity of
ICC orders and to represent itself in the Supreme Court when the Solicitor General declined
to do so. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 212, 36 Stat. 1087, 1150-51. The FTC has similar
authority. See Devins, supra note 216, at 275 & n.103 (discussing the relationship between
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trative Orders Review Act (commonly known as the Hobbs Act), the ICC's
successor agency-the Surface Transportation Board (STB)--may inter-
vene in any court proceeding in which one of its orders may be enjoined,
set aside, or suspended, including cases in the Supreme Court, without re-
gard to the action of the Attorney General. 2 '
In addition to the STB, the Hobbs Act also provides that as parties
whose interests may be affected if one of their orders is or is not enjoined,
set aside, or suspended, the FCC, NRC, and FMC may also intervene in
any proceeding to review such an order, including cases in the Supreme
Court, without regard to the action of the Attorney General.2 The SEC,
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and FERC have
authority to litigate in the courts of appeals, and the CPSC has authority to
litigate in the district court.223 As Professor Devins indicates, "there are
several agencies whose arrangements are so complex that they defy de-
scription. '22 4  [The] patchwork nature of independent agency litigating
authority is rooted in historical and organizational bases.
225
Solicitor General and independent agencies in conduct of Supreme Court litigation); see
also Todd Lochner, Note, The Relationship Between the Office of Solicitor General and the
Independent Agencies: A Reevaluation, 79 VA. L. REv. 549, 550-51 (1993) (arguing for
greater agency independence in Supreme Court litigation). For a discussion of recent FEC
litigation, see George F. Fraley, III, Note, Is the Fox Watching the Henhouse? The Admini-
stration's Control of FEC Litigation Through the Solicitor General, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U.
1215 (1996). But see ICC v. Southern Ry. Co., 543 F.2d 534, 539 (5th Cir. 1976) (con-
cluding that 1911 legislation, and subsequent statutes, did not confer authority on ICC to
litigate in its own name).
221. See 28 U.S.C. § 2323 (Supp. IV 1998).
222. See 28 U.S.C. § 2348 (1994).
223. See Devins, supra note 216, at 278-79 & nn.122-29 (summarizing litigating
authority of various independent agencies).
224. Devins, supra note 216, at 279. For example, in FEC v. NRA Political Victory
Fund, 513 U.S. 88, 98-99 (1994), the court dismissed the FEC's petition for certiorari and
denied the agency the right to represent itself before the Supreme Court. The court deter-
mined that the FEC's enabling statute did not provide the agency with independent litigation
authority. As a result, the DOJ now wields complete power to prosecute campaign finance
abuses and enforce federal election laws. Absent an express delegation of independent liti-
gation authority contained within an agency's enabling statute, other independent agencies
may find that the litigation authority they previously enjoyed has been eliminated. See gen-
erally Alane Tempchin, Note, Fall From Grace: Federal Election Commission v. NRA Po-
litical Victory Fund and the Demise of the FEC's Independent Litigating Authority, 10
ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 385, 398-99 (1996).
225. Devins, supra note 216, at 279. Even at those agencies that have some form of in-
dependent litigation authority, the Department of Justice frequently conducts litigation in
those cases that involve issues unrelated to the agency's substantive mission but common to
all departments and agencies, such as Freedom of Information Act cases, damage actions




1. Theory of the Unitary Executive v. Functionalism
The constitutionality of the independent agency was not an issue of con-
siderable debate until many decades after the establishment of the ICC.
The Progressive and New Deal eras saw the proliferation of many new in-
dependent agencies that wielded considerable power. This induced many
scholars to speculate on the constitutionality of agencies seemingly located
outside the reach of the executive branch. Within the past few decades,
there has been a resurgence of efforts to centralize the executive func-
tions.226 As a result, debates concerning issues of separation of powers
have proliferated once again.
Some commentators view the independent agency as analytically uncon-
stitutional. The rejection of the notion of agency independence flows natu-
,,227 otfrtirally from the "theory of the unitary executive, sketched out first in
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission).
226. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993) (President Clinton) (improving
efficiency and public accessibility of federal regulatory process); Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3
C.F.R. 323 (1985) (President Reagan) (creating regulatory planning process and reducing
regulatory burdens and duplication); Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981)
(President Reagan) (reducing regulatory burdens imposed by federal agencies); Exec. Order
No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 152 (1978) (President Carter) (streamlining agency rulemaking proc-
ess); Exec. Order No. 11,821, 39 Fed. Reg. 41,501 (1974) (President Ford) (requiring agen-
cies, under direction of OMB Director, to perform inflation impact statements for all legis-
lative proposals and rules).
227. Both the constitutional and policy aspects of the President's role as head of the ex-
ecutive branch, and the resultant concept of a "unitary executive," are much discussed in the
literature. There appear to be as many theories and answers as there are commentators. See,
e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Execu-
tive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1153, 1158 & n.10 (1992) (indicating that con-
stitutional text supports theory of unitary executive, but acknowledging that there are "sev-
eral versions" of theory); Colin S. Diver, Presidential Powers, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 519, 519
(1987) ("[T]he history of the administrative state is an unending contest between Congress
and the President for control of the bureaucracy."); Frank H. Easterbrook, Unitary Executive
Interpretation: A Comment, 15 CARDozo L. REV. 313, 316, 321 (1993) (appearing to en-
dorse unitary executive on policy grounds but accepting lack of constitutional precision
about actual government operation); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 169, at 2-4 (contending
that although theory of unitary executive has no foundation in early constitutional practice,
modern constitutional interpretation supports strong unitary executive); Geoffrey P. Miller,
The Unitary Executive in a Unified Theory of Constitutional Law: The Problem of Inter-
pretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 201, 201-02 (1993) (arguing that presidential control of
agencies goes from weak to strong along continuum that depends on functions and role of
particular agencies); David B. Rivkin, Jr., The Unitary Executive and Presidential Control
of Executive Branch Rulemaking, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 309, 309-10 (1993) (arguing that
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Hamilton's classic discussion of executive power, The Federalist No. 70.228
The unitary theory is derived from the "Vesting" and "Take Care" Clauses
of Article II of the Constitution. Unitary theorists understand the Vesting
Clause, which provides that "[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a
President," 229 to mean that executive power is vested only in the President,
so Congress is precluded from placing agencies outside the executive
branch. Furthermore, these theorists believe that the President himself
must undertake those enumerated powers explicitly granted by the Consti-
tution, and in general "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed. 23°
The argument suggests that this duty can be discharged only if those fed-
eral agencies that perform traditionally executive functions are understood
to be agents of the President and responsible to him. Any other structure,
the argument runs, would undermine accountability and thus collapse the
notion that "the buck stops here."
Proponents of a unitary executive view the federal bureaucracy as a
pyramid, with the President as the responsible official at the top. Although
unitary theorists differ in varying degree over the extent of the President's
executive power,231 there is consensus that the power to remove subordi-
nates who do not follow the President's directives, or in whom he no longer
has confidence, is vital to his supervisory ability and authorized by the
Constitution.232 Under the rubric of the "unitary executive" theory, courts,
both constitutional and policy considerations support unitary, elected, visible executive);
Rosenberg, supra note 117, at 634 (arguing that unitary executive lacks substantial constitu-
tional basis and "subverts our delicately balanced scheme of separated but shared powers");
Strauss, supra note 5, at 667 (rejecting notion of any "neat division" of government func-
tions); Cass R. Sunstein, The Myth of the Unitary Executive, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 299, 300-
01 (1993) (arguing that theory of unitary executive is not supported by early constitutional
history). But see Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 17 (supporting unitary executive on historical
grounds). This list does not pretend to exhaust the literature.
228. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 199 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 2d ed.
1981) ("The ingredients which constitute energy in the Executive are, first, unity; secondly,
duration; thirdly, an adequate provision for its support; fourthly, competent powers .... This
unity may be destroyed in two ways: either by vesting the power in two or more magistrates
of equal dignity and authority; or by vesting it ostensibly in one man, subject, in whole or in
part, to the control and co-operation of others, in the capacity of counsellors to him.").
229. U.S. CONST. art. 1I, § 1, cl. 1.
230. Id. § 3.
231. See, e.g., Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 227, at 1165-68 (discussing varying uni-
tary theory models).
232. See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 117, at 634 (arguing that Congress has "virtually
plenary power to create the administrative bureaucracy and to shape the powers, duties, and
tenure of the offices and officers of that infrastructure in a manner best suited to accomplish
legislative ends"); Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-
Powers Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 488, 494-95 (1987) (de-
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as in Wiener, have tended to exempt only those agencies possessed of some
semblance of adjudicatory function from "at will" removal. Indeed, as one
earlier commentator has suggested, "[w]here, in addition to their other
functions, these commissions have been entrusted with judicial power,
there has been a noticeable tendency to justify their independent position in
terms of that power alone. 233
Some scholars oppose the premise of the unitary executive and instead
embrace a notion of broad congressional power that justifies divesting the
President of unqualified executive power. They maintain that the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause234 grants to Congress the power to structure the ex-
ecutive department and insulate subordinate officers from unfettered re-
moval power of the President. "[T]he non-unitarians offer various
functionalist theories of executive power that they believe better comport
with the historical data, the Supreme Court's caselaw, and the relevant
structural concerns. 235
For a period of time, it did appear that the constitutionality of the inde-
pendent agency was under siege.236 In Buckley v. Valeo,237 the Court in-
validated a portion of the Federal Election Campaign Act because it vio-
lated the doctrine of separation of powers.238 The legislation contained a
provision that provided for congressional appointment of several members
to the Federal Election Commission. The court deemed this bequest of
authority unconstitutional for violating the powers assigned to the President
in Article II of the Constitution.239 In September, 1985, then Attorney
scribing the "strong executive" model).
233. WILSON K. DOYLE, INDEPENDENT COMMISSIONS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 41
(1939).
234. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18.
235. Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 227, at 1170. See also Martin S. Flaherty, Re-
learning Founding Lessons: The Removal Power and Joint Accountability, 47 CASE W. RES.
L. REv. 1563, 1566 (1997) (arguing that historical record does not evince consensus at time
of founding in support of presidential removal power, and that evidence tends more toward
opposition to such power).
236. See, e.g., Hospital Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1392 (7th Cir. 1986) (not-
ing that petitioner's argument, if accepted, would result in every independent agency being
declared unconstitutional); Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. FTC, 625 F. Supp. 747, 751 (D.D.C. 1986)
(stating that plaintiffs challenge to constitutionality of the FTC as independent agency
raised "a serious and substantial issue of considerable public importance" that "has never
been fully adjudicated"). But see FTC v. American Nat'l Cellular, Inc., 810 F.2d 1511,
1517 (9th Cir. 1987) (Tang, J., concurring) (upholding the enforcement power of the inde-
pendent agency).
237. 424 U.S. I (1976).
238. See id at 140-41.
239. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The President may, with the advice and consent
of the Senate, appoint and commission "Officers of the United States." See also Buckley,
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General Meese suggested, in a speech to the Federal Bar Association, that
"[t]he real lawmaking power in Washington is wielded . . . by relatively
anonymous members of the federal agencies." 240 These officials, he argued,
are accountable to neither the President nor Congress. "It should be up to
the President to enforce the law," the Attorney General declared. 24' "Fed-
eral agencies performing executive functions are themselves properly
agents of the executive. They are not 'quasi' this or 'independent' that. In
the tripartite scheme of government, a body with enforcement powers is
part of the executive branch of government.' 242  Mr. Meese urged that
"[w]e should abandon the idea that there are such things as 'quasi-
legislative' or 'quasi-judicial' functions that can be properly delegated to
independent agencies.' 243
During the following year, in Bowsher v. Synar, the court overturned a
provision of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act that gave the Comptroller
General, who was removable only by Congress, the authority to review
certain actions of the executive branch.244 The court categorized the
Comptroller General as an agent of Congress 245 and concluded that the
delegation was an unconstitutional retention of executive power by Con-
246gress. During oral argument, the Solicitor General told the justices that
the proponents of the constitutionality of the challenged Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings Act were trying to "scare" them with the argument that upholding
the lower court on the constitutional issue would endanger the independent
agencies, such as the FTC and the Federal Reserve Board. 247 At this, Jus-
tice O'Connor interposed: "They scared me with it."
248
In Morrison v. Olson,249 Mr. Meese won his linguistic battle over "quasi-
legislative" and "quasi-judicial" functions. The Morrison court discarded
the concept of "quasi-legislative" or "quasi-judicial" functions as a valid
predicate for independence. It determined that such definitional distinc-
tions, as earlier espoused in Humphrey's Executor, were no longer signifi-
424 U.S. at 140-41.
240. Howard Kurtz, Agencies 'Authority Challenged: Justice Department Seems to Side
with Conservatives on Regulatory Power, WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 1986, at A 17.
241. Id.
242. Stuart Taylor, Jr., A Question of Power, A Powerful Questioner, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
6, 1985, at B8.
243. Kurtz, supra note 240, at A17.
244. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
245. See id. at 73 1.
246. See id. at 726.
247. See Arguments Before the Court: Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act--Separation of
Powers, 54 U.S.L.W. 3709, 3709-10 (1986).
248. Id.
249. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
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cant.250  Rather, the court concluded that the issue was whether the "for
cause" provision impermissibly interfered with the President's exercise of
his executive power or his constitutional duty to "take care that the laws be
faithfully executed. 25'
By sustaining the "for cause" removal provision with respect to the in-
dependent counsel, the court seems to have ended, at least for now, any se-
rious challenge to the applicability of the "for cause" provision to members
of multi-member agencies.252 It may even have created a predicate for ap-
plication of such provisions to some executive branch agencies as well.
The question, at least for now, seems to be whether there has been an ag-
grandizement or encroachment that interferes with the execution of the
President's duties.
While there is no doubt that Morrison creates a clear flow against ex-
ecutive power, it remains to be seen whether its legacy is the demise of
formalist thinking regarding the executive power and independent agen-
cies. 253 Certainly, later courts have sustained the Morrison principle of re-
sistance to legislative encroachment on traditional legislative functions.
But one must be careful not to overread Morrison's independence princi-
ple. Morrison concerns a highly unusual fact pattern-a case in which the
executive is being asked to investigate itself. Notwithstanding the untram-
meled freedom of the independent counsel to undertake the prosecution
250. See id. at 688-91 (stating that analysis in previous removal cases was not designed
to "define rigid categories of those officials who may or may not be removed at will by the
President").
251. Id. at 689-90 (determining that good cause removal provision in statute does not
impermissibly burden the President's ability to perform his constitutional duty because the
independent counsel is an inferior officer whose duties are not central to the functioning of
the executive branch and because the President still retains some removal authority). But
see id. at 723-27 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority rule would permit restric-
tions on the President's power to remove virtually any executive officer).
252. Professors Davis and Pierce believe that the door may not be closed entirely. In
Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991), four justices criticized the court's Hum-
phrey's Executor decision. Davis and Pierce observe that "Freytag illustrates the surprising
extent to which the entire modern structure of government rests on an uncertain and contro-
versial constitutional foundation." See DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 19, § 2.5, at 64. For a
view that the debate over the President's removal power is really a "symbol of the struggle
between Congress and the President for control over policy-making" with only "limited
real-world significance," see Jonathan L. Entin, Synecdoche and the Presidency: The Re-
moval Power as Symbol, 47 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 1595, 1595, 1601 (1997).
253. There is certainly a clear line of post-Morrison cases on which "formalists" can
continue to rely. See, e.g., Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement
of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252 (1991); Hechinger v. Metropolitan Wash. Airports




function (one traditionally executive), the counsel's decision whether or not
to prosecute by its very nature encompasses an adjudicative function as
well. 25 4 It must decide that there is enough evidence to warrant going for-
ward. Thus, Morrison may be understood as a narrow holding with ex-
ceedingly broad language-language upon which those who seek to expand
the penumbra of independence rely inordinately at times.
2. Political Will Theory
Some commentators believe that in order to understand how independent
agencies operate, variables that impact upon agencies, other than their
structural organization and indicia of independence, must be analyzed.
Professor Neal Devins believes that the "the focus of agency analysis
should encompass interbranch power and expectations as well as agency
structure. 255 In his article, Political Will and the Unitary Executive: What
Makes an Independent Agency Independent?, Professor Devins claims that
political will exerted by the President, Congress, and independent agencies
invariably affects the outcome of power struggles, notwithstanding the in-
dependent structure of the agency. Devins discusses executive litigation
control and compares the effect of political will in several recent controver-
sies concerning litigation authority. His study demonstrates that a Presi-
dent, who adheres to a strong paradigm of the unitary executive and strate-
gically exerts political will in an altercation, can be victorious,
notwithstanding a structurally independent agency.
There is a theoretical debate among commentators over whose interests
the DOJ should represent when it controls litigation. There are several
models that serve to justify the respective views. Under the bureaucratic
theory of representation-the most common model-the agency is the
policy-making client and the DOJ acts as the agency's advocate. 25 6 Oppo-
nents of this model promote the theory of the unitary executive and main-
tain that the DOJ represents the policies of the President to secure a unified
executive branch through policy coordination and centralization. 257 Devins
argues that while structural factors such as litigation and removal authority
254. This adjudicative function is highlighted if one examines a comparative decision
not to prosecute-the decision of Israeli Attorney General Elyakim Rubenstein not to indict
former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu because he lacked sufficient evidence. See
Deborah Sontag, No Prosecution for Netanyahu in Graft Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28,
2000, at Al.
255. Neal Devins, Political Will and the Unitary Executive: What Makes an Independent
Agency Independent?, 15 CARDOzo L. REv. 273, 274 (1993).




often influence the choice of models, political will is the principal factor
that determines which of these models will prevail. 258  When the DOJ
wields litigation authority, for example, the President can successfully im-
plement his policies and coordinate the executive branch if he strategically
exerts his will. Devins illustrates this point by comparing the different ap-
proaches adopted by the Carter and Reagan administrations. During the
Carter administration, Attorney General Griffin Bell believed that the DOJ
should advocate the position of the agency and took pains to shield the So-
licitor General's office from White House political will.259 In sharp con-
trast, both Presidents Reagan and Bush forcefully exerted their will to cen-
tralize the executive branch, and during their administrations, the DOJ
proved to be an effective conduit through which policy was implemented
and advanced.26 °
During the Reagan administration, a power struggle reflecting these con-
flicting philosophies arose between the EEOC and the DOJ.26' In 1983, the
DOJ discovered that the EEOC was preparing to file an amicus brief in
Williams v. City of New Orleans261 in support of affirmative action, which
contradicted a brief previously filed by the DOJ. 263 Although the multi-
member commission has authority to litigate certain employment discrimi-
nation issues involving private parties before lower federal courts, the DOJ
has exclusive authority to litigate matters concerning state and local gov-
ernments. 264 The DOJ viewed the EEOC's amicus brief as an attempt to
thwart its exclusive litigating authority. 265 The situation was further com-
plicated by the fact that the EEOC had been instrumental in ensuring that
federal agencies implemented affirmative action plans under the Carter
administration and that during the Carter administration, the Solicitor Gen-
eral had allowed the EEOC to file briefs conflicting with the DOJ's
briefs.266 In contrast, the Reagan administration wanted the executive
258. See id.
259. See id at 281 (quoting Bell saying that DOJ lawyers "must take care not to inter-
fere with the policy prerogatives of our agency clients") (internal quotation marks and cita-
tion omitted).
260. See id.
261. See Devins, supra note 255, at 285-92 (describing conflict between EEOC and
DOJ).
262. 729 F.2d 1554 (5th Cir. 1984).
263. See Devins, supra note 255, at 286-87.
264. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1994).
265. See Devins, supra note 255, at 287 (noting DOJ's view that executive branch
should speak with one voice in civil rights cases involving state and local governments, and
that DOJ was appropriate entity for expressing government's uniform position).
266. See Devins, supra note 255, at 290. By Executive Order 12,067, President Carter
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branch to speak in a unitary voice in matters that it considered of major im-
portance, such as affirmative action. Faced with a DOJ opinion asserting
sole litigating authority, the EEOC surrendered.267
An independent agency's efforts to exert political will are bolstered by
several tools it has at its disposal. Its organizational structure and enabling
statute provide the agency with a measure of independent authority. The
greater the authority allocated to the agency by Congress, the greater its
freedom from the executive branch. Often, though, the measure of an in-
dependent agency's political will is dependent upon the actions of Con-
gress or the President, or their failure to intercede.268 A vigilant President
will make it more difficult for an agency to effectuate its own policies.
Likewise, if Congress chooses to, it can closely regulate an agency through
legislation and oversight. Although Congress defines the parameters of the
agency's powers through legislation, it would be inefficient and perhaps
even contrary to congressional self-interest to regulate agencies' daily ac-
tivities in this manner. For example, public choice theorists claim that
members of Congress often seek to pacify and appease powerful special
interest groups to ensure future campaign contributions and support.269
Agency action that is sympathetic to a given member's contributors will be
welcomed by that member. Thus, congressional relationships with interest
groups may give an agency more flexibility and another source of political
power.
In 1992, the United States Postal Service (Postal Service) was successful
in thwarting the will of President Bush by strategically exerting its own
political will. A dispute arose between the Postal Service and the Postal
gave the EEOC authority to develop standards and guidelines that federal agencies should
follow in complying with equal opportunity laws. Exec. Order No. 12,067, 3 C.F.R. 206
(1979), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, at 542 (1994).
267. See Litigation Authority of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in
Titile VII Suits against State and Local Governmental Entities, 7 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 57,
57 (1983); see also Devins, supra note 255, at 288. Devins attributes the surrender of the
EEOC to pressure exerted at a meeting between the EEOC Chairman, Clarence Thomas,
EEOC general counsel, David Slate, White House counsel, Ed Meese, Attorney General
William French Smith, and DOJ Civil Rights Division Chief William Bradford Reynolds.
See id. at 288.
268. Devins suggests that "agency independence is necessarily qualified. Independence
from the executive may mean dependence upon the Congress. Furthermore, independence
from the executive[] may be temporal-depending on shifting White House attitudes to-
wards unitariness or competing policy demands that yield disunitariness in interpretation."
Id. at 312.
269. See Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public Regarding Legislation through Statutory
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 223, 228 (1986).
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Rate Commission concerning rate-making authority.27° The DOJ chal-
lenged the independence of the service and tried to position itself as arbiter
between the entities to centralize the dispute.271 President Bush attempted
to directly compel the service's Board of Governors to acquiesce, and when
that tactic failed, he threatened to remove the board members who refused
to comply with his directive.272 Those board members sought an injunction
against the President to prevent their removal, which was granted.273
In this matter, the President failed in his attempts to unify the executive
branch and stymie viewpoints contradictory to those of the DOJ and him-
self. Not only did he ignore the independent structure of the Postal Service,
but he tried to "strong-arm" the board members after he lost the 1992 elec-
tion.
One ought not read this incident, however, as reflecting a secular dimi-
nution of presidential control of agency behavior generally. The President
was in the waning days of his administration and his political power was
largely emasculated, a point which the board members used to their ad-
vantage. The decision to exert his authority when his political power was
at its weakest was a grave tactical error. As a result, the executive branch's
constitutional authority was unable to overcome the structural barriers of
the Postal Service.274
III. INTERNAL AGENCY PROCEDURES
Despite objections to their constitutionality and recent administrations'
attempts to centralize the administrative state, the independent agency form
will, in all likelihood, persist into the next century. In order to understand
the contextual nature of how agencies understand their "independence," it
270. See Devins, supra note 255, at 308.
271. See id.
272. See id. at 308 & n.171 (citing Letter from President George Bush to Bert Mackie,
Governor, U.S. Postal Service (Jan. 4, 1993)).
273. See id. at 310.
274. See id. at 310-11. The structural barriers included limits on presidential removal
power, the absence of a presidential role in selecting two of the Board members, and a
statutory grant of independent litigation authority. See id In 1981, the DOJ's Office of Le-
gal Counsel declined to bring the Postal Service within the reach of an executive order that
gave the Attorney General authority to coordinate the enforcement of various anti-
discrimination laws. See Status of the United States Postal Service as an "Executive
Agency" Under Executive Order No. 12,250, 5 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 239, 240-41 (1981)
(concluding that Postal Service was not an "executive agency" under Executive Order in
part because Congress intended to "grant the Service at least some measure of insulation
from control by the President and to place the Service in a separate category from the con-
ventional executive departments").
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is instructive to review their internal operations. These internal procedures
must not be inconsistent with explicit statutory requirements. Nonetheless,
most have been developed and shaped by case law and custom or adopted
from other agencies.
A. Institutional Decisionmaking
1. Powers of the Chair
There is no doubt that the chair of a multi-member agency is ordinarily
its most dominant figure. Most agency chairs are appointed to their posi-
tions by the President and are members of his political party. They often
come to an agency to advance the President's agenda-or their own-but
some come with no agenda. Former Tariff Commissioner Dan H. Fenn ob-
served:
The Chairman, when I was appointed, believed that the Commission should be quiet
and unobtrusive. He liked to refer to [the agency) as a fire department, with its staff
wrapping hoses and keeping the equipment in good repair against the day when the
alarm would ring, when someone would knock on the door with a case to be consid-
ered. He might, some of us thought, have added that the first effort in such an event
would be to persuade the petitioner to try some other firehouse down the street.275
The legal relationship between the agency chairman and his or her col-
leagues is statutorily established but nonetheless ambiguous.27 6 It is a fre-
275. 1 SENATE COMM. ON Gov'T OPERATIONS, STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, S.
Doc. No. 95-25, at 17 (1977) (citation omitted) (alternation in original). One agency-the
FEC-still selects its own Chairman and Vice Chairman annually. That commission de-
cides uniquely partisan issues as part of its supervisory role over the election process and its
participants. To help ensure that neither major political party can wrest management control
of the Commission for a sustained period, Congress has provided that the chairmanship ro-
tates among the members, that a commissioner may serve as Chairman only once during his
or her term, and that the Commission's Chairman and Vice Chairman may not come from
the same political party. See 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(5) (1994).
276. There is some variation in the rate of pay of members of independent agencies that
appears to reflect both a rough congressional hierarchy of importance and idiosyncratic con-
siderations. Generally speaking, chairmen are paid more than their colleagues. Presidential
appointees are paid at one of five levels, with Level I being the highest. The Commissioner
of Social Security is paid at Executive Level I, the same rate as cabinet secretaries. The
Chairmen of the Federal Reserve Board and the NRC, are the highest-paid heads of multi-
member agencies at Executive Level I1. 5 U.S.C. § 5313 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). As of
January, 1997, officials at Executive Level II were paid $133,600. See Exec. Order No.
13,033, 3 C.F.R. 245 (1996), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 5332, at 252. Executive Level II is
also the rate of pay for deputy cabinet secretaries and the Administrator of the Environ-
mental Protection Agency. Most regulatory Commission chairmen are paid at Executive
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quent source of interest to members at virtually every multi-member
agency, particularly those who are new to the job, and can be a cause for
contention. Although the respective powers of a chairman and the agency
as an institution differ from agency to agency, most chairmen are essen-
tially the agencies' chief executive and administrative officers. They ap-
point and supervise the staff, distribute business among the agency's per-
sonnel and administrative units, and control the preparation of the agency's
budget and the expenditure of funds.277  But that does not mean that the
other agency members play no role in the agency's management or admini-
stration. Professor David Welborn points out:
One of the major difficulties is finding that delicate balance point at which the mem-
bers generally are engaged in the large questions in a positive way, but without con-
stricting the chairman in caring for his essential functions. There are no magic for-
mulas for locating the balance. The evidence suggests, however, that the [agencies]
almost never give systematic and focused attention to questions of balance, roles, and
the quality of the working relationship between members and chairmen. In most of
the agencies, the formal delineations of authority are imprecise. Even when defini-
tion has been attempted, substantial gray areas have been left.
278
When Congress removed the ICC from the Interior Department in 1889,
it gave the Commission as an institution substantive and organizational
Level III, as are non-Chairman members of the NRC, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
Board, and the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. See 5 U.S.C. § 5314 (1994 & Supp.
IV 1998). The rate of pay for Executive Level III is $123,100. See Exec. Order No. 13,033,
3 C.F.R. 245 (1996), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 5332, at 252. The Chairmen of the Federal La-
bor Relations Authority and the Board of Veterans' Appeals, and the non-Chairmen mem-
bers of most multi-member commissions are paid at Executive Level IV. See 5 U.S.C. §
5315 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). The rate of pay for Executive Level IV is $115,700. See
Exec. Order No. 13,033, 3 C.F.R. 245 (1996), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 5332, at 252. The
statute governing the Chemical Safety Board gives the President the power to establish pay
categories for all members. 5 U.S.C. § 5317 (1994). Presidents Bush and Clinton placed all
of the members-including the Chairman-in Executive Level IV. See Exec. Order No.
12,814, 3 C.F.R. 313 (1992).
277. See infra Appendix. Former FCC Chairman Reed Hundt has noted that, by tradi-
tion, the FCC Chairman worked with the staff to make tentative decisions that were then
presented to his colleagues for approval. The Chairman's success was measured by whether
he could get a majority of the Commission to support his decision. See HUNDT, supra note
127, at 13, 146-47.
278. DAVID M. WELBORN, GOVERNANCE OF FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES 150
(1977). The Welborn book is a revision of a study of seven multi-member agencies pre-
pared under the auspices of the Administrative Conference of the United States. Although it
examines only agencies with regulatory functions, it has relevance, in our view, to all multi-
member agencies. It attempts to analyze the "inner life" of multi-member agencies and ad-
dresses the relationship between institutional characteristics and substantive results. Chap-
ter three is a survey of the relationship between the Chairman and his or her colleagues in
the management of the agency.
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powers, including the power to appoint officers and employees, 279 establish
procedures "as will best conduce to the proper dispatch of business and to
the ends of justice," 280 and lease offices and purchase supplies. 28' There
was no provision outlining any particular powers of the Chairman. Indeed,
the chairman was referred to only once in the statute: expenses were to be
paid upon the presentation of itemized vouchers approved by the chair-
man. 282 Other multi-member agencies were modeled on the structure of the
icc.
283
Over time, both the President and Congress came to recognize that the
day-to-day administration of an agency cannot be exercised collectively.
Multi-member institutions need some centralized administration. In 1949,
the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Govern-
ment (Hoover Commission) recommended that all administrative responsi-
bility at multi-member agencies be vested in the chairman of the agency.284
During the 1950s and 1960s, Presidents Truman and Kennedy, responding
to that recommendation, presented several reorganization plans to Congress
designed to transfer from the agency to its chairman the power of day-to-
day agency administration. 2 5 Since then, even non-chairmen members of
multi-member agencies have come to accept the necessity of some central-
ized administration. 86
As our surveyed of some thirty federal multi-member agencies sug-
gests, 287 all of the reorganization statutes and their progeny fundamentally
279. See Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 382, § 7, 25 Stat. 855, 861-62.
280. Id. § 6, 25 Stat. 861.
281. See id § 7, 25 Stat. 862.
282. See id. For much of its history, the Commission itself selected its own Chairman
from among the members. From 1910 until 1937, the chairmanship simply rotated among
the members based on seniority. Reorg. Plan No. I of 1969, 3 C.F.R. §1066 (1966-1970),
reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 1547 (1994), authorized the President to select the ICC Chair-
man, and transferred administrative responsibility to the Chairman.
283. As of 1941, agency chairmen were as often chosen by their colleagues as by the
President. See CUSHMAN, supra note 10, at 683, 747-48. Some chairmen still are. See infra
Appendix (FEC, NMB).
284. See COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE
GOVERNMENT, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 5-6 (1949) [hereinafter
HOOVER COMMISSION REPORT] (Recommendation 1) ("Administration by a plural executive
is universally regarded as inefficient. ... [T]hose cases where administration has been dis-
tinctly superior are cases where the administrative as distinguished from the regulatory du-
ties have been vested in the chairman.").
285. See, e.g., Reorg. Plan No. 9 of 1950, 3 C.F.R. §§1005-06 (1949-1953), reprinted in
5 U.S.C. app. at 1470-71 (1994) (Federal Power Commission).
286. See WELBORN, supra note 278, at 36-38.
287. See Appendix, supra.
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assign substantive authority to the agency as a whole and administrative
authority to the chairman. But each statute uses its own form of words that
can create slightly different demarcations of responsibility. Frequently,
Congress simply copies from one statute to another, or amalgamates por-
tions of more than one statute into the new statute. Statutory language is
often ambiguous, and even relatively detailed statutes rarely fill in all of the
fine points of the agency's organization and operation.
The typical reorganization plan of the 1950s and 1960s contained the
following language:
There are hereby transferred from the... Commission... to the Chairman of the
Commission ... the executive and administrative functions of the Commission, in-
cluding functions of the Commission with respect to (1) the appointment and supervi-
sion of personnel employed under the Commission, (2) the distribution of business
among such personnel and among administrative units of the Commission, and (3)
the use and expenditures of funds.
28 8
Use of the term "including" before the specific enumeration of the tril-
ogy of conventional executive or administrative functions indicates that ap-
pointment and supervision of staff, the distribution of the agency's work,
and the use and expenditure of funds were generally regarded as executive
or administrative functions belonging to the chairman. But the full range of
executive or administrative powers, and the relationship between admini-
stration and substance, were undefined. The Hoover Commission could do
no better than observe that "[p]urely executive duties [are] those that can be
performed far better by a single administrative official. 289
Importantly, the chairman's administrative and executive powers were
rarely unfettered. The typical reorganization plan limited the chairman's
executive and administrative powers in four key respects:
(1) In carrying out any of his functions under the provisions of this section the
Chairman shall be governed by general policies of the Commission and by such
regulatory decisions, findings, and determinations as the Commission may by law be
authorized to make.
(2) The appointment by the Chairman of the heads of major administrative units
under the Commission shall be subject to the approval of the Commission.
(3) Personnel employed regularly and full time in the immediate offices of members
of the Commission other than the Chairman shall not be affected by the provisions of
this reorganization plan.
288. Reorg. Plan No. 8 of 1950, 3 C.F.R. 1005 (1949-1953), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app.
at 1470 (1994) (emphasis added) (FTC).
289. HOOVER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 284, at 3.
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(4) There are hereby reserved to the Commission its functions with respect to re-
vising budget estimates and with respect to determining upon the distribution of ap-
propriated funds according to major programs and purposes.
29
0
In short, Congress sought to centralize day-to-day direction and internal
administration of the agency in the chairman's hands in order to prevent
what one observer has described as "splintered management." 291 However,
as noted, Congress did not accord agency chairmen absolute administrative
and executive authority. It plainly left to each member selection and su-
pervision of staff in his or her own office. Moreover, it required that, in
exercising administrative powers, a chairman had to do so in accordance
with the agency's overall policy direction-whatever that meant. And it
gave the agency as a whole a role to play with respect to certain core re-
sponsibilities-such as overall approval of key staff appointments, and the
budget-that were likely to affect the agency's substantive functions or
mission. Professor Welborn observed in his study of multi-member agen-
cies: "Although some differences are specified in the prerogatives of
chairmen and the membership, ultimate formal responsibility for regulatory
policy development and implementation is vested in... [the agency] to be
exercised in a collegial, shared manner."
292
The most significant publicly available examinations of the respective
responsibilities of the chairman of a multi-member agency and the agency
as a whole are (1) a 1974 opinion of the Comptroller General, and an
amendment to it issued four months later, dealing with the EEOC;293 (2) a
memorandum prepared by the Office of General Counsel of the Chemical
Safety Board (CSB) outlining the respective roles of the chairman and the
290. Decision of the Comptroller General to the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission, No. B-167015, 1974 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 1627, at *14-*15 (Sept. 19, 1974)
[hereinafter 1974 Decision of the Comptroller General] (quoting Reorg. Plan No. 8 of 1950,
5 U.S.C. app at 1470). Where Congress wants to deviate from the normal statutory division
of responsibility, it knows how to do so expressly. For example, the statute governing the
EEOC confers on the EEOC chairman express power to "appoint and fix the compensation
of [officers and employees] as he deems necessary." Decision of the Comptroller General
to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, No. B-167015, 1975 U.S. Comp. Gen.
LEXIS 2550, at *4 (Jan. 9, 1975) [hereinafter 1975 Decision of the Comptroller General]
(emphasis added) (citing Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261,
§ 8(d), 86 Stat. 103, 109-10). Conversely, the FMC Chairman can make appointments "af-
ter consultation with other Commissioners." 46 C.F.R. § 501.5(a) (1999).
291. See WELBORN, supra note 278, at 10 & n.18 (quoting MARVER H. BERNSTEIN,
REGULATING BusINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 173 (1955)).
292. WELBORN, supra note 278, at 5.
293. See 1975 Decision of the Comptroller General, supra note 290, at * I; 1974 Deci-
sion of the Comptroller General, supra note 290, at * 1.
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board as a whole under the agency's rather typical statute;294 and (3) an
opinion of the DOJ Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) broadly endorsing the
CSB General Counsel's analysis.295 The Comptroller General opinion sup-
ports the historical evidence that Congress ordinarily intends to leave day-
to-day agency administration to the chairman while retaining for the
agency as a whole a role to play in those administrative or management
296matters that may affect the agency's substantive functions or mission.
In the Comptroller General case, the EEOC statute provided generally
that "the Chairman shall be responsible on behalf of the Commission for
the administrative operations of the Commission." 297 Although the words
of individual statutes may have differed somewhat, the Comptroller Gen-
eral observed that the EEOC's statute was analogous to provisions gener-
ally vesting administrative responsibilities in the heads of other independ-
ent regulatory agencies. 298 The Comptroller General stated, however, that
294. Memorandum from Christopher Warner, General Counsel et al., U.S. Chemical
Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, to The CSB Board (Aug. 30, 1999) (visited Sept. 7,
2000) <www.chemsafety.gov/board/1999/docs/boardgovmemo.pdf> [hereinafter CSB
Board Governance Memo].
295. Memorandum from Randolph D. Moss, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office
of Legal Counsel, to Paul-Noel Chretien, General Counsel, Chemical Safety and Hazard
Investigation Board (June 26, 2000) <www.chemsafety.gov/lib/DOJmemo_06_26_2000.
PDF> [hereinafter OLC 2000 Opinion].
296. Under a relatively typical organizational statute, the EEOC Chairman was respon-
sible for the agency's administrative operations. In a dispute over contracting authority,
three members of the Commission challenged the Chairman's assertion that his administra-
tive power included authority to execute contracts without submitting them first to the full
Commission for approval. Interpreting the statutory provision, the EEOC general counsel
drew a broad distinction between the establishment of agency policy, which rested with the
Commission as a whole, and the implementation of agency policy, which was within the
Chairman's purview. He concluded that the execution of contracts designed to implement
Commission policy decisions rested with the Chairman although "the award of certain con-
tracts ... may peculiarly fall within the realm of policy determinations and should therefore
properly be approved by the Commission as a whole." 1974 Decision of the Comptroller
General, supra note 290, at *10 (quoting the general counsel). The three commissioners
sought out the Comptroller General's advice on the ground that the issue involved the ex-
penditure of appropriated funds; the three commissioners also asked, more generally, that
the Comptroller General address the respective roles and responsibilities of the Chairman
vis-A-vis the Commission as a body. See id. at * 1-* 1i.
297. 1974 Decision of the Comptroller General, supra note 290, at *2 (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 2000A-4(a)).
298. See 1974 Decision of the Comptroller General, supra note 290, at * 13-* 15 (com-
paring EEOC statute with procedures governing FTC, Federal Power Commission, and
SEC). As noted above, the statute deviated from the classic model by conferring on the
EEOC Chairman express power to "appoint and fix the compensation of [officers and em-
ployees] as he deems necessary." 1975 Decision of the Comptroller General, supra note
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these provisions were "not intended to supersede or diminish in any way
the substantive authorities and responsibilities of the Commission[s] as a
whole." 299  Based in part on this understanding, the Comptroller General
approved the full commission's involvement in certain administrative ac-
tivities:
[A] number of Commission activities, while in part administrative, also involve sub-
stantive determinations of legitimate concern to the full Commission [and] . . . the
Commission as a body has authority to establish reasonable standards to delimit and
govern the substantive aspects of such activities.
3
00
Drawing on the President's views, the Comptroller General attempted to
construct the following general line between the functions of the chairman
and those of the agency as a whole:
In regard to the regulatory agencies, the [reorganization] plans distinguish between
two groups of functions necessary to the conduct of these agencies. One group in-
cludes the substantive aspect of regulation-that is, the determination of policies, the
formulation and issuance of rules, and the adjudication of cases. All these functions
are left in the board or commission as a whole. The other group of functions com-
prises the day-to-day direction and internal administration of the complex staff or-
ganizations which the commissions require. These responsibilities are transferred to
the chairman of the agencies, to be discharged in accordance with policies which the
commissions may establish.'O
There are nonetheless some administrative functions with which the
agency as a whole may not interfere. However, the Comptroller General
indicated that "where disputes arise as to what matters are procedural or
administrative and what are substantive, the full commission should have
the final say.'302 The Office of Legal Counsel endorses this principle as
well.3°3
Agency statutes are different and each is, to some extent, sui generis.
Statutory deviation from the model of the reorganization plans ordinarily
occurs when specific institutional issues are brought to Congress' attention,
or are for some reason a matter of congressional (or, more likely, congres-
sional staff) interest or concern. For example, the statute governing the
290, at *4 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
299. 1974 Decision of the Comptroller General, supra note 290, at * 17.
300. 1975 Decision of the Comptroller General, supra note 290, at *1; cf OLC 2000
Opinion, supra note 295, at 3-4 (stating that while Chairman of the Chemical Safety and
Hazard Investigation Board has authority to superintend and carry out daily activities neces-
sary to implement Board's substantive decisions, he does not have authority to make those
decisions alone).
301. 1974 Decision of the Comptroller General, supra note 290, at *18.
302. Id. at *19-*20 (citing 96 CONG. REc. 7163-64 (1950)).
303. See OLC 2000 Opinion, supra note 295, at 2 (stating that Board's decision controls
if it is not arbitrary or unreasonable).
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FCC unambiguously assigns key administrative responsibilities to the
agency as a whole. The statute provides that the commission:
may make such expenditures (including expenditures for rent and personal services at
the seat of government and elsewhere ), as may be necessary for the execution of
the functions vested in the Commission.. [;1304
... may perform any and all acts, make such rules and regulations, and issue such or-
ders, not inconsistent with this chapter, as may be necessary in the execution of its
functions[;]
30 5
* . . may conduct its proceedings in such manner as will best conduce to the proper
dispatch of business and to the ends of justice[;]
30 6
.. . shall have authority . . . to appoint such officers, engineers, accountants, attor-
neys, inspectors, examiners, and other employees as are necessary in the exercise of
its functions.
307
It further expressly provides:
From time to time as the Commission may find necessary, the Commission shall or-
ganize its staff into (1) integrated bureaus, to function on the basis of the Commis-
sion's principal workload operations, and (2) such other divisional organizations as
the Commission may deem necessary.
308
The statute also has an explicit statutory provision requiring meetings:
[To] be held at regular intervals, not less frequently than once each calendar month, at
which times the functioning of the Commission and the handling of its work load
shall be reviewed and such orders shall be entered and other action taken as may be
necessary or appropriate to expedite the prompt and orderly conduct of the business
of the Commission with the objective of rendering a final decision (1) within three
months from the date of filing in all original application, renewal, and transfer cases
in which it will not be necessary to hold a hearing, and (2) within six months from the
final date of the hearing in all hearing cases.
30 9
304. 47 U.S.C. § 154(g)(1) (1994).
305. Id. § 154(i).
306. Id. § 154(j).
307. Id. § 154(f)(1). At first blush, the appointment power in section 154(f)(1) would
appear to include the power to appoint a managing director. Nevertheless, Congress goes on
to provide expressly that the Commission "shall have a Managing Director who shall be ap-
pointed by the Chairman subject to the approval of the Commission." Id. § 155(e). Pre-
sumably, this surplusage is intended to make clear both that the Commission must have a
managing director and that the Commission as a whole must approve the Chairman's selec-
tion.
308. 47 U.S.C. § 155(b) (1994).
309. Id. § 155(d).
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The statute then sets out the chairman's powers with some specificity. He
has the duty to :
[PJreside at all meetings ... [;J
[R]epresent the Commission in all matters relating to legislation ... except that any
[individual] commissioner may present his own or minority views or supplemental
reports ... [;]
[Maintain contacts] with other governmental ... agencies, and.., coordinate and or-
ganize the work of the Commission in such manner as to promote prompt and effi-
cient disposition of all matters within the jurisdiction of the Commission.
3 1 0
Each of the chairman's explicit powers seems to come easily within the
ordinary concept of administrative and executive authority. Taken together
with those provisions that appear to accord the agency as a whole greater
than usual administrative authority, the inclusion of these specific provi-
sions leads to the presumption that Congress intended to leave no doubt as
to the distinct responsibilities of the agency and the chairman.
31'
Many statutes are far less detailed regarding the relationship between the
chairman and the agency as a whole. They simply give the chairman unde-
fined administrative and executive powers. For example, the statute gov-
erning the Federal Reserve Board provides that, "[t]he Chairman of the
Board, subject to its supervision, shall be its active executive officer."
312
The National Labor Relations Board's statute provides simply that the
President shall designate one member to serve as chairman, but it otherwise
has no provisions relating to the chairman's duties. 31 3 As a practical mat-
ter, key decisions at both agencies are made collegially.
31 4
The chairman's clearest area of responsibility is the day-to-day admini-
stration of the agency. The prototype statute expressly gives the chairman
the right to distribute business among agency personnel and administrative
units within the agency.1 5 No other approach is genuinely workable. This
power includes the direction of the work of the staff on behalf of the
agency, and may also include the ability to initiate departures from routine
310. Id. § 155(a).
311. Former FCC Chairman Reed Hundt was constantly concerned about the lack of a
"reliable majority." See HuNDT, supra note 127, at 157.
312. 12 U.S.C. § 242 (1994).
313. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 154 (1994).
314. See infra Appendix.
315. See Reorg. Plan No. 9 of 1950, § 1(a), 3 C.F.R. 1005 (1949-1953), reprinted in 5
U.S.C. app. at 1470-71 (1994), and in 64 Stat. 1265 (1950) (Federal Power Commission).
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or established approaches, either with or without notification of board
members.1 6
Most agency statutes give the chairman the right to appoint the staff, al-
though such authority is frequently subject to some form of agency ap-
proval.317 By regulation, the NRC chairman can only appoint heads of
major administrative units with the "approval of the Commission. 318 What
constitutes a "major administrative unit" within an agency is left to the
agency's determination. 319 However, even those statutes that merely re-
quire that the chairman's executive or administrative actions be governed
by the "general policies and decisions" of the agency32 , would appear to
give the agency as a whole some role, albeit undefined, in agency admini-
stration-if it elects to exercise it.
One administrative area in which agency members frequently have been
involved is budgeting. Many statutes affirmatively accord the agency as a
whole the right to approve the annual budget. Even where such authority is
not explicitly conferred, the Comptroller General has recognized that
316. A reorganization plan that required a Chairman to act in accordance with agency
directives would not give the agency the power to mandate that, in their day-to-day busi-
ness, an agency's bureaus or officers must report to someone other than the Chairman.
Letter to George M. Stafford, Interstate Commerce Commission, No. B-181536, 1974 U.S.
Comp. Gen. LEXIS 1817, at *3-*6 (July 25, 1974).
317. During his four years in office, FCC Chairman Reed Hundt hired 200 new peo-
ple-about 10% of the total workforce and 50% of the policy ranks. See HUNDT, supra note
127, at 69. Both the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC) and
the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission (FMSHRC) are adjudicatory tri-
bunals that review matters brought by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to the "split-
enforcement" model created by the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.), and the
Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-164, 91 Stat. 1290 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 30 U.S.C.), respectively. They perform equivalent func-
tions. Yet the OSHRC statute states that "[tihe Chairman shall be responsible on behalf of
the Commission for the administrative operations of the Commission and shall appoint such
administrative law judges and other employees as he deems necessary to assist in the per-
formance of the Commission's functions and to fix their compensation." 29 U.S.C. § 661(e)
(1994). The FMSHRC statute states that "[tihe Chairman shall be responsible on behalf of
the Commission for the administrative operations of the Commission. The Commission
shall appoint such employees as it deems necessary to assist in the performance of the
Commission's functions and to fix their compensation ...." 30 U.S.C. § 823(b)(2) (1994)
(emphasis added). Are the Chairmen's powers intended to be different? As a practical
matter, the Chairmen appear to exercise the same powers at both agencies. See infra Ap-
pendix.
318. 10C.F.R.§ 1.ll(a)(2000).
319. See WELBORN, supra note 278, at 5 1.
320. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § I 111(e) (1994) (National Transportation Safety Board).
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"budget submissions involve policy determinations., 321 But the chairman
also controls the agency's workload and expenditure of funds and is the
agency's collegial spokesman with outside groups, including Congress.
Although the location of these roles with the chairman does not prevent
other agency members from offering their separate, independent views in
an appropriate fashion, it accords the chairman the most powerful role in
the agency for setting agendas, establishing budget priorities, developing
consensus on substantive decisions, and handling external relationships.
3 22
It nonetheless seems clear, as the Comptroller General's opinion at least
implies, that the chairman's unitary authority often does not extend beyond
the preparation or drafting of budget documents, which is considered an
administrative or executive responsibility. 23  This is the system used at
those agencies with which we are familiar.
According to the OLC, silence in a statute on issues such as an agency's
internal organization, practices, and procedures, clearly implies that these
issues are to be decided by the members of the agency. 324 As a practical
matter, virtually every multi-member agency inevitably must fill in at least
some statutory gaps and arrive at a modus vivendi for its operation. Fortu-
nately, agencies have broad authority to fill in the gaps and resolve ambi-
325guities.  Most agency internal procedures and allocations of responsibil-
321. 1974 Decision of the Comptroller General, supra note 290, at *22.
322. See WELBORN, supra note 278, at 20, 22-23 (noting centralized decisionmaking
within agencies and discussing powers of Chairmen in different agencies).
323. See 1974 Decision of the Comptroller General, supra note 290, at *22-*23 (indi-
cating that while the Chairman has significant responsibility for budget preparation, the full
Commission has authority to approve budget submissions to OMB and Congress).
324. See National Commission on Neighborhoods (Pub. L. No. 95-24)---Powers-Ap-
propriations, 2 Op. Off. Legal Counsel, 366, 367 n.5 (1977).
325. For example, some statutes make no explicit provision for a Vice Chairman or
some other person or persons to temporarily run the agency in the event of the absence or
disability of the Chairman. However, it would be irresponsible for an agency to allow itself
simply to drift if critical administrative functions needed to be performed. The FCC has
filled this statutory void by providing that it will temporarily designate one of its members
to serve as Chairman in the absence of the appointed Chairman. See 47 C.F.R. § 0.3(b)
(1999). The agency presumably relies on its statutory power to "perform any and all acts,
make such rules and regulations, and issue such orders ... as may be necessary in the exe-
cution of its functions." 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (1994). However, even agencies with more
limited statutory authority should have ample power to designate one of its members to per-
form functions that are essential to the continued operation of the agency. The Supreme
Court has traditionally allowed agencies considerable procedural discretion, observing that
agencies "should be free to fashion their own rules of procedure and to pursue methods of
inquiry capable of permitting them to discharge their multitudinous duties." Vermont Yan-
kee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 543 (1978) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 290 (1965)). Internal operations, in par-
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ity evolve over time.326 Institutional determinations regarding these matters
receive respect in the courts.327 In the absence of agency policy on a par-
ticular subject, the chairman necessarily possesses substantial discretion to
act on his or her own. The OLC's general observations on the respective
roles of the chairman and the agency as a whole are worth setting out in
some detail:
[U]nder the Act and general principles governing the operations of boards, the day-
to-day administration of Board matters and execution of Board policies are the re-
sponsibilities of the chairperson, subject to Board oversight, while substantive poli-
cymaking and regulatory authority is vested in the Board as a whole. In disputes over
the allocation of authority in specific instances, the Board's decision controls, as long
as it is not arbitrary or unreasonable....
[Tihe Act provides that the chairperson "shall be the Chief Executive Officer of the
Board and shall exercise the executive and administrative functions of the Board." ...
[Tihe terms ["Chief Executive Officer" and "executive and administrative functions"]
... provide some general guidance on the proper division of authority between the
chairperson and the Board as a whole. ... The chairperson, in other words, superin-
tends and carries out the day-to-day activities necessary to effectuate the Board's sub-
ticular, are rarely disturbed by the courts. See FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134
(1940); T.S.C. Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. United States, 186 F. Supp. 777 (S.D. Tex.
1960), affdper curiam sub nom., Herrin Transp. Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 419 (1961).
Looking at multi-member agencies where the Chairman has general administrative respon-
sibility, the Comptroller General has concluded that, in the absence of a Chairman, the re-
maining commissioners retain a "residual power" to perform administrative functions. Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Review Commission-Authority of Commissioners, 60 Comp.
Gen. 627, 628 (1981). The OLC, more protective of the President's prerogatives, advised
the Federal Reserve Board that its Vice Chairman could not simply assume the duties of the
Chairman when a vacancy occurred because the Vice Chairman had express statutory power
only to "preside" at Board meetings in the absence of the Chairman. The OLC acknowl-
edged that a contrary argument could be made and noted that the Federal Reserve Board
had, in the past, actually elected one of its members to serve as Chairman pro tempore.
Nonetheless, the OLC asserted that, absent an express statutorily prescribed mechanism for
filling vacancies, the President may designate one of the Board members to serve as acting
Chairman. Federal Reserve Board-Vacancy with the Office of the Chairman-Status of
the Vice Chairman, 2 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 394 (1978). When the Chemical Safety and
Hazard Investigation Board was without a Chairman, it delegated some administrative re-
sponsibilities to each of its four members but did not designate an "Acting Chairman." See
infra Appendix.
326. See Idaho v. ICC, 939 F.2d 784, 788 (9th Cir. 1991) (explaining and upholding tra-
ditional use of ICC's notation voting procedures), affg Union Pac. R.R.-Abandonment in
Fremont and Teton Counties, Idaho, 6 I.C.C.2d 641 (1990).
327. See Falcon Trading Group, Ltd. v. SEC, 102 F.3d 579, 582 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (up-
holding SEC's creation of innovative quorum requirements).
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stantive decisions. He does not, absent some form of Board approval ... make those
decisions by himself.
The Act also empowers the Board to "establish such procedural and administrative
rules as are necessary to the exercise of its functions and duties.". . . These could in-
clude rules bearing on matters of internal Board governance ... as well as rules gov-
erning the conduct of Board business with the public .... To the extent the Board
establishes such rules, the chairperson, as the Board's administrative and executive
officer, must put them into practice....
[T]his does not mean that the Board, exercising its oversight authority and its powers
to make substantive decisions ... may or should attempt to address itself to the pleth-
ora of minute administrative problems bound up with the operation of a complex or-
ganization. Some degree of managerial discretion is inherent in the concept of an ex-
ecutive or administrative office, and the statutory assignment of the Board's
executive and administrative functions to the chairperson necessarily vests the chair-
person with a degree of managerial autonomy on which the Board, in the proper ex-
ercise of its powers, cannot trench .... At the same time ... any number of Board ac-
tivities or day-to-day aspects of Board business, while at least in part administrative
and even seemingly mundane, may involve or affect the board's duties and functions
in ways that are of legitimate concern to the board as a whole. Where that is the case,
it is the prerogative of the Board to pass upon such issues in ways appropriate to its
function as a policymaking and rule-setting body.
3 28
It must be noted that an agency's statute alone rarely tells the complete
story of agency operation. Because most statutes are incomplete or am-
biguous and there is no official forum (such as a court) for regular resolu-
tion of intra-agency management questions, agency chairmen may, and at
certain times do, assert administrative prerogatives. Former FTC Chairman
Miles Kirkpatrick observed:
I should make it clear that in the management of the Commission's day-to-day af-
fairs, there are no collegial decisions. Management of the Commission, save for the
appointment of the top policy making positions and policy decisions having to do
with the allocation of major resources, is placed squarely in the Chairman. In my ex-
perience, matters having to do with the management of the Commission's staff are
not the subject of debate among the Commissioners. 29
328. OLC 2000 Opinion, supra note 295, at 2-4 (internal citiations omitted).
329. Miles W. Kirkpatrick, Nineteenth Annual Antitrust Spring Dinner Address, in 40
ANTITRUsT L.J. 328, 332 (1971). Even at the FCC, where the Chairman's powers are
somewhat circumscribed by statute, former FCC member Glen Robinson has noted: "From
personal experience I can report that the FCC's Chairman and a handful of staff-usually
selected by the chair-can and usually do exercise nearly total control over that agency's
basic policy agenda." Glen 0. Robinson, Independent Agencies: Form and Substance in
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Professor Welborn also suggests that chairmen have a relatively greater
influence than their colleagues do on substantive matters. He found that
agency chairmen dissent with far less frequency than their colleagues in
substantive, collegial decisions. 330 As a result, decisionmaking even at
multi-member agencies is "relatively centralized" and "independent action
at lower levels on critical matters is limited.",331 A more recent study by
Professors Derthick and Quirk of three multi-member agencies (Civil
Aeronautics Board, ICC, FCC) during the deregulatory period from 1975-
1980 reached much the same conclusions.332 They observed:
Commission members tended in general to defer to the chairman. The formal execu-
tive powers that all of the chairmen possessed gave them a great advantage over
commission members .... In truth, commission members had very little to do and
few resources with which to do it....
Being the president's choice also helped the chairmen .... This created some pre-
sumption that the chairman was pursuing policies that were also the president's poli-
cies and that he was therefore entitled to support from those commission members
who were of the same political party as the president and the chairman.
333
As a practical matter, the combination of political prestige and manage-
rial authority accord some agency chairmen the power to dominate and
Executive Prerogative, 1988 DUKE L.J. 238, 245 n.24. Professor Welborn indicates that
"[olperating arrangements in which the role of Chairman is primary and that of the Com-
mission as a whole is secondary are considered to be entirely appropriate, or legitimate."
WELBORN, supra note 278, at 36. Indeed, this is also the practice at the NTSB. However,
the OLC makes clear that the retention of significant authority in a Chairman "is a matter of
the development, through collegial practice and over time, of the [agency's] own internal
policies concerning delegation of authority to the ... chairperson, the [agency's] acquies-
cence in the chairperson's assertion of authority over certain substantive areas, and the gen-
eral evolution of the [agency's] current allocation of responsibilities." OLC 2000 Opinion,
supra note 295, at 7. Absent an express statutory provision, the accretion of power by a
Chairman over an agency's affairs is a "matter of the [agency's] grace and does not deprive
the [agency] ... of its stated authorities and responsibilities." Id. at 6.
330. See WELBORN, supra note 278, at 109 (stating that based on a survey of reported
decisions since 1961, "[w]ith only a few exceptions, the number of times chairmen dissent
during their tenure can be counted on the fingers of one hand.").
33 I. ld. at 20. This is not to minimize the volume or importance of action taken by the
staff. However, such action is typically based on reasonably well-accepted agency prece-
dent or the staff's view of current agency policy. The Welbom study offers a comprehen-
sive examination of the powers of seven independent agency chairmen and the relationship
of agency chairmen to other agency members. See id at 20-27.
332. See MARTHA DERTHICK & PAUL J. QUIRK, THE POLITICS OF DEREGULATION (1985).
333. Id. at 86-87.
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control their agencies' agendas. Such control is obtained more easily at
agencies that have a tradition of chairman leadership. 334 Alfred Kahn was
heir to such tradition when he became chairman at the Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB) in the mid-1970s. More importantly, his personal association
with President Carter and the White House staff allowed him an effective
veto over the nomination or reappointment of other board members.335
This ensured that he worked with a sympathetic set of colleagues.
336
Kahn's political influence at the White House-and, to some degree at
least, his overall reputation-also ensured his colleagues' acquiescence on
staff appointments and the board's agenda.
337
334. See id. at 77-78 (noting tradition of Chairman leadership at CAB and FCC and lack
of it at ICC). It wasn't until 1969 that administrative authority was transferred from the ICC
collegially to the Chairman. See Reorg. Plan No. I of 1969, 3 C.F.R. 1066-67 (1966-1970),
reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 1547 (1994). The Commission's first permanent Chairman,
George Stafford, rarely used it. DERTHICK & QUIRK, supra note 332, at 78.
335. See MCCRAW, supra note 52, at 288-89 (stating that Kahn proposed names for
President Carter's consideration and that all appointments to the Board itself met with
Kahn's approval). Former FCC Chairman Reed Hundt has noted that during his tenure in
the Clinton administration, the Senate Republicans exercised a veto power over Republican
seats on the Commission. See HUNDT, supra note 127, at 159.
336. Cf Robinson, supra note 329, at 245 (noting that "[r]espectful regard for signs of
presidential preferences on policy issues is ensured not so much out of gratitude for the fa-
vor of the appointment (though this may be a factor) as by the possibility of future rewards
for faithful service (including other high appointments in the government.")).
337. Although the Board had to approve the appointment of heads of major administra-
tive units, see Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1961, 3 C.F.R. 873 (1959-1963), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
app. at 1508 (1994), a Board majority gave Kahn carte blanche. Kahn reorganized the
Board, created a new Office of Economic Analysis, and appointed a number of committed
deregulators to critical positions. See McCRAw, supra note 52, at 274-75; DERTHICK &
Qun, supra note 332, at 78-79. After key staff members were appointed, the Washington
Post quoted Kahn as saying "[aill the bomb throwers are here and in place. You have to
judge this agency starting from this point forward; now there are no excuses." McCRAw,
supra note 52, at 275 (quoting Carole Shifrin, CAB Geared Up to Cut Regulation, WASH.
POST, Jan. 12, 1978, at D9). Kahn also used the Chairman's control of the Board's calendar
to advance his substantive agenda. He moved two applications from new entrants to the
head of the queue for evaluation. See Id. at 280-82. Professor Edles served as CAB Deputy
General Counsel during the Kahn administration. He participated in a meeting at which
Kahn's executive director indicated that the Chairman wanted the application of Midway
Airlines, a new entrant, to be considered by the Board within a year. The only way to meet
Kahn's deadline was to eliminate the preparation of an initial decision by the presiding ALJ
and have the Board decide the case itself, as an agency is authorized to do in initial licensing
cases under 5 U.S.C. § 557(b)(1) of the APA. So the staff developed a schedule that had the
ALJ preside at the hearing but simply certify the record to the Board for decision. The gen-
eral counsel's office worked closely with Kahn and his colleagues in reviewing the evidence
and drafting an opinion, and the Board issued its decision (technically a "tentative deci-
sion") within a year as Kahn had directed. Chicago-Midway Low-Fare Route Proceeding,
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A chairman's assertion of power can be thwarted by colleagues. A 1999
turf battle between the Chairman of the Chemical Safety and Hazard In-
vestigation Board (CSB) and his fellow members demonstrates the inade-
quacy of law and the ascendancy of political will in the resolution of inter-
nal agency conflicts. The CSB's statute and legislative history, not
uncharacteristically, fail to delineate precisely the respective roles of the
chairman, as the agency's chief administrative officer, and his colleagues,
in directing the agency's overall operation. At long-established agencies,
this relationship has been worked out over time. But the CSB was brand
new, with four newly appointed members.
None of the four board members were lawyers. Three of them were dis-
tressed that the chairman and a newly appointed chief operating officer
simply ran the agency without consultation.338  The three asked the agency
general counsel to provide guidance as to the respective responsibilities of
the chairman and the board as a whole. He opined that the chairman was in
day-to-day administrative control of the agency, with authority, for exam-
ple, to assign work to and supervise the staff, but he also said that the board
had statutory power to play some admittedly undefined role in the overall
administration of the agency, such as approval of senior staff appointments
and the agency's annual budget. 339 With no express statutory guidance on
any particular division of responsibility, the general counsel proposed that
the board members jointly agree on a modus vivendi.340 The chairman de-
78 C.A.B. 454 (1978). See also Mark E. Budnitz, The FTC's Consumer Protection Pro-
gram During the Miller Years: Lessons for Administrative Agency Structure and Operation,
46 CATE. U. L. REv. 371, 413-14 (1997). Budnitz observes that the approval process for
many FTC rules in the pipeline but not promulgated became "stalled" when James Miller
became the FTC Chairman. Nonetheless, some rules went forward. The FTC unanimously
enacted a credit practices rule and promulgated a funeral industry practices regulation over
Miller's opposition. See id. at 421-24. Budnitz notes that Chairman Miller did not termi-
nate any rulemaking proceedings, thus leaving open the possibility that a new Chairman
might have resumed them. As of the 1997 date of the article, that had not happened. See id.
at 436-37. The FTC's adjudicatory caseload also decreased during the Miller administra-
tion. See id. at 391.
338. Among other things, the Chairman unilaterally decided that the Board would not
undertake any new investigations. See Guy Gugliotta, Chemical Hazards Board and Chief
a Volatile Mix, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 1999, at A21.
339. Id. The general counsel's thirty-one page memorandum was released to the public
and is available at the Board's web site at <www.chemsafety.gov/board/1999/docs/
boardgovmemo.pdf>. See CSB Board Governance Memo, supra note 294. Professor Edles
served as a consultant to the Office of General Counsel during this period.
340. See CSB Board Governance Memo, supra note 294, at 2 ("The Chairperson and the
Board Members should work cooperatively to design a set of rules that do not compromise
the statutory functions of either the Chairperson or the Board Members and that permit the
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clined and, instead, asserted total authority to run the agency.34' The other
members demurred. Matters came to a head when the chairman submitted
his own budget request to Congress without consulting his colleagues. 342
There is no official forum for the resolution of such intramural dis-
agreements.343 An administration can play a role by informal intervention,
however, and so too can key members of Congress. In the instant case,
Senator Lautenberg-described as "the board's biggest congressional
booster"-endorsed the board majority's power-sharing approach.344
Given the CSB's tenuous position with Congress,3 45 his views were signifi-
cant. The chairman backed down, tendered his resignation as chairman (he
elected to remain on the board as a member), and all members signed a
"concordat" that went forward with a request for a DOJ opinion regarding
the general counsel's views. While awaiting the opinion, all board mem-
bers reviewed and commented on communications submitted to Congress,
Board to fulfill its fundamental substantive responsibilities. ... ); Gugliotta, supra note
338.
341. See Gugliotta, supra note 338 (quoting the Board Chairman as indicating that
"[h]iring personnel and budget development, in my view, are administrative").
342. See Gugliotta, supra note 338; see also Dean Scott, Board Acts Without Chairman,
Calls for Justice Department to Settle Rift, 23 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1358, 1358 (Nov.
26, 1999) (reporting that three Board members voted to direct the Chairman to rescind his
request for a doubling of the Board's budget). The agency's chief operating officer de-
scribed the dissension as "an ideological disagreement." Id. at 1359.
343. The OLC is permitted to offer "informal opinions" or "legal advice" on issues af-
fecting independent agencies pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 0.25(a) (1999), and independent agen-
cies solicit such opinions or advice from time to time, although not very often in our experi-
ence. Agencies will seek advice when to do otherwise might expose them to subsequent
legal risk or embarrassment. See, e.g., Federal Reserve Board Policy on Bank Examiner
Borrowing, 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 509 (1982), clarified in 17 Op. Off. Legal Counsel
168 (1993) (determining whether Board bank examiners may borrow from or hold credit
cards from banks they are authorized to examine); Authority of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission to Collect Annual Charges from Federal Agencies, 15 Op. Off. Legal Counsel
74 (1991) (determining whether NRC has statutory authority to collect annual charges from
federal agencies that hold licenses issued by NRC). But seeking advice-particularly on
internal agency operations-may mean that the agency will get an answer it does not like
and will then be constrained, even if only politically, to follow the advice received.
344. Guy Gugliotta, Hill Quits as CEO of Chemical Investigations Board, WASH. POST,
Dec. 18, 1999, at AI5. A chemical workers' union official who had supported the Board
blamed the Chairman for the impasse. See id.
345. See Dean Scott, Hazard Investigation Board Members Seek Meeting to Discuss
Role in Budget, Policy, 23 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1323 (indicating that some members of
Congress questioned the need for the agency, the House Appropriations Subcommittee
Chairman was "skeptical" of the agency's annual request for budget increases, and the Sen-




including the agency's appropriation request and on contracts involving
more than $25,000. In addition, the board members concurred in the hiring
of heads of offices within the agency. The members also agreed to sched-
ule monthly public meetings.346 The OLC's June 26, 2000, opinion force-
fully backing the CSB general counsel and the board majority largely
ended the turf battle.347
2. Collegial Decisionmaking
When the chairman of the NLRB was about to leave his post in the
summer of 1998, he complained about the inability of the board to issue
key decisions, noting that even a single member could hold them up.
348
The problem was one of collegiality and custom (or inability to muster a
majority) rather than legality.
349
Where circumstances require, a majority of a multi-member agency gen-
erally can issue a decision without awaiting preparation of any dissenting
or other separate statements. The courts use this technique, usually with
the consent of the dissenting members, 350 but it can also be done over the
objection of a dissenting colleague.35 1 Although the technique can com-
346. See Gary Taylor, USCSB "Truce" Offers Board Review without Approval,
CHEMICAL NEWS & INTELLIGENCE, Dec. 13, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Group File.
347. See OLC 2000 Opinion, supra note 295; cf Budnitz, supra note 337, at 385-91
(discussing FTC Chairman James Miller's efforts to reorganize FTC, including resistance of
two of Miller's colleagues to his effort to close most of Commission's regional offices, and
resultant congressional intervention). At the SEC, Chairman William Casey in 1972 sepa-
rated the Enforcement Division from the Division of Market Regulation. In the opinion of
one former commissioner, this reorganization, coupled with key appointments to the Com-
mission and its senior staff, made the Division of Enforcement staff the dominant player in
setting the Commission's agenda. The dynamic changed to some extent when Chairman
Harold Williams gave the Office of General Counsel a role to play in analyzing Enforce-
ment Division recommendations. See Roberta S. Karmel, Creating Law at the Securities
and Exchange Commission: The Lawyer as Prosecutor, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33,
40-41 (1998).
348. See Karen Alexander, Gould Goes Out Gunning, LEGAL TIMES, July 13, 1998, at 1.
349. See generally Flynn, supra note 127, at 517-28 (detailing breakdown of collegiality
within NLRB).
350. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194. 209 (1947) (Frankfurter, J. & Jack-
son, J., dissenting) (stating that while they dissented, "there is not now opportunity for a re-
sponse adequate to the issues raised," and that "detailed grounds for dissent will be filed in
due course"); Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's Servs., 547 F.2d
835, 857 (5th Cir. 1977) (Roney, J., dissenting) (regretting that press of court business pre-
vented preparation of dissent in time for distribution with majority opinion).
351. See In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 946 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (Smith, J., dissenting) (protest-
ing publication of majority opinion before dissenting opinions had been completed).
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promise collegial decisionmaking, materials submitted to us and contained
in the Appendix indicate that those agencies that have specifically ad-
dressed the matter allow a majority to issue an opinion without awaiting the
preparation of dissenting or other separate statements. Indeed, even the
NLRB has such a procedure.5 2 It just does not seem to use it.353
B. Quorum and Voting Requirements
Agency quorum and voting requirements are established by statute or, in
the absence of a statutory provision, by agency regulation or tradition. The
National Labor Relations Act contains an example of the traditional statu-
tory provision. It provides simply that three of the NLRB's five statutory
354members constitute a quorum.
Obviously, agencies must follow explicit statutory quorum or voting re-
quirements. 355 Absent a statutory provision, however, most multi-member
federal agencies follow the common law "majority of the quorum" rule,
which means that a quorum is needed before the agency may act, but only a
majority of the quorum is needed for action once a quorum is constituted.
Thus, if an agency's enabling legislation provides that it has five members
352. See infra Appendix (NLRB).
353. In a highly unusual case, certain private parties sued the three-member Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC) to compel its secretary to release a
decision that had been signed by two members, one of whom had left the agency before the
third member (the Chairman) had completed his dissenting statement. The remaining mem-
ber of the majority joined in the lawsuit. In due course, following completion of the Chair-
man's dissenting statement, the agency released the "2-1" decision and the court dismissed
the case as moot. See Arcadian Corp., 17 O.Sh. Cas. (BNA) 1345 (Apr. 27, 1995) (Weis-
berg, Chairman, dissenting), dismissed as moot, In re Arcadian Corp., 17 O.S.H. (BNA)
1406 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 4, 1995).
354. See 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1994).
355. For example, the FEC statute requires four affirmative votes out of six commis-
sioners before the agency may act; a vote of 3-2, with one abstention, is insufficient. See 2
U.S.C. § 437c(c) (1994). In one case, the FEC was unable to muster the necessary four
votes, and thus dismissed a complaint without opinion notwithstanding a recommendation
by its general counsel, based on FEC precedent, that the complaint be pursued. The D.C.
Circuit held that the FEC was required to explain its reasons for dismissal so that the court
could evaluate them. Democratic Congressional Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 831 F.2d 1131,
1132 (D.C. Cir. 1987). An agency member who concurs separately but articulates what a
court decides is an impermissible basis for his or her decision can doom an agency's deci-
sion. Where four of five members of the NLRB participated in a case-two joined in a plu-
rality opinion, one concurred separately, and one dissented-the court reversed the decision
because it found that the concurring opinion had relied on an impermissible construction of
the statute. The court found it unnecessary to examine the plurality opinion because the
Board, as a whole, had failed to articulate a proper basis for resolving the case. Oil, Chem.
& Atomic Workers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 46 F.3d 82, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
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and that three members shall constitute a quorum, the agency may take ac-
tion by a 2-1 vote.356 It is immaterial that only a minority of the agency's
total membership participates or that any statutorily intended balance is dis-
rupted.357 To be counted as part of a quorum, agency members need not
offer their views on the merits of a proceeding. 358 As the New Jersey Su-
preme Court observed in connection with a multi-member state agency:
Insofar as the presence of a legal quorum is in issue, all that matters is whether the
physically present commissioners participated in agency deliberations and took pur-
poseful action by joining, concurring in, dissenting from, or even abstaining from the
final decision.35 9
Absent statutory requirements, a multi-member agency may, within rea-
son, use its other statutory powers to determine how its quorum require-
ments will be satisfied. For example, the enabling statutes for the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (SEC) do not have explicit quorum
requirements. Those statutes nonetheless authorize the agency to "make
such rules and regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to implement
the provisions of this chapter for which they are responsible or for the exe-
cution of the functions vested in them by this chapter .... 360
In 1995, the SEC adopted a regulation that provides that three members
constitute a quorum unless the number of members in office is fewer than
three, in which case the quorum consists of the number of members actu-
ally in office.361 The regulation further provides that if on any matter of
business, the number of members in office minus the number of members
who are disqualified to consider the matter is two, then those two members
constitute a quorum for purposes of that specific matter. The D.C. Circuit
356. See FTC v. Flotill Prods., Inc., 389 U.S. 179, 183-84 (1967).
357. See Braniff Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 379 F.2d 453, 460 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
358. Morris v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 980 F.2d 1289, 1293-94 (9th Cir.
1992) (stating that agency member who merely concurred in the result held to have partici-
pated in the decision for quorum purposes).
359. King v. New Jersey Racing Comm'n, 511 A.2d 615, 618-19 (N.J. 1986); see also
American Commercial Lines, Inc., 291 N.L.R.B. 1066, 1066 (1988) (reporting a decision
issued by two members of three-member Board where third member did not participate in
merits of decision). Decisions by numerous courts and agencies establish that an agency
member who did not participate at the agency's oral argument may nonetheless familiarize
himself or herself with the record and participate in the decision. See, e.g., Porter &
Dietsch, Inc. v. FTC, 605 F.2d 294, 298-99 (7th Cir. 1979) (citing Gearhart & Otis, Inc. v.
SEC, 348 F.2d 798, 802 (D.C. Cir. 1965)).
360. 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(1) (1994) (outlining the Commissions' power to promulate
rules and regulations).
361. See 17 C.F.R. § 200.41 (1999) (clarifying the Commission's quorum requirement).
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upheld the validity of the SEC's quorum provision. 362 The Ninth Circuit
upheld a decision by the ICC to allow five members to participate through
a written notation vote on a circulating draft decision, although one mem-
ber had resigned before the last member had voted on the same decision.
Although the ICC's regulations did not explicitly cover this eventuality, the
court was influenced by the fact that the procedure had been used by the
Commission for many years and was not invented for the purposes of the
instant case.363
The original Act to Regulate Commerce provided that vacancies on the
ICC did not impair the right of the remaining members to act. A similar
provision has been incorporated into many subsequent statutes. Even
where it has not, the courts have generally reached the same result as a
matter of sensible administration.364
Less than a quorum of the agency may ordinarily grant discretionary re-
view of an administrative law judge's decision. A typical provision is that
of the five-member Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission,
which requires only two votes to take review. 365 Likewise, the five-
member Securities and Exchange Commission grants review on request of
only one of its members.366
Depending on the language of an agency's enabling statute, there may be
limited circumstances where it can even operate without a statutory quo-
rum. In Railroad Yardmasters of America v. Harris, the court decided
whether the National Mediation Board violated its quorum requirement.
367
According to statutory provisions, the National Mediation Board has
authority to delegate functions to individual members. 368 In Harris, one
seat on the Board was vacant and another seat was soon to be vacated.36 9
On the eve of the resignation of the second Board member, the two mem-
362. See Falcon Trading Group, Ltd. v. SEC, 102 F.3d 579, 582 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(holding that SEC was within its authority to promulgate the rule).
363. See Idaho v. ICC, 939 F.2d 784, 788 (9th Cir. 1991), affg Union Pacific R.R.
Co.-Abandonment In Fremont and Tentom Counties, 6 i.C.C.2d 641, 644 (1990) (ex-
plaining the ICC's notation voting procedures).
364. See Assure Competitive Transp., Inc. v. United States, 629 F.2d 467, 472-74 (7th
Cir. 1980).
365. See 29 C.F.R. § 2704.308(b) (1999) (explaining that novel questions of law or pol-
icy only require two votes).
366. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.411(c) (1999) (providing rules governing review of Commis-
sion decisions).
367. See Railroad Yardmasters of Am. v. Harris, 721 F.2d 1332, 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
368. See 45 U.S.C. § 154 (Fourth) (1994).
369. See Harris, 721 F.2d at 1333-35 (explaining one member had retired and a second
was about to resign).
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bers delegated decisional authority to the soon to be remaining member
who, thereafter, acted for the agency pursuant to the delegation. The D.C.
Circuit held the arrangement was valid because it prevented the three-
member Board from complete disability due to the two vacancies.37
Similar to the National Mediation Board's provision, the statute that con-
trols the operations of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Com-
mission provides that an administrative law judge's decision goes into ef-
fect "unless any Commission member has directed that such [decision]
shall be reviewed by the Commission., 371 Thus, an ALJ's decisions go into
effect if no member directs review, even if the Commission has no mem-
bers!
Whether a tie vote constitutes agency action depends on the agency's
statutes and regulations, which vary among agencies. Agency and court
interpretations reflect an experiential linkage between procedure and sub-
stance. Generally speaking, where affirmative agency action is required, a
tie vote does not represent agency action because a majority of the agency
has failed to agree on a decision.372 Following this approach, the rules of
the SEC expressly provide that an initial decision of one of the agency's
ALJs has no effect if a majority of the Commission cannot agree to a dis-
position on the merits of a decision that is under its review.373 In contrast,
when the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission divides
equally, two for affirmance and two for reversal, the ALJ's decision is af-
firmed.374 The difference in approach may be explained by the fact that the
FMSHRC's major responsibility is dispute-resolution while the SEC per-
ceives its adjudicatory role to be part of its broader policy-making respon-
sibilities.
370. See id. at 1334-35. Other agencies have comparable statutory authority. See No-
tice of Delegation of Authority to the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 60
Fed. Reg. 34,561 (1995); Order Delegating Authority to Secretary and Certain Office Di-
rectors, 63 F.E.R.C. 61,073 (Apr. 16, 1993).
371. McLaughlin v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 869 F.2d 1039, 1041 (7th Cir. 1989). But see
Ed Taylor Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 938 F.2d 1265, 1269 (1 Ith Cir. 1991) (holding that there
may be circumstances in which absence of Commissioners available to review ALJ's deci-
sion can constitute denial of individual's procedural rights, in which case decision may be
returned for review by Commission).
372. See Farmers Export Co. v. United States, 758 F.2d 733, 736-37 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(explaining that "there can be no final decision when there is no majority agreement on the
merits of a position").
373. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.41 1(f) (1999) (stating that when there is failure to obtain a
majority, an order shall be accordingly issued).
374. See Secretary of Labor v. Pennsylvania Elec. Co., 12 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1562, 1563-65




Courts are divided on what the effect of decisions made by divided
agencies should be. With respect to the three-member Occupational Safety
and Health Review Commission that has frequently operated with only two
members (and occasionally with only one), some courts have concluded
that at least those decisions by an equally-divided agency (1-1) purportedly
"affirming" an AU's decision constitute final, judicially reviewable agency
action,3 7 while other courts have reached the opposite result.376 Some stat-
utes provide that a divided vote on reconsideration brings an agency action
to an end by leaving the original decision in place.377 In common sense
fashion, numerous agencies have adopted the same approach in practice,
which has been approved by the courts.
3 78
A practical question that arises from time to time, but which has re-
ceived little attention, is whether members who are disqualified or have re-
cused themselves voluntarily from participation in a matter may, nonethe-
less, constitute part of a quorum. Members who are disqualified from
participation because of some genuine conflict of interest probably cannot
be included in the quorum. The participation rights of a member who vol-
untarily recuses himself or herself likely depends on the circumstances and
terms of the recusal.
As best we can tell, there is no direct precedent involving the federal
multi-member agencies. However, the Third Circuit confronted the issue
in a case involving a local draft board. 379 The court determined that par-
ticipation by a disqualified member, even to constitute a quorum, would
conflict with the duty to act impartially.380 Acknowledging that there is a
split of opinion on the issue, the court relied on cases involving corporate
boards of directors, and suggested that a strict rule was required when gov-
ernmental agencies acted in order to protect the due process rights of indi-
375. See Curry v. Beatrice Pocahontas Coal Co., 67 F.3d 517, 522 n.8 (4th Cir. 1995)
(stating that decision by equally divided agency, like similar court decision, is "affirmance-
by-necessity").
376. See Cox Bros., Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 574 F.2d 465, 467 (9th Cir. 1978) (stat-
ing that "affirmance" by equally divided court was not official because it was supported by
one member instead of statutorily required vote of two members); Shaw Constr., Inc. v.
OSHRC, 534 F.2d 1183, 1186 (5th Cir. 1976) (deciding that no reviewable order exists in a
tie vote of Commission).
377. See generally 47 U.S.C. § 405 (1994) (explaining FCC's guidelines for petitions).
378. See Ford Motor Co. v. ICC, 714 F.2d 1157, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (explaining that
3-3 tie vote leaves prior decision final); Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 497 F.2d 608, 615
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that unless split-Board decision contained fundamental defect,
Board's original order shall stand).
379. See In re Shapiro, 392 F.2d 397, 399-400 (3d Cir. 1968).
380. See id. at 399-400.
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viduals. 38' The New Jersey Supreme Court reached the same result in a
case involving a state administrative agency. 382 The court observed:
We are thus entirely satisfied that for purposes of determining whether a legal quo-
rum is present, it is not relevant whether a member is physically absent, is disquali-
fied because of interest, bias, or prejudice, or other good cause, or voluntarily recuses
himself or herself. A member who is disqualified from participating in a particular
matter may not be counted in determining the presence of a legal quorum.38 3
Nevertheless, agencies have been advised by courts to attempt to reach a
final decision whenever possible. 38 4 Where the recusal or disqualification
of individuals would prevent the body from acting, and there is no legally
available substitute decisionmaker, courts have approved the participation
of individuals who may be "biased" as a matter of law under a "rule of ne-
cessity." Such cases include United States v. Will,38 5 where the Supreme
Court decided an issue involving pay raises for all federal judges even
though the case affected their salaries, and FTC v. Cement Institute,
386
where disqualification of the entire administrative agency would have left
no forum available for decision.387
381. See id.
382. See King v. New Jersey Racing Comm'n, 511 A.2d 615, 618-19 (N.J. 1986).
383. Id. at 618.
384. See, e.g., Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 861 (D.C. Cir.
1970) (stating agency member's vote, cast simply to avoid an impasse, is "a perfectly sound
reason for his vote"); United Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 281 F.2d 53, 56 (D.C. Cir. 1960)
(finding no abuse of discretion when agency member read briefs and participated in case
despite not hearing oral argument).
385. 449 U.S. 200, 216-17 (1980) (holding that public interest in attaining competent
and independent judiciary was more important than the disqualification of judges).
386. 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
387. See id. at 700-01 (holding that Commission's expression of views in other official
contexts cannot serve to disqualify all Commissioners because Congress has not provided
for any alternative tribunal). Two Nuclear Regulatory Commission decisions reflect that
agency's effort to avoid incapacity as a result of recusals. During the course of their Senate
confirmation hearings, two prospective NRC commissioners agreed to limit their participa-
tion in a particular license proceeding then pending before the agency, but had differing un-
derstandings with the Senate committee regarding the extent of possible participation. In
Public Service Co. of New Hampshire, 32 N.R.C. 218, 223 (1990), with one vacancy on its
five-member Commission, the NRC denied a motion to reopen the case. This denial indi-
cated that two commissioners voted in favor of the result, one commissioner did not partici-
pate, and the fourth abstained. See id at 223. Under established NRC procedure, the quo-
rum count included the abstaining commissioner but not the non-participant. Therefore, the
agency was able to act with only a 2-0 vote. In Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, 5
N.R.C. 1330 (1977), the NRC had two vacancies on its 5-member Commission. The
Chairman who had voluntarily recused himself from consideration of the merits of a par-
ticular licensing proceeding, participated to form a quorum for the sole purpose of preserv-
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C. Disqualification and Recusal
The APA provides that a presiding or participating employee may at any
time disqualify himself.388 But the APA does not apply to the agency
members themselves (except in those rare instances where an agency
member serves as presiding officer) or contain a substantive definition of
bias.389 The law on the subject, which applies to all agencies, whether
multi-member or not, has been developed in court decisions that rely on ba-
sic principles of due process.
390
1. Bias
The definitions of bias are now reasonably well established and attempt
to take into account two critical distinctions between agencies and courts. 391
First, agencies undertake legislative, executive and quasi-judicial functions
simultaneously. If an administrative system is to function without a dupli-
cation of personnel or a cloning of politically accountable officials, the
mere performance of all three functions by agency members should not,
and does not, standing alone, violate due process. 3 92 Second, agencies are
ing the agency's ability to defer the issue until such time as a proper quorum to consider the
merits was available. See id. at 1331. Finally, in Kellogg Co., the FTC decided that a
Commissioner's voluntary recusal from one phase of a proceeding did not necessarily re-
quire his recusal from another, unrelated phase of the proceeding. See Kellogg Co., 97
F.T.C. 159, 161-62 (1981).
388. If disqualification is requested by a party to an agency adjudication, "the agency
shall determine the matter as a part of the record and decision in the case." APA § 7(a), 5
U.S.C. § 556(b) (1994). The term "presiding or participating employee" refers to those in-
dividuals who preside at the reception of evidence, such as administrative law judges.
389. The provision on disqualification was contained in original section 7 of the APA,
which deals with the hearing process. See § 7(a), 5 U.S.C. § 556(b); see also UNITED
STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT 71-74 (1947). The original APA provided that any presiding or partici-
pating employee "may at any time withdraw if he deems himself disqualified." Section
7(a), 5 U.S.C. § 556(b); see also United Corp., 32 S.E.C. 633, 634 n.3, 635 (1951) (rejecting
motion requesting disqualification of SEC commissioners). The Federal Maritime Commis-
sion, by regulation, defines "presiding officer" to include members of the Commission it-
self. See 46 C.F.R. § 502.25 (1999).
390. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970) (holding impartial decision
maker is essential due process requirement in administrative proceedings).
391. See, e.g., Berkshire Employees Ass'n v. NLRB, 121 F.2d 235, 238-39 (3d Cir.
1941) (reiterating that administrative bodies operate in different fashion from courts).
392. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 58 (1975) (deciding that combination of
prosecuting and decisional powers in same agency does not constitute denial of due proc-
ess); see also Kessel Food Markets, Inc. v. NLRB, 868 F.2d 881, 888 (6th Cir. 1989) (com-
menting agency may find reasonable cause for seeking injunction against respondent and
subsequently adjudicating merits of case).
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program-oriented institutions that possess substantial discretion in the ad-
ministration of their duties. They have a responsibility for deciding indi-
vidual cases within a broad statutory and policy context. Agency members
frequently seek agency positions (or are selected for them) because they are
experts in the field or hold views on how the agency's statutory responsi-
bilities should be administered. The public benefits when those views are
known rather than concealed. So an underlying philosophy of regulation,
even publicly articulated, does not ordinarily rise to a level of bias that
would violate due process principles.393 Indeed, in an oft-quoted phrase,
the Seventh Circuit has observed that a total absence of preconceptions
"would be evidence of a lack of qualification[s] not lack of bias." 394 Pro-
fessors Gellhorn and Levin have pithily stated, "[T]he law has generally
demonstrated a keen awareness that an agency decisionmaker should be
open minded, but not empty headed. 395
The courts have adapted concepts of bias to the administrative arena.
When an agency is engaged in formal adjudication, most closely resem-
bling dispute resolution as practiced by judges, the courts have created a
definition of bias closely resembling that applicable to judges. As a general
matter, a federal judge must disqualify himself: "in any proceeding in
which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned;" where he has a
"personal prejudice concerning a party, or [has] personal knowledge of dis-
puted facts;" or has an interest "that could be substantially affected by the
outcome of the proceeding." 396 The classic disqualification standard appli-
cable in formal administrative adjudications was set forth in Cinderella Ca-
reer and Finishing Schools, Inc. v. FTC: "[t]he test for disqualification [is]
whether 'a disinterested observer may concluded that [a decisionmaker] has
in some measure adjudged the facts as well as the law of a particular case
in advance of hearing it.
' ' 397
393. See FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 701 (1948) (arguing views expressed by
agency members on general illegality of pricing system do not disqualify them from sitting
in judgment on the use of that system in specific industry); Skelly Oil Co. v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 375 F.2d 6, 18 (10th Cir. 1967) (deciding agency member having "advance views
on important economic matters in issue" not disqualified), modified sub nom. Permian Basin
Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
394. Mattes v. United States, 721 F.2d 1125, 1132 (7th Cir. 1983) (quoting Laird v. Ta-
tum, 409 U.S. 824, 835 (1972) (Rehnquist, J.) (memorandum denying motion to disqual-
ify)).
395. ERNEST GELLHORN & RONALD M. LEVIN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS IN A
NUTSHELL 277 (4th ed. 1997).
396. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)-(b) (1994) (describing rules governing disquaification of jus-
tices, judges and magistrates).
397. 425 F.2d 583, 591 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (quoting Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d
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Allegations of bias in adjudicatory proceedings principally arise in two
ways. First, an agency member may have pre-existing views on issues he
or she is supposed to determine from the facts presented in the proceeding.
Typically, such views are revealed when the agency member speaks out
forcefully on issues or matters pending before the agency. In Cinderella,
FTC Chairman Dixon's speech to the National Congress of Petroleum Re-
tailers used one of Cinderella's advertising claims to illustrate a case of
possible fraud. 398 The court ruled that Chairman Dixon was disqualified
because he had prejudged, or at least appeared to have prejudged, specific
facts at issue in an adjudication still pending before him.399 However, the
mere exposure to facts as part of an agency member's official duties, apart
from adjudication, will not require disqualification. 40 0 Similarly, having a
preconceived position concerning legal or policy issues, which an agency
member has acquired while carrying out other duties, will not ordinarily
result in disqualification.40'
Second, an agency member may have had some association with a case
he or she is later called upon to decide. For example, in Trans World Air-
lines, Inc. v. CAB,40 2 a member of the agency was prohibited from partici-
pating in a decision involving the determination of an airline's mail pay
where he had earlier signed a brief in the case as solicitor for the Post Of-
fice Department.40 3 It is important to note that the prior contact need not
have been as a representative of a party. In American Cyanamid Co. v.
FTC,40 4 the agency chairman was barred from participating in a case be-
cause he had previously been counsel to a congressional committee, and
because he had played an active role in investigating some of the same is-
sues while a congressional staff member.40 5
Similarly, an agency member may be seen as having some personal, or-
dinarily pecuniary, stake in the outcome of the proceeding. In such cir-
cumstances, disqualification is not merely required in the interest of fair-
ness,406 but participation in the case may constitute a criminal offense or
461, 469 (2d Cir. 1959)).
398. See id. at 591.
399. See id.
400. See Hortonville Joint Sch. Dist. No. I v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n, 426 U.S. 482,
497 (1976) (holding that Board's familiarity with case was not sufficient to "overcome the
[Board's] presumption of honesty and integrity").
401. See Cement Inst., 333 U.S. at 701 (stating that information acquired through an ex
parte investigation did not automatically result in bias).
402. 254 F.2d 90 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
403. See id. at 91 (stating that participation was prohibited to preserve fairness).
404. 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966).
405. See id. at 763.
406. See, e.g., Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577 (1973) (involving state licensing
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otherwise violate federal law.4 °7 However, cases in which an agency offi-
cial actually participates in a proceeding in which he or she has a financial
interest or had a prior involvement are now infrequent. The rigorous
screening process conducted by the White House Counsel's office, the
agency's ethics officer, and the Office of Government Ethics ensures that
any agency official who is nominated by the President will not derive per-
sonal gain from the position.48
The courts have been unwilling to impose the strict Cinderella standard
when agencies are engaged in informal rule-making proceedings of a pol-
409icy nature. In such cases, the court will disqualify an agency decision-
Board that was deemed to be biased and therefore unable to fairly adjudicate issues before
it).
407. See 18 U.S.C. § 208 (199) (forbidding government employees from engaging in
acts affecting personal financial interest, otherwise he will be subject to penalties). The
Federal criminal conflict of interest laws prohibit all federal employees from, among other
things, participating personally and substantially in matters in which the employee or a
member or his or her family has a financial interest, including an interest in prospective em-
ployment. See id. Agency members, as well as their staffs, are prohibited from participat-
ing in certain cases by the government-wide provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified as amended in 5 U.S.C. app. at 1400
(1994)), and related statutes, including those sections dealing with conflicts of interest and
impartiality. Many agency statutes also contain additional conflict-of-interest provisions
that prohibit both agency members and staff from participating in proceedings in which their
impartiality may be suspect.
408. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Control Versus Impermissible Bias in Agency
Decisionmaking: Lessons from Chevron and Mistretta, 57 U. CHi. L. REv. 481, 488 (1990).
In a thorough discussion of the tension between responsibility for agency action by politi-
cally accountable officials, and impermissible bias, Professor Pierce argues that agency de-
cisionmakers should never be disqualified from participating in rule-making proceedings
simply because they express strong views on the policy issues to be resolved. See id. at 489.
For example, in Association of Nat'l Advertisers v. FTC, FTC Chairman Pertschuk spoke
out strongly and often about the evils of certain children's advertising, and even committed
to ending the practice, but was not disqualified. 627 F.2d 1151, 1189-90 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(MacKinnon, J., concurring and dissenting). Professor Pierce contends that the articulation
of an agency official's views, even with regard to matters at issue in adjudications, has a
salutary effect. It helps the regulated sector understand the agency's policies so that they
can shape their conduct accordingly. See Pierce, supra. Pierce perceives little harm in the
Cinderella approach since agency officials use methods of expressing their policy views
other than citing to pending adjudications. See id. at 494-95; see also Recommendation 80-
4 of the Administrative Conference of the United States, Decisional Officials' Participation
in Rulemaking Proceedings, 45 Fed. Reg. 46,777 (1980) (reporting that disqualification for
prejudgment in rulemaking should be limited to prejudgments of material "adjudicative" or
"specific" facts where the agency's factual determination is based on evidentiary record).
409. See Association of Nat 'l Advertisers, 627 F.2d at 1168-69 ("The Cinderella view of
a natural and detached adjudicator is simply an inapposite role model for an administrator
who must translate broad statutory commands into concrete social policies.") But see Ce-
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maker only when there has been a clear and convincing showing that the
agency member has an unalterably closed mind on matters critical to the
disposition of the proceeding.4 1°
Judge MacKinnon has argued that the unalterably closed mind assump-
tion would be "practically impossible to prove," 41' and he appears to have
been correct.412
2. Theory of Political Contacts and Independence
Agency members can especially be influenced by members of Congress
or Administration officials, including the President, who may attempt to
sway the agency's decision, either through the public submission of views
or via some type of off-the-record contact. Up to a point, efforts to influ-
ence or superintend agency activity is a recognized part of the oversight
process by elected officials. 13 Public pronouncements, including speeches
in Congress or the public filing of documents with the agency, have not
posed legal problems. Communications implicate considerations of fair-
ness in two circumstances. First, if political involvement is off-the-record,
i.e., it involves communications with the agency not known to the partici-
pants in the proceeding or subject to effective rebuttal, it plainly endangers
ment Inst., 333 U.S. at 701 (applying "irrevocably closed mind" standard). Although the
Supreme Court has never overruled Cement Institute with respect to this standard, it is no
longer followed. See Bernard Schwartz, Bias in Webster and Bias in Administrative Law-
The Recent Jurisprudence, 30 TULSA L.J. 461, 479-82 (1995).
410. See Association of Nat'l Advertisers, 627 F.2d at 1154 (holding Cinderella standard
inapplicable).
411. Id. at 1181 (MacKinnon, J., concurring and dissenting).
412. See 3 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 374-75 (2d ed. 1980)
(agreeing that closed mind standard is impossible to prove). But see Northwestern Bell Tel.
Co. v. Stofferhahn, 461 N.W.2d 129, 134-35 (S.D. 1990) (applying "unalterably closed
mind test" to disqualify a state regulatory commissioner who opposed deregulation from
participating in any proceeding involving issues of "deregulation, classification, or competi-
tive status determination of telecommunication services" where U.S. West Communications
was a party). Professor Davis also suggests that the proper distinction lies in the nature of
the fact alleged to have been prejudged, not in the nature of the proceeding. He calls the
Cinderella case "[a]n outstanding example of disqualification for prejudgment of adjudica-
tive facts." DAVIS, supra, at 382. He notes that the leading case of FTC v. Cement Institute,
333 U.S. 683 (1948), where the FTC issued cease and desist orders against 74 companies,
involved so-called "legislative facts," not adjudicative facts, such that "the question whether
the Commission's proceeding was adjudication or rulemaking was of no consequence."
DAVIS, supra, at 414.
413. See DCP Farms v. Yeutter, 957 F.2d 1183, 1187-88 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding com-
munications between Congress and agencies over policy issues or administration of a con-




the transparency of the agency's proceeding. Second, political involvement
can encourage the agency to decide a matter based on factors not included
in a statute as relevant to the agency's consideration. A reliance on imper-
missible factors renders an agency decision arbitrary.414 Here too, the
courts have taken into account the practical factors affecting the relation-
ship between agencies and their political overseers.
Political contacts by the executive branch can be viewed as violations of
agency independence. The notion is that the executive chooses the com-
mission member, particularly the chairman, because of a consonance be-
tween his or her political views and the President's views. The President
may further give him a general route to follow. But when the new member
"sails off" in the general direction urged upon him, he has to maintain radio
silence. This consequence of this silence is that he will lack the kind of
reinforcement or mid-course correction provided to an executive branch
employee.
The APA has explicit prohibitions against ex parte contacts that affect
all agencies and complement the law of bias. Such provisions prohibit
"[an] interested person outside the agency" from communicating off-the-
record with any agency official, whether a member of the staff or a political
appointee, "who is or may reasonably be expected to be involved in the de-
cisional process of the proceeding.'" 415 They also prohibit any decisional
official within the agency from making an ex parte communication to "any
interested person outside the agency. '41 6 Because they are included in sec-
tion 557, they are applicable only to formal proceedings and the courts
have recognized the distinction between the agency's activity as adjudica-
tor and rule-maker. The Fifth Circuit's decision in the leading case of
Pillsbury Company v. FTC4 17 established the proposition that the courts can
set aside an agency's decision in a formal adjudication where it appears
that agency members were unduly influenced by a congressional investiga-
tion of a case pending before the agency. 41 8 Since the high water mark of
414. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Aut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 46
(1983) (concluding agency's decision to rescind rule was arbitrary and capricious).
415. APA § 6(a), 5 U.S.C. § 557(d)(l)(A) (1994).
416. Id. §§ 5(c) & 557(d)(1)(B); see also Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org. v.
FLRA, 685 F.2d 547, 562 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (defining "interested person" broadly to include
"any individual or other person with an interest in the agency proceeding that is greater than
the general interest the public as a whole may have"). It would seem that anyone with suffi-
cient concern to contact the agency on the merits of a case would qualify as an "interested
person."
417. 354 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1966).
418. See id. at 964 (stating that Congress is intervening in agency's judicial function
when investigation focuses on mental processes of Commission).
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the Pillsbury case, however, courts have been exceedingly reluctant to con-
demn members of Congress when they openly express their views to agen-
cies. They recognize that members of Congress and the Administration
cannot be prevented from attempting to influence agency decisions.419
The prohibitions on congressional (and Executive) intervention in formal
adjudicatory proceedings, as outlined in Pillsbury, do not extend to. less
formal agency adjudicatory activity. Examining an agency's pre-hearing
informal activities, the Fifth Circuit observed that the test (at least in such
circumstances) should be whether the congressional contacts urged the
agency to rely on factors that are not relevant under the statute420a stan-
dard with which an agency's skilled professional writing staff should be
able to comply.
421
Ex parte contacts in a rule-making proceeding of a policy nature are not
prohibited. In Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC,422 the D.C. Circuit Court ap-
peared to change the law by concluding that ex parte contacts impermissi-
bly compromised the court's obligation to review an agency's decision
based on the body of material contained in the paper record.423 Nonethe-
less, shortly thereafter, in Action for Children's Television v. FCC,424 the
D.C. Circuit made it clear that ex parte prohibitions in rule-making pro-
ceedings were only applicable when the proceedings involved competing
private claims to a valuable privilege, i.e., when they resembled adjudica-
tory proceedings.4 5 That limitation is now clearly established.426
419, See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 563 F.2d 588, 611 (3d Cir. 1977).
The court characterized the congressional interest as directed more toward the agency's pro-
cesses (the case had taken too long to decide) than its substantive outcome, and that any "in-
cidental intrusions" did not actually affect the agency's decision. See id. Similarly, in
California v. FERC, 966 F.2d 1541, 1552 (9th Cir. 1992), the court declined to upset an
agency decision where the congressional correspondence, although from a powerful com-
mittee chairman, did not introduce new evidence or inquire into the agency's decisional pro-
cesses. But see Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534,
1550 (9th Cir. 1993) (remanding adjudicatory proceeding to agency to determine whether
decision was tainted by ex parte contacts from White House staff).
420. See DCP Farms, 957 F.2d at 1187-88 (stating aim of congressional communication
was not to influcence decisionmaking body).
421. See Louisiana Ass'n of Indep. Producers & Royalty Owners v. FERC, 958 F.2d
1101, 1112-13 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (stating pre-hearing and non-substantive communications
are appropriate and do not compromise judicial integrity).
422. 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
423. See id. at 58 (stating that Commission should hold all evidentiary material so that a
hearing examiner can determine the nature and source of the ex parte pleas).
424. 564 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir.1977).
425. See id. at 477 (holding that communications were not of kind susceptible to ex
parte influence).
426. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 400, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United
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As a practical matter, most agencies maintain some form of public "ex
parte file" for the receipt of "off-the-record" comments, including those
from the legislative and executive branches. Such file is not part of the re-
cord for decisional purposes.4 27 However, the availability of such a file
gives members of Congress a useful vehicle for transmitting constituent
views or even their own opinions. The file also accords agencies a respect-
ful way to acknowledge off-the-record submissions by noting that they
have been placed in a public file, without compromising the integrity of the
agency's proceedings.
428
Even in formal adjudications, courts demand that agencies simply follow
their own rules on ex parte contacts and attempt (as best they can) to resist
off-the-record pressure. ATX, Inc. v. Department of Transportation 429 is a
good illustration of an agency's response to congressional pressure that re-
ceived strong judicial endorsement. It represents a utilitarian accommoda-
430tion between agency and Congress.
Steelworkers of Am. v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (stating that pro-
ceedings in this case are distinguished from those that resolve "'conflicting private claims to
a valuable privilege' or are "'quasi-adjudicatory' proceedings) (internal citations omitted).
427. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 1.1206(a) (1999) (stating ex parte regulations of the FCC).
See generally JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 231-33 (3d
ed. 1998) (explaining that independent regulatory agencies appear to have the most restric-
tive rules regarding ex parte contacts in rulemaking proceedings).
428. See 15 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 5 (1991) (discussing ex parte communications be-
tween White House officials and FCC commissioners during FCC rulemaking).
429. 41 F.3d 1522 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
430. See id. at 1530. In ATX, Frank Lorenzo, who had previously been chief executive
of Eastern Air Lines during a period of tumultuous labor-management relations, filed an ap-
plication with the Department of Transportation to establish a new airline. See id. at 1524.
At the urging of labor unions, over 60 members of Congress, including key committee
chairmen, wrote strong letters to the Secretary requesting that he deny Lorenzo's applica-
tion. See id. at 1527. Two members of Congress introduced legislation to prevent Lorenzo
from reentering the business. See id. at 1525. The Secretary ordered that the application be
set for public hearing before an agency administrative law judge and that the final decision
be made by the Department's senior career official. See ATX, 41 F.3d at 1525. The Secre-
tary also responded to the Congressional communications with a form letter indicating that
"it would be inappropriate for me to discuss the merits of the case with you," that the con-
gressional correspondence would be placed in the "ex pane file," and noting that the appli-
cation would be thoroughly reviewed. Id. at 1525. Following the hearing at which one
congressman actually testified, the decisional official, Deputy Assistant Secretary Murphy, a
career civil servant serving temporarily as Acting Assistant Secretary, rendered a 75-page
opinion based entirely on the public record. See id at 1526. That was about all the agency
could do considering the circumstances, and the court upheld its decision even though the
agency denied Lorenzo's application, which was what the members of Congress had ini-
tially requested. See id. at 1532. It was probably helpful to the agency's position in court
that it had affirmed its administrative law judge's decision. However, as long as the agency
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3. Agency Supervision of Its Members
It is not entirely clear if multi-member agencies have a collegial obliga-
tion to evaluate one of their members to determine if he or she should be
disqualified from a proceeding. The legislative history of the APA sug-
gests that the agency's power to disqualify is limited to its presiding offi-
cers.13 1 But permitting a "biased" agency member to participate in a case
can clearly call the agency's substantive decision into question. For exam-
ple, in Berkshire Employees Ass 'n v. NLRB,432 the court determined that the
litigants were entitled to an unbiased tribunal, but recognized that it was
impossible to determine if one member influenced his or her colleagues.
Under these circumstances, the agency was required to "determine for it-
self' whether one of its members should be disqualified from participa-
tion."'
Only a handful of agencies have regulations that explicitly address
whether the agency may independently determine whether one of its mem-
bers should be disqualified from participation in a particular case. Agen-
cies that have considered the matter have taken different positions. Most
agencies, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, provide that
the decision to disqualify a member from a proceeding "rests with that in-
dividual member."434 Nevertheless, in at least one case, the SEC collec-
tively investigated allegations of bias after the two commissioners against
whom the allegations were brought voluntarily agreed to have their col-
leagues assess their culpability.435 The Federal Trade Commission's regu-
lations, however, allow the Commission to disqualify a commissioner in
the event that the commissioner in question declines to recuse himself or
had taken proper account of the presiding officer's decision, and had reached a reasonable
result supported by the evidence, the agency was entitled to make its own independent as-
sessment of the facts and substitute its judgment for that-of the ALJ on issues of law, policy,
or discretion. See ATX, 41 F.3d at 1523; see also Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340
U.S. 474 (1951); Valkering, U.S.A., Inc. v. Department of Agric., 48 F.3d 305, 308-09 (8th
Cir. 1995) (holding that Secretary of Agriculture, reviewing decision of ALJ, is authorized
to substitute his judgment for that of ALJ).
43 1. See S. Doc. No. 79-248, at 206-07, 268-69 (1946).
432. 121 F.2d 235 (3d Cir. 1941).
433. See id. at 239; see also Berkshire Knitting Mills v. NLRB, 139 F.2d 134, 136-37
(3d Cir. 1943). Where the term of the allegedly biased member expired, and the remaining
agency members (including two who were not agency members at the time of the earlier
decision) reconsidered the case, the court subsequently declined to examine the allegations
of bias against the former member. See id.
434. 17 C.F.R. § 200.60 (1999).
435. See United Corp., 32 S.E.C. 633, 634 n.3 (1951) (demonstrating agency's collec-
tive involvement in disqualifying one of its members).
1196 [52:4
INDEPENDENT FEDERAL AGENCIES
herself from the proceeding.436 Accordingly, the FTC has exercised this
provision.437
4. Recusal
Neither the APA nor case law indicates whether, and in what circum-
stances, an agency official who has not yet been legally disqualified from a
matter, should exercise his or her discretion not to participate in the interest
of avoiding an appearance of conflict of interest. The principal court deci-
sion that evaluates an agency member's discretionary decision not to recuse
is Center for Auto Safety v. FTC.438 Judge Harold Greene reviewed the re-
cusal policies of several high level government officials and determined
that the then-chairman of the FTC did not abuse his discretion in declining
to recuse himself from a proceeding involving a former client.439
Judge Greene indicated that "[a]bsent an abuse of discretion, the deci-
sion with regard to recusal is that of the official who is directly in-
volved. 40 Agency members appear to have different philosophies in this
regard. Former FTC Commissioner Maclntyre's decision in the National
Biscuit Co.441 case reflected his determination not to let his participation
delay the resolution of a case. In contrast, former NRC Chairman Pallad-
ino's refused to step down in Long Island Lighting Co.442 because he feared
that if he did so, he would "[appear] to give credence to an accusation that
aims baseless charges of impropriety not just at me," but at other NRC of-
ficials as well. ,143
436. See 16 C.F.R. § 4.17(b)(3)(ii) (2000).
437. See, e.g., Kellogg Co., 97 F.T.C. at 159; see also Lone Star Airways, 97 C.A.B.
642, 642 (1982) (considering-and rejecting-an allegation of bias lodged against member
of former Civil Aeronautics Board).
438. 586 F. Supp. 1245 (D.D.C. 1984).
439. See id. at 1251 (holding that FTC Chairman's favorable references and relationship
with automobile manufacturer and related testimony given before Congress was not im-
proper participation).
440. Id. at 1250; see also Metropolitan Council of NAACP Branches v. FCC, 46 F.3d
1154, 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (applying "deferential, abuse of discretion" standard) (citing
Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. DOT, 899 F.2d 1230, 1231-32 (D.C. Cir. 1990)) (finding cabi-
net secretary's participation in decision declining to investigate client of prospective em-
ployer not an abuse of discretion).
441. National Biscuit Co., 79 F.T.C. 264 (1971).
442. 20 N.R.C. 1061 (1984).
443. Id. at 1062-63.
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IV. THE TENSION BETWEEN AUTONOMY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
A. The Needfor Accountability and the Independent Administrator
Concept
A central question addressed by the form, structure and operations of
administrative agencies is whether accountability should be focused in one
place, or if it should be diffused. The debate has been ongoing since crea-
tion of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887. Placing decisional
responsibility with a group ensures that the group takes into account di-
verse policy perspectives and that it adopts moderate policies. Consensus-
building through compromise can also produce a broader range of public
acceptance for those decisions ultimately reached. This approach has espe-
cially drawn favor where agencies serve as adjudicators, deciding licensing,
rate-making, antitrust and similar cases that typically involve the resolution
of issues affecting individual rights.
It is important to assign accountability in one place for two interrelated
reasons. First, accountability is vital to a proper implementation of demo-
cratic principles in the administrative state. The American public and
elected representatives can examine the activities of unelected official, de-
termine the identity of the person who completed each act, and evaluate the
success or failure of a particular initiative. Officials who are appointed by
the President and who serve at the President's pleasure are, to some degree
at least, the President's responsibility. Eventually, the President's ap-
pointments and policies will be tested at the polls during the presidential
elections.
Second, accountability can translate into better decisionmaking. For ex-
ample, Professor William Kovacic examined appointments to the Federal
Trade Commission and concluded that, as a threshold matter, "[r]eplacing a
multi-member structure with a smaller number of commissioners or a sin-
gle administrator probably increases the likelihood that more nominees will
be highly qualified. 444 Kovacic also believes that this approach narrows
the ability of the President to appoint, or the Congress to endorse, candi-
dates with weak qualifications.445 We would argue that a strong adminis-
trator can establish policy, create clear lines of responsibility for imple-
mentation of that policy, and eliminate delay in at least certain aspects of
an organization's operation by shifting resources. But we doubt that the
444. William E. Kovacic, The Quality of Appointments and the Capability of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission, 49 ADMIN. L. REv. 915, 948 (1997).
445. See id. at 948-49.
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reduction in the size of multi-member agencies alone is likely to improve
the quality of appointees.
The perceived ineffectiveness of collegial decisionmaking at the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission at the time of the Three Mile Island accident, and
the benefits of centralized control, were arguments advanced in 1988 and
1989 for replacing that multi-member commission with a single adminis-
trator. Senator John Breaux of Louisiana observed:
I sincerely believe that the benefits of a Commission process are largely illu-
sory.
I think it is fair to say that we have learned that we primarily have both people
and organizational problems with nuclear energy, not technological problems.
... [L]ess than 10 percent of the decisions that have come from the agency
[over a 3-year period] can be attributed to collegial discussions occurring in an open
meeting when a majority of the Commissioners are present. A more cursory exami-
nation of the record since 1975 indicates that this pattern is not far from the norm of
every Commission during that time-frame. 46
In contrast, a perceived lack of independence led Congress in 1994 to
remove the SSA from the Department of Health and Human Services
447(HHS) and establish it as an independent agency.
The structure that Congress adopts for a particular agency depends both
on what it expects from the agency and what it can achieve politically.
Should an agency be personally answerable to the President or, should it,
like the independent agencies, have a measure of autonomy? The structural
and organizational options theoretically available to Congress are quite
varied. At one time or another, Congress has created departments, offices,
boards, commissions, government corporations, quasi-public government-
sponsored enterprises, and foundations-almost as many types of govern-
mental units as there are problems to solve and programs to administer.448
446. 135 CONG. REc. 8530 (1989).
447. The Administrator of SSA is appointed by the President with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate to a six-year term and may be removed only for "neglect of duty or mal-
feasance in office." 42 U.S.C. § 902(a)(l)-(3) (1994). Her budget is submitted to Congress
by the President without revision. See 42 U.S.C. § 904(b) (1994).
448. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV. FOR THE SENATE COMM. ON GOV'T AFFAIRS. 96TH




In our experience, the benefits of one type of structure can also be found
to some degree in the other. On the one hand, there are few agencies that
are both headed by a single person and deemed to be genuinely monolithic.
They often have staff components that reflect different viewpoints. They
are subjected to a multiplicity of outside pressures. Compromises are made
internally as recommendations move up the chain to the ultimate decision-
maker. On the other hand, statutes establishing multi-member organiza-
tions tend to minimize confusion by resting day-to-day administrative re-
sponsibility in the hands of one of the members. Moreover, as a practical
matter, not every member of a multi-member agency is interested in every
issue. Thus, a single member may well take a keen interest only with re-
spect to a specific project or matter. Indeed, as noted above, the chairman
at many federal multi-member agencies is likely to exercise both manage-
ment and policy leadership.
Congress' decision not to place an agency explicitly within the executive
branch can bear on the ability of the Administration or Congress to super-
intend its activities. 449 Agencies that are perceived to be "independent"
usually were intended to have this characteristic. They are also generally
believed to be less responsive to the policy direction of an incumbent
President than appointees who serve expressly at his pleasure. In our expe-
rience, this outcome did not result because independent agency officials
were unwilling or unable to follow policy direction. Rather, it is because,
right or wrong, both sides believe that there must be less interactive com-
munications between the President and his staff and his "independent" ap-
pointees, and more freedom by such appointees to reach their own deci-
sions without direct consultation with Administration policymakers. The
appointees of independent agencies, in other words, are often left largely to
their own devices. Frequently, they align themselves with congressional
committees.45° It is difficult to rearrange established relationships whether
increased accountability or increased independence is the objective.
As we discuss later, Senate efforts to transform the multi-member Nu-
clear Regulatory Commission into a single administrator structure were un-
availing despite the public concern over government responsibility in the
wake of the Three Mile Island accident. Other recent initiatives, such as
the initiative to make the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inde-
pendent of the Department of Transportation, and the initiative to bring the
449. See HUNDT, supra note 127, at 12 (noting that Congress viewed the FCC as its
creature because the agency's authority came from congressional statute).
450. But see STRAUSS, supra note 5, at 92 (suggesting that differences in political lead-
ership should not overwhelm a larger sense of similarity between multi-member agencies
and those situated more directly in executive branch).
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multi-member Federal Energy Regulatory Commission more squarely un-
der presidential control by replacing it with a single commissioner, were
both equally unsuccessful (at least so far).
For its part, the Executive Branch, no matter how demanding its rhetoric,
has been relatively loath to require independent agencies to follow tradi-
tional executive oversight procedures. When President Reagan issued Ex-
ecutive Order 12,291 in 1981 requiring agencies to submit proposed and
final rules to OMB for clearance, and Executive Order 12,498 in 1985 re-
quiring agencies to submit their anticipated regulatory initiatives to OMB
annually, both excutive orders exemped the multi-member independent
agencies. 451 President Bush took an initial step by distributing in January
28, 1992 to both department heads and independent agencies a memoran-
dum entitled "Reducing the Burden of Government Regulation." The
memo placed a ninety-day freeze on new regulations so that a review of all
current regulations could be performed to identify regulations that unneces-
sarily inhibited U.S. economic growth.452 On September 30, 1993, Presi-
dent Clinton issued his own Executive Order 12,866.453 Although the
Clinton executive order retained the provision excluding independent agen-
cies from the requirement of submitting proposed and final rules to OMB,
it did extend the regulatory planning process to these agencies.454
B. Divided Accountability and Super Separation of Functions
The draftsmen of the APA rejected the principle that there must be a to-
tal separation of enforcement and adjudicatory functions through the estab-
lishment of separate agencies. The concentration of functions within the
same agency, and even in the same person, does not automatically violate
recognized principles of due process. 45 5 Nonetheless, the APA requires
that, within an agency, employees who are involved in adversarial pro-
451. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, 13,194 (1981) (revoked by Exec.
Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1994)); Exec. Order
No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. § 323 (1986) (revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 638
(1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1994)).
452. See Memorandum on Reducing the Burden of Governmental Regulation, 28
WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 232 (Jan. 28, 1992). This regulating moratorium was extended
for another 120 dyas on April 29, 1992. See Memorandum on Impementing Regulatory Re-
forms, 28 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 728 (Apr. 29, 1992).
453. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
(1994).
454. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. at 639.
455. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 58 (1975) (recognizing combination of inves-
tigative and adjudicative functions does not constitute due process violation).
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ceedings (other than'the agency heads) be insulated from those with deci-
sional responsibilities.456
Congressional attempts to change this arrangement at multi-member
agencies have been sporadic and driven by pragmatic or political, and not
institutional, considerations. Only a year after enactment of the APA,
Congress rejected the general APA-model in the labor-management con-
text. In the Taft-Hartley Act,457 Congress modified the structure of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to allow the Board's General Coun-
sel to be appointed -by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate and to have independent authority to prosecute unfair labor practice
charges.458 The General Counsel's discretion whether or not to prosecute is
not reviewable by the Board itself. Further, the NLRB members have per-
sonal assistants who review the record in particular cases but, unlike most
agencies, the NLRB may not establish a review staff to advise the mem-
bers.459 It was fear of pro-labor commissioners that led Congress to amend
the Taft-Hartley Act to insulate the "charging" function from the Board.460
In 1952, the members of the FCC, and the agency's administrative law
judges (then called examiners) were statutorily prohibited from having a
review staff.461 The prohibition was dropped in 1961 .462 The Senate Com-
mittee explained that such a strict prohibition against access to the agency's
expert staff was "wasteful and inefficient. 463
In 1998, congressional dislike of the Federal Election Commission led to
an effort to split off that agency's General Counsel, making him an advice
and consent appointee of the President rather than a civil servant directly
456. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2) (1994).
457. Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-
166 (1994)).
458. See 29 U.S.C. § 153(d).
459. See id. § 154(a). See generally Benjamin W. Mintz, Administrative Separation of
Functions: OSHA and the NLRB, 47 CATH. U. L. REv. 877, 881-82 (1998). At most agen-
cies, personal assistants or the member themselves work on separate statements. See infra
Appendix. At other agencies, such as the FMSHRC, staff assistance is provided, if needed.
See infra Appendix. At the EEOC, by tradition, no dissenting statement is issued even if a
Commission member disagrees wit the majority's determination. See infra Appendix.
460. See Christy Concannon, Comment, The EAJA and the NLRB: Chilling the General
Counsel's Prerogative to Issue Unfair Labor Complaints?, 36 CATH. U. L. REv. 175, 177
(1986).
461. See Daniel J. Gifford, Federal Administrative Law Judges: The Relevance of Past
Choices to Future Directions, 49 ADMIN. L. REv. 1, 11-12 (1997) (discussing Communica-
tions Act of 1952's prohibition against consultation).
462. See id
463. S. REP. No. 87-576 (1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2462, 2465.
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accountable to the Commission.4 64 The effort was not undertaken to pro-
tect the independence of the General Counsel, who was a career civil ser-
vant, but instead reflected congressional displeasure at the incumbent. 65
Congress wanted a chance to vote on his tenure. The effort ultimately
failed, but it demonstrated how accountability can undermine technical ex-
pertise.
On a handful of occasions involving regulation by executive agencies,
Congress created independent, multi-member boards to adjudicate en-
forcement proceedings instituted by the executive agency. This so-called
"split enforcement" model gives the cabinet agency the responsibility for
promulgating and enforcing regulations and the independent, multi-
member agency the responsibility for adjudication.466 The Occupational
Safety and Health Act4 67 reflects a congressional fear that the political
agendas of executive appointees will inappropriately infiltrate their adjudi-
catory activities. Specifically, it was the private business' fear of Depart-
ment of Labor pressure that lead to the creation of the Occupational Safety
and Health Review Commission (OSHRC) in the final days of congres-
sional debate. 68
464. See H.R. 3748, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. 1998. See amendment discussed in House
Hearings on FEC Authorization Act of 1998. H.R. REP. No. 105-606 (1998). See also dis-
cussion in Cong. Rec. S9912 (Sept. 3, 1998).
465. See Bruce T. Rubenstein, FEC General Counsel's Job is Threatened by Congress,
CoRP. LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 1998, at 4; see also Amy Keller, FEC Counsel Tries to Prevent
His Ouster, ROLL CALL, Oct. 1, 1998, available in LEXIS, Allnewsplus Library.
466. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 661-668 (1994) (establishing Occupational Safety and
Health Review Commission to adjudicate cases prosecuted by Occupational Safety and
Health Administration of the Department of Labor); 30 U.S.C. §§ 823-825 (1994) (estab-
lishing Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission to adjudicate cases prosecuted
by Mine Safety and Health Administration of the Department of Labor). Certain cases in-
volving the revocation or suspension of licenses issued by the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion (FAA) and some civil penalty cases are prosecuted by the Federal Aviation Admini-
stration but adjudicated by the National Transportation Safety Board. Other cases are
adjudicated by the FAA itself, although administrative law judges of the Department of
Transportation serve as the presiding officer rendering the initial decision in each case. See
generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Enforcing Aviation Safety Regulations: The Case for a
Split-Enforcement Model ofAgency Adjudication, 4 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 389 (1991).
467. Occupational Health & Safety Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1994)).
468. Labor groups wanted all authority consolidated in the Department of Labor. Busi-
ness groups were prepared to allow the Department to investigate and prosecute cases but
wanted separate entities to promulgate health and safety standards and to decide enforce-
ment cases. Under a compromise amendment proposed by New York Senator Jacob Javits,
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration within the Department of Labor prom-
ulgates standards and prosecutes violations but the separate Occupational Safety and Health
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The abolition of the multi-member Civil Aeronautics Board in 1985, and
the transfer of its remaining functions to the Department of Transportation
(DOT), presented Congress with a classic choice between independence
and political accountability. Among the functions transferred to DOT was
the Board's responsibility for adjudicating competing international route
licensing applications. Historically, such licensing cases were heard ini-
tially by one of the Board's administrative law judges but the decisions of
ALJs were always reviewed by the Board itself and then transmitted to the
President, who made the final decision.469 To allay concerns that interna-
tional licensing cases would henceforth be decided on political grounds, the
DOT informed Congress that it would create procedures that "insulated"
certain decisions from political pressure. Congress acquiesced in those as-
surances.
470
Review Commission decides cases. See Mintz, supra note 459, at 885.
469. See Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 114
(1948) (noting that Board orders are "not mature" and ready for judicial review until they
are "finalized for Presidential approval").
470. See Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. DOT, 51 F.3d 1065, 1070-72 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding
that Department of Transportation correctly applied insulating procedures when awarding
airline carrier routes). Congress authorized the DOT to process applications either through
the traditional hearing method or through simplified non-hearing procedures. See 49 U.S.C.
§ 41111 (1994). Implementing the legislation, the DOT issued regulations that provided,
among other things, that "[c]arrier selection proceedings for international route authority
and such other hearing cases as the Secretary deems appropriate" would be adjudicated
through a hearing process, and the final decision would be made by the Department's "sen-
ior career official." 14 C.F.R. § 302.22a(b)(4) (2000). Final decisions by the senior career
official are subject to a "petition for reconsideration" filed with the Assistant Secretary. But
the regulations limit the Assistant Secretary's options to affirming the decision or remanding
it for further action pursuant to instructions-options more limited than the normal deci-
sional options available when an agency reviews a presiding officer's decision. The APA
provides that an agency has all the powers when reviewing an initial or recommended deci-
sion that it would have in making the decision in the first instance. See § 7(a), 5 U.S.C. §
556(b) (1994). An agency may, with some limitations, review the evidence de novo and
substitute its judgment on issues of law, policy, discretion and even facts, for that of its pre-
siding officer. See Valkering, U.S.A., Inc. v. Department of Agric., 48 F.3d 305, 308 (8th
Cir. 1995) (holding that agency determination, if reasonable, must be upheld by Court even
if different from that of subordinate hearing officer); NLRB v. Brooks Cameras, Inc., 691
F.2d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding court must uphold factual determinations of Board).
Other hearing cases and non-hearing cases are decided directly by the Assistant Secretary.
See 14 C.F.R. § 302.22a(c)-(d) (2000). Significantly, the Department construes its regula-
tions to give the Assistant Secretary discretion to determine what procedures will be used.
The D.C. Circuit upheld the regulations. Judge Rogers observed the fact that "this scheme
does not minimize the participation of political appointees to the extent desired by [the peti-
tioning airline] does not make it plainly erroneous." Delta Air Lines, 51 F.3d at 1071; see
also USAir, Inc. v. DOT, 969 F.2d 1256, 1262 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (discussing how procedure
limiting Assistant Secretary's review to remand has "an artificial quality" but is not illegal).
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C. Oversight Agencies
On occasion, Congress uses the multi-member agency as a check on the
work of the executive branch departments. Although the work of these
agencies is entirely or primarily advisory, their multi-member structure
"diffuses" power and inhibits executive control of a process designed to re-
view the executive.
Examples of this type of agencies are the Defense Nuclear Facilities
Safety Board (DNFSB), the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB),
the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) and the Postal
Rate Commission (PRC). The DNFSB reviews the design of defense nu-
clear facilities run by the Department of Energy (DOE), makes recommen-
dations to DOE regarding the safety of these facilities, and investigates
events or practices at these facilities that may affect public health or safety.
The NTSB investigates civil aviation accidents and significant accidents in
other modes of transportation and makes recommendations to the FAA and
other bodies. 47' The CSB investigates the probable cause of accidental
chemical releases in much the same way as the NTSB investigates trans-
portation accidents. The CSB also conducts research and issues reports
concerning the safety of chemical production.472 The PRC is an adjudica-
tory agency that issues formal recommendations regarding changes the
Postal Service proposes regarding postal rates, fees and mail classification.
Although Congress requires that executive departments respond to recom-
mendations in some fashion,4 73 none of the multi-member agencies has the
power to enforce its recommendations.
A skepticism about the executive branch agencies' ability to police
themselves undergirds the creation of these advisory boards. They are de-
signed as an independent check on the regulatory or operational activities
of the executive branch. As the Senate Report observed when setting up
the Chemical Safety Board:
471. See 49 U.S.C. § 1131 (1994). The NTSB also has regulatory responsibility for the
administrative trial and appellate review of FAA and Coast Guard decisions assessing civil
penalties or affecting the certificates of pilots, mariners, or mechanics. See id. § 1133.
472. See id. § 7412(r)(6)(C).
473. For example, the Secretary of Labor must respond within 180 days to recommen-
dations of the Chemical Safety Board. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(6)(J). The Labor Depart-
ment must indicate whether the Secretary will initiate a rule-making or issue orders to im-
plement the CSB's recommendations. "Any determination by the Secretary not to
implement a recommendation or to implement a recommendation only in part ... shall be




[lit is unlikely that an agency charged both with rule-making and investigating func-
tions would be quick to acknowledge that existing requirements were insufficient to
prevent an accident. In fact, the investigations conducted by agencies with dual re-
sponsibilities tend to focus on violations of existing rules as the cause of the accident
almost to the exclusion of other contributing factors for which no enforcement or
compliance actions can be taken. The purpose of an accident investigation (as
authorized here) is to determine the cause or causes of an accident whether or not
those causes were in violation of any current and enforceable requirement.
.... [T]he [multi-member advisory agency] is created as an independent source
of expertise which may make recommendations for rules and orders .... 474
D. Independent Agencies in the Executive Branch
In Morrison v. Olson,475 the Chief Justice decided whether a statutory
provision had impermissibly restrained the President's power to control ex-
ecutive branch officials. In the opinion, he indicated that the focus is on
whether any removal restriction "impermissibly burdens the President's
power to control or supervise the [appointee], as an executive official, in
the execution of his or her duties under the Act. 'A76 Phrased differently,
does the limitation "interfere impermissibly with [the President's] constitu-
tional obligation to ensure the faithful execution of the laws.' , 7 In the dis-
senting opinion, Justice Scalia characterized the Court's approach as "an
open invitation for Congress to experiment."'478 What about "a special As-
sistant Secretary of Defense for Procurement?" he asked.479 Frankly, no
one knows. If the Court's approach was indeed an invitation, Congress has
rarely accepted it.
Multi-member agencies emerged in the 1880s as the regulatory vehicle
of choice, and flowered during the New Deal.480 In recent years, that
regulatory model has been largely replaced by congressional and Presiden-
tial interest in agencies with a single head. Twice since Morrison v. Olson,
Congress passed legislation that attempted to combine the advantages of
unified administration and centralized control with the benefits of inde-
474. S. REP. No. 101-228 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3613-14.
475. 487 U.S. 654 (1987).
476. Id. at 692.
477. Id. at 693.
478. Id. at 726 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
479. Id.
480. See generally Rosenberg, supra note 117, at 657; see also Sidney A. Shapiro, A
Delegation Theory of the APA, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 89, 97-98 (1996).
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pendence. In both cases-the Special Counsel and the Social Security
Administration--Congress removed the entities from their parent organi-
zations, gave the new head of the agency a statutory term, and provided
that he or she may be removed by the President only for cause.
When Congress in 1979 created the Office of Special Counsel, the office
was an independent investigative and prosecutorial component of the multi-
member Merit Systems Protection Board.481 However, the Whistleblower
Protection Act of 1989482 recreated the office as a free-standing, independ-
ent agency. The Special Counsel, who heads the agency, is responsible for
enforcing the ban on so-called prohibited personnel practices by federal
agencies, especially those involving whistleblowers, ensuring compliance
with provisions of the Hatch Act that deals with political activity, and
prosecuting cases involving denial of federal benefits to veterans and re-
servists. 483 The agency itself is small and employs about ninety employ-
ees. 484 To ensure the agency's independence, Congress provided that the
Special Counsel be appointed by the President, with the advice and consent
of the Senate. The Special Counsel serves a five-year term and may be re-
moved from office only for the classical reasons-"inefficiency, neglect of
duty, or malfeasance in office." 485 The Special Counsel is given explicit
statutory power to submit reports and testimony simultaneously to Con-
486gress and the President. However, Congress has not given the Special
Counsel the authority to represent himself or herself in court.
The SSA, in contrast, is a large agency that administers what has been
described as "the Western world's largest income support program for peo-
ple unable to engage in substantial gainful activity.' '487 Its massive adjudi-
cation apparatus handles nearly three million disability claims annually and
481. See Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. I 111 (1979)
(reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 1101 (1994)).
482. Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 1201 (1994)).
483. See also Act to Reauthorize Office of Special Counsel, Pub. L. No. 103-424, 108
Stat. 4361 (1994) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 1211(b)); Uniformed Services Employment and
Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-353, 108 Stat. 3149 (1994) (codified at
38 U.S.C. § 4301 (1994)). See generally Bruce D. Fong, Whistleblower Protection and the
Office of Special Counsel: The Development ofReprisal Law in the 1980s, 40 AM. U. L.
REv. 1015 (1991).
484. See Office of Special Counsel Home Page (last modified July 16, 1999) <http://
www.osc.gov/introl.htm>.
485. 5 U.S.C. § 1211(b) (1994).
486. See id. § 1212 (delineating powers and functions of Office of Special Counsel).
487. Charles H. Koch, Jr. & David A. Koplow, The Fourth Bite at the Apple: A Study of
the Operation and Utility of the Social Security Administration's Appeals Council, 17 FLA.
ST. U. L. REv. 199, 205 (1990).
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holds nearly 600,000 hearings each year using over 1,000 ALJs. 48 8 To ac-
cord the Administrator a measure of independence, Congress removed the
Administration from the HHS in 1994 and provided that the Administrator
be appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to
a 6-year term and may be removed only for "neglect of duty or malfeasance
in office." 48 9 The Administrator's budget must be submitted to Congress
by the President without revision. 490 Like the Special Counsel, the Admin-
istrator may not represent himself or herself in court.491
The emergence of these two agencies reflects a congressional effort to
shift the traditional balance in some, but not all, respects. When Congress
enacted the Special Counsel legislation, President Clinton, based on advice
from the DOJ, opined that the removal provision raised a significant con-
stitutional question.492 Although not all innovative approaches offend sepa-
ration of powers principles, each must be analyzed from both policy and
constitutional perspectives. However, Congress' determination is entitled
to some weight. Whether Congress' judgment in these two cases is suffi-
cient to override the President's ordinary authority over executive branch
officials has yet to be seen.
The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) recently evaluated the President's
removal power as part of a wide-ranging reappraisal of separation of pow-
ers issues.493 OLC observed:
The Supreme Court's removal cases establish a spectrum of potential conclusions
about specific removal limitations. At one end of the spectrum, restrictions on the
President's power to remove officers with broad policy responsibilities in areas Con-
gress does not or cannot shelter from presidential policy control clearly should be
deemed unconstitutional. We think, for example, that a statute that attempts to limit
the President's authority to discharge the Secretary of Defense would be plainly un-
488. See Process Reengineering Program; Disability Reengineering Project Plan, 59
Fed. Reg. 47,887 (1994).
489. 42 U.S.C. § 902(a)(3) (1994).
490. See id § 904(b).
491. See id § 902 (delineating powers and functions of Commissioner of Social Secu-
rity).
492. See President's Statement on Signing the Social Security Independence and Pro-
gram Improvements Act of 1994, 1994 PUB. PAPERS 1471, 1472 (Aug. 15, 1994); Douglas
W. Kmiec, OLC's Opinion Writing Function: The Legal Adhesive for a Unitary Executive,
15 CARDozo L. REv. 337, 340 (1993) (citing letter from John Harmon, Assistant Attorney
General, Office of Legal Counsel, to Senator Abraham Ribicoff, Chairman, Senate Comm.
on Governmental Affairs of June 14, 1978 concerning separation of powers issue evoked by
Special Counsel's predominantly executive powers).
493. See Memorandum of the Office of Legal Counsel, The Constitutional Separation of
Powers Between the President and Congress, Memorandum for the General Counsels of the
Federal Government, 1996 OLC LEXIS 6 (May 7, 1996).
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constitutional and that the courts would so hold.... At the other end of the spectrum,
we believe that for cause and fixed term limitations on the power to remove officers
with adjudicatory duties affecting the rights of private individuals will continue to
meet with consistent judicial approval: the contention that the essential role of the ex-
ecutive branch would be imperiled by giving a measure of independence to such offi-
cials is untenable under both precedent and principle.
Between these two extremes, the arguments are less clear .... In situations in which
Congress does not enact express removal limitations, we believe that the executive
branch should resist any further application of the Wiener rationale, under which a
court may infer the existence of a for-cause limit on presidential removal, except with
respect to officers whose only functions are adjudicatory.49
Given the nature of the Social Security Administration's primary func-
tion, the "for cause" removal provision seems quite likely to withstand con-
stitutional attack. The Special Counsel statute is more problematic, but
would probably meet the Morrison v. Olson test. However, neither statute
may actually be challenged on constitutional grounds. There appears to be
little incentive for an aggrieved party to claim that the agency head should
not be independent. Therefore, it appears likely that this new form of
agency will join the others among the accepted structures of government
institutions.
495
494. Id. at * 147-*49.
495. The recent restructuring of the Federal Aviation Administration reflects a useful
illustration of an agency head who, despite some statutory changes, remains under the
President's plenary control. In the agency's 1996 Reauthorization Act, Congress provided
that the Administrator shall continue to be appointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate, as before, but shall now serve a five-year term. See 49 U.S.C. §
106(b) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). There is no "for cause" removal provision. Moreover, the
Administrator continues to report to the Secretary of Transportation. See id. These statutory
provisions create a strong presumption that Congress did not intend to alter the President's
historic removal power over the Administrator. The five-year term appears simply to be a
political compromise designed to encourage continuity of office by according the Adminis-
trator some added decisional and management freedom. The legislative history supports
this reading of the statute. H.R. 2276, an early version of the reauthorization legislation,
would have removed the FAA from the Department of Transportation and replaced the cur-
rent Administrator position with a three-member Presidentially-appointed Board whose
members could only be removed for cause. See H.R. REP. No. 104-475, pt. I, at 25 (1996).
The Senate approach, which was enacted, simply added a five-year term for the Adminis-
trator. See 49 U.S.C. § 106(b); see also S. REP No. 104-333 (1996). In contrast, the single,
ten-year term for the Director of the FBI indicates a congressional intent to limit a director's
tenure. See Kenneth Williams, Gays in the Military: The Legal Issues, 28 U.S.F. L. REV.
919, 954 n.286 (1994). As with the FAA administrator, the FBI director's tenure provision
does not prevent summary removal by the President before the term expires.
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V. THE FUTURE OF THE INDEPENDENT AGENCY
The independent agency has developed deep roots in the American ad-
ministrative state. However, as this article suggests, the independent
agency reflects a political calculation of a specific time and place drawn
first from the 19th century British and state experience in railroad regula-
tion,496 followed by the Progressive movement's elevation of experts and
"the science of administration"'4 97 into a governing cultural myth. The
number of independent agencies has not grown significantly since the
Great Society. Newer multi-member agencies often play more a supervi-
sory than a regulatory role-different from their earlier counterparts.
498
Some newer agencies were previously components of larger units. At
times, multi-member agencies have disappeared because they were trans-
mogrified into different forms,49 9 reorganized into more fashionable struc-
tural modes, 50 0 or terminated because they completed their work. 50' At the
same time, few multi-member agencies have been abolished. 2 The Civil
496. See supra text at notes 15-90.
497. See supra text at notes 91-1 13.
498. See infra Part. V-B.
499. For example, the Tariff Commission, established in 1917, ch. 463, § 700, 39 Stat.
795 (1916), was the predecessor to the U.S. International Trade Commission. See Pub. L.
No. 93-618, § 171, 88 Stat. 2009 (1975) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1330 (1994)).
500. The Federal Power Commission, created in 1920, ch. 285, 41 Stat. 1063, became
the Federal Energy Regulation Commission in 1977 as part of the Department of Energy
Organization Act. See Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 565 (1977).
501. The Assassination Records Review Board was established in 1994 as a temporary
agency to identify, collect, examine and disseminate materials relating to the assassination
of President John F. Kennedy. See President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Col-
lection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-526, 106 Stat. 3443, reprinted in 44 U.S.C. § 2017, at
600 (1994). The Board was composed of five members, appointed by the President with
Senate confirmation, from among individuals with distinguished professional reputations
and without regard for political affiliation, and including one lawyer and one professional
historian. See § 7(b)(4)-(5), 44 U.S.C. § 2017, at 604. Its members could only be removed
for cause. In an unusual statutory provision, members were expressly authorized to chal-
lenge their removal in court and the court was expressly authorized to order reinstatement.
See § 7(g), 44 U.S.C. § 2107, at 604. The Board's original three-year authorization was ex-
tended for an additional year. See Pub. L. 105-25, 111 Stat. 240 (1997). The Board com-
pleted its mission, submitted its final report, and went out of business on September 30,
1998. See § 7(o), U.S.C. § 2107, at 605; see also H.R. REP. No. 105-138 (1997) (amending
President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992); H.R. REP. No.
103-587 (1994) (discussing need for further legislation for release of Kennedy Assassination
Records).
502. Occasionally, a temporary agency will be abolished. The National Bituminous
Coal Commission was established in 1935 as a temporary multi-member agency within the
Department of the Interior. Cushman observes that there was no discussion in Congress of
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Aeronautics Board appears to be the only permanent multi-member agency
actually abolished since the New Deal.50 3
What then is the future of the independent regulatory mode? The fol-
lowing points should be kept in mind.
A. Restructuring Multi-Member Agencies: The Single Member Option
Most congressional efforts to restructure agencies have generally re-
sulted in legislative paralysis. This is due principally to division among
relevant interest groups and executive branch opposition to any desiderata
of agency independence. The SSA is an interesting exception.
1. Social Security Administration
The depression-era SSA has had an interesting institutional history.50 4 In
1935, President Roosevelt sent Congress legislation to establish a Social
Insurance Board as part of the Department of Labor. After receiving the
legislation, the House and Senate divided on the institutional placement of
the new entity. The Senate backed the Roosevelt approach and the House
favored the creation of an independent agency.50 5 In the end, the House
the Commission's status within the Interior Department, although the Interior Secretary later
testified that he in fact exercised no control over the Commission's activities. See
CUSHMAN, supra note 10, at 379-80, 387-88. Key features of the Commission's enabling
statute were declared unconstitutional in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
Although the agency was later resuscitated by the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937, ch. 127, 50
Stat. 72, it was eliminated as part of a presidential reorganization plan in 1939, and its func-
tions were transferred directly to the Interior Department. See CUSHMAN, supra note 10, at
388-89. Cushman observes that the Commission "passed out of the picture, apparently un-
lamented." Id. at 389.
503. See Theodore J. Lowi, President v. Congress: What the Two-Party Duopoly Has
Done to the American Separation of Powers, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1219, 1227 (1997)
(observing that two New Deal agencies-the CAB and the ICC-have been abolished).
However, as we discuss, the ICC was actually transformed into a new multi-member
agency.
504. Except as noted, the material in this section is adapted from the SSA Organiza-
tional History contained on the Social Security Administration's web page. See Social Se-
curity Administration History Page: SSA History (last visited Oct. 5, 2000)
<http://www.ssa.gov/history/orghist.html>.
505. See Wilbur J. Cohen, The Development of the Social Security Act of 1935: Reflec-
tions Some Fifty Years Later, 68 MiNN. L. REV. 379, 397 nn. 123-27 (1983). One author in-
dicates that the opposition to the Labor Department rested on its seeming friendliness to la-
bor factions, although gender animus toward Labor Secretary Frances Perkins may have
played a role. See Kathleen M. Keller, Federalizing Social Welfare in a World of Gender




view prevailed. The Social Security Act of 1935 established a three-
member agency known as the Social Security Board50 6 to administer the old
age and survivors insurance, unemployment compensation, and public as-
sistance programs. The Board had many of the characteristics of an inde-
pendent multi-member agency except it did not have an explicit statutory
provision governing removal of members.
50 7
A mere four years after its creation, the. Board lost its independent status.
In the Reorganization Plan I of 1939, President Roosevelt created the Fed-
eral Security Agency (FSA), a sub-cabinet level entity, to administer a
range of programs, including the U.S. Public Health Service, the Civilian
Conservation Corps, and the Office of Education. The reorganization plan
retained the Social Security Board but it was placed under the jurisdiction
of the FSA.5°8
Then, in 1946, the Board lost its multi-member status. Reorganization
Plan 2 of 1946 abolished the Social Security Board and transferred its
functions directly to the FSA. 509 Then President Truman praised the
Board's work but characterized its status as an "anomaly." In the Presi-
dent's view, the "existence of a department within a department [was] a se-
vere barrier to effective integration." 510 The FSA Administrator created the
position of SSA Commissioner and named the Board's Chairman as the
first Commissioner of Social Security.
In 1953, the FSA was abolished and its functions, including those of the
SSA, were transferred to the newly established Department of Health, Edu-
cation and Welfare. 51  Later, the SSA became a central part of HHS when
506. See Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, 74-271, § 701, 49 Stat. 635 (1935).
507. The Board had three members, appointed by the President with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate, serving six-year terms, no more than two of whom could be from the
same political party. See id.
508. The Board's functions were thereafter to be administered "as a part of the Federal
Security Agency under the direction and supervision of the Federal Security Administrator."
Reorg. Plan No. I of 1939, 3 C.F.R. § 1290 (1938-43), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 1429
(1994). The Board's Office of General Counsel was consolidated with the Office of Gen-
eral counsel of the Federal Security Agency. The statute was also amended in 1939. See
Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, 53 Stat. 1360. The old age insurance
program was so drastically amended in 1939 that the amendments were called "the new
Act." See S. Doc. No. 77-10, pt. 3, at 2 (1941).
509. See Reorg. Plan 2 of 1946, 3 C.F.R. § 1064 (1943-48), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at
1448 (1994). The FSA delegated most of its powers to the Commissioner of Social Secu-
rity, although the FSA Administrator retained authority over the Appeals Council. See
Koch & Koplow, supra note 487, at 235.
510. Reorg. Plan No. 2 of 1946, Message of the President, 3 C.F.R. § 10 (1943-48), re-
printed in 5 U.S.C. app. at 1448 (1994).
511. See Reorg. Plan No. I of 1953, 3 C.F.R. § 1022 (1949-53), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
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that department was established in 1980.512 However, this reorganization
did not quiet the conflict. In the 1990s, the classic institutional battle arose
yet again. An agency backlog of disability cases, coupled with a re-
examination of disability claims that resulted in the numerous termination
of benefits, led to a perception that the agency lacked independence from
political control. Eventually, legislation was proposed to remove the Social
Security Administration from HHS and establish it as an independent
agency. The House favored the independent multi-member board format
akin to the one that it had favored in 1935, but the Senate's preference pre-
vailed.1 3 This time, the new agency would be headed by a single individ-
ual whose independence would be protected by a statutory provision that
allows the President to remove the individual only for good cause.
51 4
2. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
The effort to replace the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) with a
single administrator produced a more typical result. In the wake of the
Three Mile Island nuclear accident, a "maze of reform proposals" for the
NRC were introduced in Congress.515 Six separate bills were introduced in
the House of Representatives, covering the waterfront of administrative re-
organization and inter-branch issues. In particular, two bills, H.R. 3285
and H.R. 4134, would have replaced the Commission with a single admin-
istrator.516 Several bills reflected efforts to resolve the internal squabble
app. at 1488 (1994).
512. See Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 96-88, § 509, 93 Stat.
668 (1980).
513. See Social Security Administrative Reform Act of 1994; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-
670, at 89-90 (1994) (disucssing establishment of Social Security Administration as inde-
pendent agency).
514. See 42 U.S.C. § 902(a)(3) (1994).
515. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Reorganization Legislation: Hearings on H.R.
2126, H.R. 3049, H.R. 3124, H.R. 3285, H.R. 4134, H.R. 4140 Before the Subcomm. on En-
ergy and the Env 't of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs. 100th Cong. I
(1988) [hereinafter NRC Hearings] (statement of Rep. Udall, Chairman, Subcomm. on En-
ergy and the Env't).
516. See NRC Hearings, supra note 516, at 237, 239 (statement of Lando W. Zech, Jr.,
Chairman, NRC) (testifying that majority of the NRC supported the single administrator
concept). H.R. 3285 would also have established a statutorily independent Inspector Gen-
eral and a brand new multi-member independent Nuclear Safety Board responsible for in-
vestigating events at both NRC-regulated and Department of Energy-owned facilities. See




between the NRC's Executive Director for Operations and its Director of
the Office of Investigations, or to address other perceived NRC failings." 7
A bare majority of the Commission supported the single administrator
concept,518 but only if the new Administrator were to be entirely free of the
usual forms of OMB regulatory oversight.519 A fourth Commissioner
thought that things were fine as they were and that the Sunshine Act was at
the heart of the Commission's institutional problems because it impeded
collegiality.5 20 The fifth Commissioner, who would later become Chair-
man, supported retention of the multi-member NRC, but wanted enhanced
administrative powers for the Chairman.
5 2 1
Congressional efforts to ensure independence from presidential over-
sight for the new agency was virtually a kiss of death for any legislation.
The Department of Justice strongly opposed the creation of any independ-
ent board as part of the new agency regime on constitutional grounds.5 22
517. See id. at 118 (statement of Rep. Gejdenson) (referring to undermining by NRC
staff of Office of Investigations examinations of licensee wrongdoing and noting House
Subcommittee Chairman Udall's letter to NRC urging it not to place Office of Investiga-
tions under Executive Director for Operations); Matthew L. Wald, Report Contradicts Rea-
son Given By Nuclear Officials for an Inquiry, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 9, 1989, at A12 (noting
conflicts between NRC's Chief of Staff and senior staff of Office of Investigations). These
bills, however, adopted conflicting approaches. H.R. 3285 and H.R. 4134 would have
eliminated the position of Executive Director for Operations, while H.R. 3124 would have
elevated the position to a presidential appointee, confirmed by the Senate. See NRC Hear-
ings, supra note 516, at 239 (statement of Lando W. Zech, Jr., Chairman, NRC). H.R. 4140
would have established the Office of Investigations as a statutory office, and it would have
required the office to report to the Commission. See id. at 242. H.R. 2126 addressed the
issue of the Inspector General and the Office of Investigations, but injected a separate issue
by proposing new protections for whistleblowers. See id at 240. Finally, H.R. 3049 ad-
dressed conflicts-of-interest by precluding the appointment to the Commission of any indi-
vidual who had a significant financial relationship with a regulated entity in the two years
prior to the appointment. See id. at 243; see also Ben A. Franklin, Nuclear Officials As-
sailed as Biased, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 22, 1987, at Al (concerning allegations that top man-
agement at NRC improperly assisted regulated companies and noting congressional claims
that a "distinctly cozy relationship" existed between Commission's top manager and a
regulated company).
518. See NRC Hearings, supra note 516, at 147 (statement of Lando W. Zech, Jr.,
Chairman, NRC) (stating that "the Commission majority on this issue is very marginal").
519. See id. at 232 (statement of Lando W. Zech, Jr., Chairman, NRC) (explaining that
majority of NRC believed it should not be subject to OMB regulatory oversight).
520. See id. at 213 (statement of Frederick M. Bernthal, Commissioner, NRC) (arguing
that Sunshine Act undermined concept of collegial decisionmaking).
521. See id. at 223 (statement of Kenneth C. Rogers, Commissioner, NRC) (urging that
Chairman be made responsible for management of all operational matters).
522. The Department said that it would recommend a presidential veto of any bill that
contained a new, independent-style Board. See Letter of Thomas M. Boyd. Acting Assistant
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The OMB opposed giving the new agency authority to bypass OMB on
legislative, budgetary and regulatory matters.523 In due course, the reform
effort collapsed and the Senate indefinitely postponed a bill to reorganize
the functions of the NRC.524
3. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
The short-lived effort to replace the FERC with a single administrator
came as a surprise element of the Bush Administration's 1991 National En-
ergy Strategy. 5  Introduction of the National Energy Strategy itself "fol-
lowed 10 years of work by lobbyists, academics, true-believer congres-
sional staff members, think-tank scholars, policy specialists and a handful
of aggressive industry leaders. 526 However, the Bush Administration's ef-
fort to abolish FERC was "an eleventh hour recommendation" by Vice
President Quayle's Competitiveness Council.
527
The proposed abolition of FERC appears to have been a rather sweeping
response to the chronic delays that were seemingly endemic in the agency's
proceedings.5 2' But such significant structural change not only threatened
prevailing arrangements but lacked both the sense of urgency and the con-
sensus of "elite opinion" that Professors Martha Derthick and Paul Quirk
believe is essential to reform. 529 There had also been little, if any, political
preparation. As a result, Congressman John Dingell, the Chairman of the
House Energy and Commerce Committee, urged the Administration to
separate it from the overall energy initiative,530 while Senator Bennett
Attorney General, to Sen. Quentin N. Burdick, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Env't and Pub-
lic Works (Mar. 21, 1988), reprinted in 134 CONG. REC. 20,792 (1988).
523. OMB too was prepared to recommend that the President veto the bill. See Letter of
James C. Miller, Director, OMB, to John Glenn, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Gov't Affairs
(July 26, 1988), reprinted in 134 CONG. REc. 20,794 (1988).
524. See 134 CONG. REc. 20,870 (1988) (request of Sen. Byrd).
525. See Letter of Secretary James D. Watkins, Dep't of Energy, to Dan Quayle, Presi-
dent of the Senate (Mar. 4, 1991), reprinted in 137 CONG. REC. S2795 (daily ed. Mar. 6,
1991) ("This proposal was developed independently of the National Energy Strategy by the
Vice President's Council on Competitiveness. It is included here because it complements
the reform and streamlining of the regulatory infrastructure for the natural gas and hydroe-
lectric power industries contained in the National Energy Strategy.").
526. Thomas W. Lippman, Utility Industry Overhaul: Surprisingly Static-Free, WASH.
POST, June I1, 1992, at A25.
527. Johnston Urges Spinoff of FERC Plan to Speed Senate Action on NES, PLATr'S
O1LGRAM NEWS, Mar. 8, 1991, at 6.
528. See James H. McGrew, Let's Streamline, Not Abolish FERC, PUB. UTIL. FORT.,
June 15, 1992, at 12 (rejecting abolition of FERC as a way to streamline it).
529. See DERTHICK & QuIRK, supra note 332, at 238-39.
530. See Lori M. Rodgers, NES: A Mixed Bag Receives Mixed Reactions, PUB. UTIL.
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Johnston, the Senate Energy Committee Chairman, opposed the initiative
from the outset.5 31 Elements of the regulated sector opposed the measure as
well.532
FERC itself seems to have been taken a bit by surprise. Its chairman,
Martin Allday, 533 was a Texas lawyer and personal friend of President Bush
who had been involved in Republican activities but had served on the
Commission for only about a year 5 34 Vice President Quayle was careful
not to link the FERC abolition proposal to any Administration dissatisfac-
tion with Allday's chairmanship 35 At the same time, Chairman Allday
was publicly noncommittal about the proposal. In March 1991, he de-
fended his agency's performance but offered no specific comment on the
reorganization. 36 Three months later, when pressed by a House committee
for FERC's views on the pending legislation, Chairman Allday chose to
submit only a staff analysis of the legislation that included the following,
somewhat Delphic, observation:
To the best of our knowledge, neither the Chairman nor the Commission recom-
mended a legislative proposal regarding the transfer of its functions. It is our under-
standing that Chairman AlIday was consulted prior to the proposal being submitted to
the Congress.537
On the merits, the staff noted, in a surprisingly noncommittal fashion for
an agency under attack, that "there are both advantages and disadvantages
in the independent commission and single administrator structures, which
have been the focus of much debate throughout the years." '38 FERC may
FORT, Apr. I, 1991, at 36 (stating that proposal faced uncertain future in Congress because
of Rep. Dingell's opposition).
531. See NES Package Sees Replacing FERC with Gas, Electricity Commission,
PLATT's O[LGRAm NEWS, March 1, 1991, at 4 (citing Senate Energy Committee Chairman
Johnson at an Interstate Natural Gas Association of America meeting).
532. See McGrew, supra note 528, at 12.
533. See 1989 PUB. PAPERS 1345, 1345 (Oct. 16, 1989) (announcing President Bush's
intent to nominate AlIday as Chairman of FERC).
534. See Allday Tells President April 12 is His Last Day at FERC, ENERGY DAILY, Mar.
2, 1993, at 4.
535. See FERC Restructuring Plan is Unveiled: Johnston, Dingell Unimpressed, INSIDE
F.E.R.C., March 4, 1991, at I (praising Allday's performance and promoting FERC's ac-
complishments).
536. See id.
537. Staff Report and Analysis in Response to Chairman Dingell's May II, 1991 Letter
of Chairman Martin AlIday, Chairman, FERC 3 (June 14, 1991) (on file with author).
538. Id. at 4. The staff paper nonetheless defended FERC's operations. See id. at 5-7
("The independence of the Commission does not stand in the way of a coordinated national
energy policy.... [W]e do not understand the basis of the Council's claim that the Commis-
sion's current structure hampers Congress in the performance of its oversight and legislative
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well have recognized that by the time of its June 1991 response that the re-
organization proposal was a dead letter.539 The overall energy legislation
passed with virtually no opposition.5 40  But the attempt to abolish FERC
failed, and FERC remains resilient.54'
4. Others
More recent efforts to reorganize agency structures have focused less on
independence and more on accountability. For example, Congress at-
tempted to create a Nuclear Defense Security Agency within the Depart-
ment of Energy in order to provide that agency with greater access to the
542 ~ erirSecretary. As noted earlier, Congress also attempted to make the general
counsel of the Federal Election Commission a Senate-confirmed position
that could have allowed the Senate greater leverage regarding the FEC's
docket. 43 Finally, efforts were made in 1999 to create a separate agency
within the DOT to reduce truck accidents.544 As seen, the emphasis is no
longer on independence per se, but on clearer lines of authority and ac-
countability.
roles .... [Although] [tihe multiple membership of the Commission sometimes adds to the
length of its decisionmaking process ... we know of no studies that have compared the ex-
tra time it takes to obtain a majority vote of a collegial body to the time expended in getting
approval for an important regulatory action through the various layers of an executive de-
partment and, in the case of regulations, through the OMB review process."). The staff ar-
gued that "the independence and fixed terms of Commissioners enhance the continuity and
stability of administrative decisionmaking by enabling Commissioners to serve long enough
to develop expertise and by minimizing, or providing a transition phase for, policy shifts
that otherwise might occur after a change in the Administration." Id. at 8.
539. FERC Restructuring Takes Back Seat as Senate Energy Markup Begins, INSIDE
F.E.R.C., Apr. 22, 1991, at 1.
540. See Lippman, supra note 526, at A25 (reporting that bill passed with a vote of 381
to 37 in House and 94 to 4 in Senate).
541. See, e.g., S1678, 104th Cong. (1996) (proposing abolition of Department of En-
ergy); 142 CONG. REc. S3404 (daily ed. 1996) (statement of Sen. Grams) (introducing
S1678, a bill to abolish Energy Department, leaving FERC as a fully independent agency).
542. See 145 CONG. REc. S8937 (daily ed. July 21, 1999) (proposing Agency for Nu-
clear Stewardship); see also Walter Pincus, Senate Votes for New DOE Nuclear Weapons
Agency, WASH. POST, July 22, 1999, at A6.
543. See Rubenstein, supra note 465, at 4; see also Senate Acts on FEC Issue, Treasury
Funds, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 1998, at A7; Sean Scully, House to Vote on Bill Targeting
Election Commission Attorney, WASH. TIMES, July 14, 1998, at A8.
544. The bill upgrades the Federal Highway Administration Office of Motor Carrier
within the Transportation Department. See Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999




1. Civil Aeronautics Board
The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) was in the business of regulating
airlines from 1938 to 1985.14' A 1982 article by one of the current authors
observed that a "unique confluence of factors brought about airline de-
regulation." 546 Among the key factors that influenced Congress was an im-
pressive empirical data-base (including clearly identifiable anecdotal evi-
dence) that conveyed the benefits of unregulated competition,547 the strong
divisions within the regulated sector over the continuing benefits of gov-
ernment intervention, the lack of a well-organized opposition to deregula-
tion, and the commitment of two presidential administrations and the
agency (and its staff) itself.
48
Timing was critical. First, airline deregulation was on the agenda during
relatively prosperous and improving economic times for the airline indus-
try.549 Second, the CAB, which had historically been able to retain the loy-
alty of all segments of the airline industry to some extent, established poli-
cies during the Nixon Administration that divided the industry's loyalty.
550
545. The Board had an ambiguous institutional beginning. It started life in 1938 as the
Civil Aeronautics Authority, with responsibility for economic and safety matters. See Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973. The 1938 statute also established an Ad-
ministrator for the Authority, who was the forerunner of the Federal Aviation Administrator,
and a separate Air Safety Board to investigate accidents, which was an institutional precur-
sor to the National Transportation Safety Board. See CUsHtAN, supra note 10, at 401-02.
A Presidential Reorganization Plan in 1940 consolidated the functions of the Authority and
the Air Safety Board into a new Civil Aeronautics Board and placed the Board within the
Commerce Department. See Reorg. Plan No. 4 of 1940, 3 C.F.R. 1302 (1938-1943), re-
printed in 5 U.S.C. app. at 1444 (1994). The Administrator was placed under the direction
of the Secretary of Commerce. See id.; see also CUSHMAN, supra note 10, at 415-16. The
Board's safety functions were shifted to the newly created Department of Transportation by
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731.
546. Gary J. Edles, The Strategy of Regulatory Change, 49 ICC PRAC. J. 626, 626
(1982).
547. Id.
548. See id. at 626-31; see generally DERTHICK & QUIRK, supra note 332 (discussing
deregulation of CAB, ICC, and FCC).
549. See Edles, supra note 546, at 626.
550. See also George W. Hilton, The Basic Behavior of Regulatory Commissions, 62
AMER. ECON. REv. 47, 48 (1972) (explaining how agencies receive support from all key
sectors of regulated sector by engaging in "minimal squawk" industry pacification behavior
in which no constituent group is disaffected in the longer term). There may also have been,
however, a generation component at work. Roy Pulsifer, a career government lawyer ac-
tively involved in promoting airline deregulation during his tenure at the Civil Aeronautics
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By 1985, however, Congress abolished the CAB and transferred its sur-
viving functions to the Department of Transportation.55'
2. Trucking Deregulation
Timing was also critical to trucking deregulation. Congress acted in
1995 as part of the anti-regulation agenda that accompanied the Republican
take-over of Congress that year.52 But the ICC's abolition had been in the
works for a while, and was ultimately only partial and somewhat symbolic.
Although the government regulation of trucking ended, Congress retained
railroad regulation and replaced the ICC with the smaller Surface Trans-
portation Board (STB). This action gave the STB, a new multi-member
agency, the responsibility of overseeing the gradual decrease of govern-
ment intervention in surface transportation. 553 The railroad industry's sup-
port for "an industry-friendly forum for their mergers"-rather than review
by the Department of Justice-and the support from congressional com-
mittees "whose clout stood to be greatly diminished by elimination of the
Board, asked the essential question: "Why ... should the criticisms that academic econo-
mists have been making for more than twenty years and government economists since the
early 1960s suddenly become popular issues, and why should the Administration be pro-
posing drastic changes in the law?" Roy Pulsifer, Introduction, 41 J. AMR L. & COM. 573,
575 (1975). His answer was provocative.
The basic reason appears to be that the end of the great post-World War I1 boom, and
the recent recession, compounded by the negative impact on income resulting from
petroleum price increases, have made the public sensitive to claims of the adverse
impact of economic regulation on consumer prices. Put another way, the impact of
governmental regulation on the allocation of resources, on how the pie is sliced, be-
comes a matter of intensified public concern when the overall economy, the pie, is
not expanding. A second factor, although far from understood, is the maturation of
the generation born during and in the decade after World War I. This group, by edu-
cation and upbringing in a time of prosperity, is skeptical of government protection-
ism, and is likely to call for changes in any government policy which does not maxi-
mize opportunity, including regulatory regimes that seem to favor the status quo in
industrial organization.
Id. at 575-77.
551. See Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-443, 98 Stat.
1703.
552. See, e.g., ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 803.
553. The new Board is now administratively part of the Department of Transportation.
See Mary Jacoby, Foes of Bureaucracy Learn A Tough Lesson, CHI. TRm., June 16, 1996, at
C1 (reporting that although ICC's name on the building was removed and its $15 million
budget cut in half, three former ICC commissioners and a staff of 200 were still "at their




ICC," helped ensure that the ICC was "reinvented," and not simply abol-
ished.554
C. Comparative Examples
Administrative law scholarship in the United States understandably fo-
cuses on domestic rather than comparative elements, 555 and most American
work in the field at least, proceeds from the view that our constitutional
framework is set in time, if not in stone. Still, it is worth considering the
extent to which centralization and its attendant mode-burearcratization may
or may not be the future of regulation in governments globally. In the post-
World War II era many thought bureaucracy was associated with concepts
such as tyranny and centralized authority.556 Indeed, in his exhaustive
study, Oriental Despotism, Karl Wittfogel concluded that the need for
"large-scale and government-managed works of irrigation and flood con-
trol" influenced the totalitarian structure of many ancient and medieval
eastern societies. 57 Put otherwise, the marginal bureaucracy needed in or-
der to run and protect large-scale government public works projects can
lead all to easily to centralized state control.558
Modern (meaning before the fall of the Berlin wall) Marxist scholars
recognized the dangers inherent in what some termed the bureaucratisation
du mond.559 Liberals prophesized that a knowledge-based elite, be they
scientists or engineers, were taking over.5 60  Conservatives bewailed the
554. Id. atCI2.
555. But see BERNARD SCHWARTZ & H.W.R. WADE, LEGAL CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT:
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN BRITAIN & THE UNITED STATES (1972); BERNARD SCHWARTZ,
FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE COMMON-LAW WORLD (1954) (comparing French,
English and American administrative law); MARTIN SHAPIRO, INDEPENDENT AGENCIES: US
AND EU 20 (Jean Monet Chair Papers No. 34, The Robert Schuman Centre, European Univ.
Inst., 1996).
556. The classic text is FRANZ NEUMAN, BEHEMOTH (1942) (discussing history and phi-
losophy of National Socialism). See also HANNH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF
TOTALITARIANISM (2d prtg. 1959) for additional material on totalitarianism.
557. KARL WITTFOGEL, ORIENTAL DESPOTISM: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF TOTAL
POWER 3 (1995).
558. Under this notion of "Asiatic despotism" (viewed by Marx as an exception to his
laws of economic development). It is the technological imperative, rather than the eco-
nomic "mode of production," that determines the structure of society and need for a strong
overbearing state. Karl Marx, The British Rule in India, N.Y. DAILY TRm., June 25, 1853,
in 12 KARL MARX & FREDERICK ENGLES: COLLECTED WORKS 125 (Moscow 1979).
559. See BRUNO RIZZO, THE BUREAUCRATIZATION OF THE WORLD 2 (Adam Westoby
trans., 1985) (stating bureaucratization leads to formation of a new "class" form).
560. Several scholars have written material that supports this prophecy. See, e.g., JOHN
K. GALBRITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 282-95 (1967) (discussing the educational and
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advent of "the Technological Society"5 6' with its contaminant loss of faith.
Many accepted the inevitability of continued bureaucratic centralization, as
evidenced by the title of a recent law review article: The Rise and Rise of
the Administrative State.
562
But there may be limits to this centrifugal pull in both this country and
abroad. True, in the United States, the constitutional norm of the "unitary"
executive creates normative pressure toward centralization in the federal
administrative state. Nonetheless empirical sociology suggests a structural,
dare we say, extraconstitutional tension, between bureaucracy and centrali-
zation and subsidiarity and local flexibility which affects regulatory efforts
in and out of the United States. Rather than centralization, it is possible
that the priciples of subsidiarity, accountability and lines of authority in
other countries who, like us, have drank deeply from the administrative
state. There can be little doubt that centrifugal pressures toward diffused
bureaucratic accountability, or what some have called "diffused sover-
eignty,' 563 have dramatically affected the bureaucratic structure of the ad-
ministrative state outside of the United States.
The rich variety of pragmatic and eclectic organizational structures and
differing elements of political control that characterize American adminis-
trative management appear in European public administration as well. As
in the United States, Departments or Ministries are under the control of a
minister (who is himself a member of the legislative branch), which are the
most prominent organizational units in European governments. 64 None-
theless, European governments also deploy a diverse range of ad hoc gov-
scientific establishment); Daniel Bell, Notes on the Post-Industrial Society (I), PUB.
INTEREST, Winter 1967, at 27-28; Zbigniew Brzezinski, America in the Technetronic Age,
ENCOUNTER, Jan. 1968, at 16.
561. See JACQUES ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY x (John Wilkinson trans., 1964)
(1954) (stating that phrase technological society describes the way as "the way in which an
autonomous technology is in process of taking over the traditional values of every society
without exception, subverting and suppressing these values to produce at last a monolithic
world culture in which all nontechnological difference and variety is mere appearance.").
562. See Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 1231, 1231 (1994) (asserting that the post-New Deal administrative state contravenes
the Constitution's design).
563. Daniel Guttman, Public Purpose and Private Service: The Twentieth Century Cul-
ture of Contracting Out and the Evolving Law of Diffused Sovereignty, 52 ADMIN. L. REV.
859, 881-82 (2000).
564. Yvts MtNY, GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN WESTERN EUROPE: BRITAIN, FRANCE,
ITALY, GERMANY 283 (Janet Lloyd trans., Oxford University Press 2d, ed. 1993) (comparing
structure of European ministries); see also RENATE MAYNTZ & FRITZ W. SCHARPF, POLICY-
MAKING IN THE GERMAN FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 63-64 (1975) (discussing structure of




ernment institutions that undertake specialized functions. Many of these
are not accountable to parliamentary authority. Indeed, the term "public
agencies" in France is defined as those that engage in any activity that the
government believes should be performed by a public authority in the pub-
lic interest.5 65 So there is a full range of "[p]ublic administrative or indus-
trial and commercial establishments,... mixed-economy companies, . . .
agencies, commissions, and offices, not to mention the thousands of or-
ganizations funded with public money and camouflaged by their anodyne
appearance as associations set up under the law of 190 1.,,566 Indeed, the
creation of such administrative entities can serve as a political compromise
or "way station" as countries move to deregulate or privatize industry or
167services.
The "cooperative federalism" of Germany represents a special form of
governmental arrangement, where power is shared between the national
government, and regional "Laender" governments. 568  Indeed, two aca-
demic observers have noted that in Germany, "most federal ministries
should be regarded primarily as fairly large policy-making staffs rather
565. See John Bell, The Concept of Public Service under Threat from Europe? An Illus-
tration from Energy Law, 5 EuR. PUB. L. 189, 191-92 (1999). "Public bodies" may be or-
gans of the government or public enterprises of an administrative or commercial kind. Id. at
192. For example, the French railroad is a publicly-owned commercial enterprise while the
French airline, Air France, was created under private law, with the government holding a
majority interest.
566. MtNY, supra note 565, at 300. The Law of I July 1901 deals with the right of as-
sociation. See BROWN & BELL, supra note 565, at 17.
567. For example, in french administrative law there are:
[I]ndependent and autonomous agencies to regulate or supervise particular policies or
policy areas: the Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertds, which
regulates the use of computers and databases; the Conseil de la Concurrence, which
monitors monopolies, take-overs and restrictive practices; the Commission des Sond-
ages, which investigates complaints about opinion polls; the Commission de la Con-
sommation, which advises on consumer affairs; the Commission des Opgrations de
Bourse, which regulates the financial markets; and the Commission Nationale de
contr6le des campagnes ilectorales, which makes recommendations and monitors the
conduct of national electoral campaigns. In the areas of deregulated markets and pri-
vatized industries, such agencies have a major role in supervising the operation of the
market. Thus the Conseil Supirieur de IAudiovisuel supervises broadcasting, and
the Autoritg de rigulation des t~licommunications deals with the telecommunications
sector. Control by officials is seen in many cases as a way of resolving problems
which divide politicians.
BROWN & BELL, supra note 565, at 26-27.
568. See KURT SONTHEIMER, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF WEST GERMANY 152
(Fleur Donecker trans., Hutchinson Univ. Library 1972).
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than as administrative line organizations. '569 Committees of national and
Laender officials often negotiate agreements on issues of common concern,
which are often entitled to judicial enforcement.5 70 The national and re-
gional governmental entities create further interdependence by negotiating
fiscal and financial arrangements.
571
The emergence of the European Union (EU) has created new tensions
between centralization and independence for the administrative process.
Two elements of "independence" are particularly important in the Euro-
pean Union context. On the one hand, the European Commission is de-
signed to be free of domination by individual member states. Article 10 of
the Merger Treaty of 1965, which combined earlier European institutions,
expressly provides that commissioners must "neither seek nor take instruc-
tions from any government or from any other body. 572 On the other hand,
numerous EU agencies are designed to be only partially independent of the
Commission or the member states.573 So agencies are created with mana-
gerial, technical, or information gathering and analysis responsibilities, but
not ordinarily with independent regulatory power.574 To that extent, they
have some of the flavor of "Sunshine Commissions" of 19th century
America. Those agencies that make decisions ordinarily do so by consen-
sus that does not compromise the prerogatives of the individual national
administration.575
569. MAYNTZ & SCHARPF, supra note 564, at 46. Thus a pivotal and continuing issue of
German governmental administration is the practical degree of cooperation between the
central government and the Laender.
570. See MtNY, supra note 564, at 295.
571. Seeid.at297.
572. Treaty Establishing A Single Counsel and A Single Commission of the European
Communities, Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Communities,
Apr. 8, 1965, 4 I.L.M. 776, at 782.
573. See SHAPIRO, supra note 555.
574. See id. For example, the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Prod-
ucts and the European Environment Agency are not regulatory bodies and only have the
power to make recommendations to the Commission. See GIANDOMENICO MAJoNE, THE
NEW EUROPEAN AGENCIES: REGULATION BY INFORMATION, 2 (Robert Schuman Centre,
European Univ., Inst., 1997); KARL-HEINZ LADEUR, THE NEW EUROPEAN AGENCIES: THE
EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENT AGENCY AND PROSPECTS FOR A EUROPEAN NETWORK OR
ENVIRONMENTAL ADMINISTRATIONS 1-3 (European Union Institute Working Paper No.
96/50, 1996) (on file with Robert Schuman Centre, European Univ. Inst., Florence).
575. See RENAUD DEHOUSSE, REGULATION BY NETWORKS IN THE EUROPEAN




It is unclear whether European treaties permit the creation of multi-
national European administrative entities. 57 6 The precise place of European
Community institutions remains, therefore, ambiguous. Professor Renaud
Dehousse suggests that their institutional position is something of a com-
promise. "Agencies owe their existence to a kind of paradox. On the one
hand, increased uniformity is certainly needed; on the other hand, greater
centralization is politically inconceivable, and probably not desirable.5 77
Professor Martin Shapiro agrees that they are not genuinely free. of "inter-
governmental politics. '5 78 These traits seem to be endemic in any demo-
cratic administration.
What is true for the U.S. and continental Europe is true for Britain as
well. A review of the British system demonstrates the apparent need for
independence in other large administrative states. In Britain, the depart-
ments of the national or central government, known as Departments of
State, are the most political entities, and resemble United States cabinet de-
partments in many respects. 579 Each department is headed by a politically
accountable member of the government, usually a Secretary of State, but
relies on a large staff of civil servants. British secretaries of state are also
members of the legislative branch.
In 1968, the Fulton Committee on the Civil Service recommended the
"hiving off' of certain responsibilities from government departments to
autonomous or semi-autonomous institutions.8 These "children of de-
partments '' 81 are not subject to direct political control. They are, however,
subject to certain financial, policy and performance arrangements that are
formulated by the Minister, the Permanent Secretary, and the agency head,
and embodied in a framework document.5 82 The performance of these
agencies is reviewed every three years. 3 The bodies are unofficially re-
576. See LADEUR, supra note 574, at 3.
577. DEHOUSSE, supra note 575, at 20.
578. SHAPIRO, supra note 555, at 20.
579. See PATRICK BiRKrNsHAw, GRIEVANCES, REMEDIES AND THE STATE 29-34 (2d ed.
1994).
580. A.W. BRADLEY & K.D EWING, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 303
(12th ed. 1997).
581. BIRKINSHAW, supra note 579, at 26.
582. See BIRKINSHAW, supra note 579, at 26. For example, the Civil Aviation Authority
(CAA) was created from the Department of Trade and Industry. See P.P. CRAIG,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 81-82 (3d ed. 1994). Originally, the CAA operated under the general
guidance of the minister but that authority was abolished in 1980. See BImKINSHAW, supra
note 579, at 165. Nonetheless, there remains a right of appeal to the minister from CAA
decisions, although not every participant in proceedings before the CAA may appeal. Id.
583. See BIRKINSHAW, supra note 578, at 27 (stating that they are reviewed for comple-
tion of objectives, quality of service, financial performance, and levels of efficiency).
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ferred to as NDPBs (non-departmental public bodies) or "quangos" (quasi
non-governmental organizations),584 and include various regulatory boards
and commissions and grant-giving agencies such as the Commission for
Racial Equality and the Arts Council. 85  Numerous public corporations,
such as the BBC, the Post Office, and the British Airports Authority, were
also created in an effort to remove ministers from day-to-day control of
certain administrative or oversight functions.8 6
The broadest initiative to transfer power away from British government
departments to independent agencies was the creation of the so-called
"Next Step" agencies. An outgrowth of the government's "Next Steps"
Report in 1988,587 these agencies reflected devolution of power to non-
departmental agencies, largely in the areas of service delivery. 58 8 As of
1992, there were ninety-two Next Step agencies, including the Social Secu-
rity Benefits Agency, the Employment Service, the Passport Office, and the
Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency. 9
British Statutory Tribunals (at times called authorities, commissions,
committees, or tribunals) are primarily adjudicatory bodies, designed to ap-
ply an established body of rules to particular facts. 590 With antecedents in
the 1600s,59' tribunals decide disputes involving specialty subject areas
such as employer-employee relations, social security, taxes, or immigra-
tion.592 These, independent tribunals are justified on much the same basis
as independent U.S. federal agencies. Their processes are cheaper, faster,
and less formal than the generalist courts. They also possess greater sub-
ject matter expertise and may be more sympathetic to the protection of sub-
stantive interests.593 Tribunals are typically headed by a President, who is
584. See BRADLEY & EWING, supra note 58, at 327. The term "quango" is a word of
American origin that never caught on in the United States, "perhaps because it sounds too
much like a marsupial." SEnrz, supra note 50, at 273 n.2.
585. See BRADLEY & EWING, supra note 580, at 302-03.
586. See BRADLEY & EWING, supra note 580, at 328-29.
587. See PRIME MINISTER, IMPROVING MANAGEMENT IN GOVERNMENT: THE NEXT STEPS
AGENCIES (1988).
588. See CRAIG, supra note 582, at 83 (noting reasons for creating departmental agen-
cies).
589. See id. at 84.
590. See SIR WILLIAM WADE & CHRISTOPHER FORSYTH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 909 (7th
ed. 1994) (stating that tribunals function similarly to courts; tribunals consider facts and ap-
plication of statutes to those set of facts). There are about 2000 tribunals deciding 250,000
cases a year. See BiRKINSHAW, supra note 580, at 47.
591. The Commissioners of Customs and Excise were given statutory judicial power in
1660. See WADE & FORSYTH, supra note 590, at 905.
592. See id. at 904, 908.
593. See WADE & FORSYTH, supra note 590, at 906-07; see also BIRKINSHAW, supra
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responsible for the tribunal's administration.594 The President decides,
among other things, how many local tribunals should be established
throughout the country. 595 Each local tribunal is ordinarily headed by a
lawyer, with laymen as panelists. 596 The courts retain a statutory right of
review on "questions of law" from adverse tribunal decisions.
597
note 579, at 46-50.
594. See CRAIG, supra note 582, at 147.
595. See id.
596. See id. Membership depends on the nature of the tribunal's business. See WADE &
FORSYTH, supra note 590, at 913. The so-called "balanced" tribunal includes a legally
trained Chairman, appointed by the Lord Chancellor, and two members representing op-
posing interests or perspectives, such as management and labor. See id. On such tribunals
the Chairman is ordinarily paid while the others serve without compensation. See id
Where greater expertise is required, full-time paid members may be asked to serve on the
tribunal. See id. at 913-14.
597. See CRAIG, supra note 582, at 157. An issue in many cases is what constitutes an
"issue of law." Some scholars and court decisions divide matters into legal issues and fac-
tual issues. The latter includes inferences from so-called "primary facts." See id. An im-
portant supervisory body-the Council on Tribunals-oversees the work of tribunals. It is a
purely advisory body but can make recommendations on tribunal membership and opera-
tions and must be consulted before any tribunal enacts new procedural regulations. See id.
at 146. The Council of 10-15 members includes both lawyers and non-lawyers but a major-
ity are laymen. See id. We should note that the British also have a highly developed system
of Ombudsmen. The principal Ombudsman, known as the Parliamentary Commissioner for
Administration, is responsible for investigating complaints concerning administrative func-
tions of the departments and agencies of the central government. See id at 127. There are
two principal restrictions on the Ombudsman's authority. He may only entertain a com-
plaint referred to him by a member of Parliament and may not examine the merits of an
agency's discretionary decisions. See id. He is charged, in other words, with investigating
"maladministration." CRAIG, supra note 582, at 129. The Parliamentary Commissioner for
Administration also serves as the Ombudsman for the Health Services. However, in exer-
cising these powers, he may entertain complaints directly from the public. See id. at 134-35.
Finally, there are Commissions that serve as Ombudsmen over local government authorities
and a separate Ombudsman for Northern Ireland. See id. at 138. Another "independent"
structure for review of government action is the statutory inquiry. See id. at 160. The Brit-
ish employ the statutory inquiry as a governmental instrument that melds impartiality with
political accountability. The statutory inquiry process emerged in Britain in the latter part of
the 19th century as a means of resolving primarily local disputes between individuals and
public authorities, or between authorities and the national government. Inquiries are most
common in the areas of planning and development and serve as either an appeal mechanism
or a vehicle for the public presentation of views before government action is taken. See id.
For example, a local authority may refuse planning permission for a requested project and
the losing applicant can appeal. See id. Alternatively, the public may be asked to offer its
views before some form of application or request is granted. See CRAIG, supra note 582, at
160. Generally, an independent person (or persons) is appointed to gather the facts and re-
port to the relevant minister. However, the minister, or one of his or her immediate associ-
ates, makes the final decision. See id. at 160-61.
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Several broad theories have been offered to justify creation of the myr-
iad of institutional arrangements outside the scope of the traditional British
government departments.
First, there is the 'buffer' theory which sees them as a way of protecting certain ac-
tivities from political interference. Second, there is the 'escape' theory which sees
them as escaping known weaknesses of traditional government departments. Third,
the 'Corson' theory, following Mr. John Corson sees them as used to 'put the activity
where the talent was', which might be outside government departments. Fourth,
there is the participation or 'pluralistic' theory which thinks it desirable to spread
power. Fifth, there is the 'back double' theory. This is based on the analogy with a
taxi-driver who finds the main streets too busy and therefore uses back streets-what
is known to taxi drivers as 'back doubles.' The back double theory is that if govern-
ments, local authorities or other bodies find that they cannot do the things they want
within the existing structure, they set up new organisations which make it possible to
do them. Sixth, the 'too many bureaucrats' view, mainly an American one, suggests
that if the public thinks a country has too many civil servants it can set up quasi-non-
governmental organisations whose employees are not classified as civil servants. 59
Whatever the rationale, it is clear that the rest of the industrialized world
has seen fit, on occasion, to create administrative structures with diffused
lines of authority and accountability similar to the independent regulatory
agencies. Whether this is a reflection of a drive toward subsidarity or a re-
flection of the limits of centralized authority in technologically-driven soci-
ety remains to be seen.
D. American Perspectives
Notwithstanding the increased focus on issues of agency accountability
since the Great Society, recent years have seen a seeming efflorescence of
creative quasi-governmental administrative structures with varying levels
of government control. Private parties have taken over a variety of public
functions through "contracting out"5 99 and privatization. 600  Public-private
598. Id. at 82 (quoting PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE INTERESTS: THE INSTITUTIONS OF
COMPROMISE 362 (Douglas C. Hague et al. eds., 1975)). Professors Wade and Forsyth view
the system in more pragmatic terms. As they see it, "[t]ribunals are subject to a law of evo-
lution." WADE & FORSYTH, supra note 590, at 908. Each is devised for the purposes of
some particular statute and is, therefore, so to speak, tailor-made. See id.
Professor Birkinshaw would concur, but would seemingly go further. In his view,
"[tihe method of regulation adopted by government over particular bodies or activities will
often reflect the degree of trust with which a body or institution is held by government."
BIRKtNSHAW, supra note 579, at 163. Both observations are also true of their American
counterparts.
599. Daniel Guttman, Public Purpose and Private Service: The Twentieth Century Cul-
ture of Contracting Out and the Evolving Law of Diffused Sovereingly, 52 ADMIN. L. REV.
813, 821 (2000). See generally DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING
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partnerships can also substitute for government regulation through use of
industry self-audits and industry standard setting.60 1 Jody Freeman has in-
cisively referred to regimes of "mixed administration, 60 2 "in which private
actions and government share regulatory roles. 60 3 Two such government-
sponsored enterprise (GSE) regimes are public corporations and govern-
ment-sponsored enterprises. Public corporations are largely controlled by
the federal government while GSEs are further removed from government
control.
1. Public Corporations
Like independent agencies, public corporations are viewed as important
vehicles through which the business of government can be effectuated.
They include entities such as the Legal Services Corporation,60 4 the Corpo-
ration for Public Broadcasting,6 5 the United States Postal Service60 6 and
the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.60 7 The cornerstone of these en
tities has been their independence, which they obtained because of their lo-
cation outside the political realm. While they share similar characteristics
with the independent agencies-expertise, independence, and reduced ac-
countability-their corporate structure is the feature that sets them apart
from the independent agency.60 8 The public corporation was designed as a
profit-making entity that was self-sustaining and removed from the political
fray. Wholly-owned Federal Government Corporations (FGCs) 6 9 are
GOVERNMENT: HOW THE ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRT IS TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR
(1992); STEPHEN GOLDSMITH, THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY CITY: RESURECTING URBAN
AMERICA (1997).
600. See Marianne Lavelle, Public Works Go Private, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 25, 1995, at Al.
601. Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543,
(2000).
602. Jody Freeman, Private Parties, Public Functions and the New Administrative Law,
52 ADMIN. L. REV. 813, 816 (2000).
603. Id.
604. See 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (1994).
605. See 47 U.S.C. § 396 (1994).
606. See 39 U.S.C. § 201 (1994).
607. See 29 U.S.C. § 1302 (1994).
608. See RONALD MOE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., SENATE COMM. ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 104TH CONG., MANAGING THE PUBLIC'S BUSINESS: FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS 2-3 (Comm. Print 1995) (hereinafter MOE REPORT]. The MOE
REPORT states that "[clorporations could be, it was believed, 'depoliticized' and run on a
professional basis. Professional managers would be insulated to a degree from overt politics
.... .1 Id.
609. For example, Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC); Tennessee Valley
Authority (TVA); Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC); and the Federal Depository Insur-
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treated like agencies located within the executive branch and are subject to
executive control. 610 For example, the United States Postal Service, a gov-
ernment corporation, is treated as a government department for purposes of
the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. 6 1 Mixed-ownership
FGCs, 612 however, are considered more akin to private entities, and presi-
dential control over them is tenuous.
FGCs are subject to varying degrees of government control. Those that
are wholly owned or controlled by the government are subject to portions
of the APA and treated more like agencies, while those that have a more
tenuous connection to the government greater autonomy. 61 3 GSEs, on the
other hand, are private federal corporations that are subject neither to gov-
ernment ownership nor to significant government control. As the nature of
the corporation moves closer to the private ownership end of the spectrum,
the amount of control that the government wields over the corporations'
activities wanes.614
While most FGCs are subject to the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA), a few are exempt.6 15 This is also the case with the APA,616 with
various civil service rules and the Government Corporation Control Act.6 t7
ance Company (FDIC). See 31 U.S.C. § 9101(3) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
610. See A. Michael Froomkin, Reinventing the Government Corporation, 1995 U. ILL.
L. REV. 543, 608 (discussing legal implications of government corporations).
611. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Silver v. United States Postal Serv., 951 F.2d
1033, 1040 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding Postal Service is part of Executive Branch because the
President has power to appoint Postmaster General).
612. See 31 U.S.C. § 9101(2) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
613. Cf Irwin Memorial Blood Bank v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 640 F.2d 1051, 1057
(9th Cir. 1981) (explaining Red Cross is "a close ally" of United States but not an "agency"
subject to Freedom of Information Act), with Rocap v. Indiek, 539 F.2d 174, 181 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (holding that Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation's "federal characteristics"
make it a government controlled corporation subject to Freedom of Information Act).
614. For example, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy stated that the directors of
COMSAT, a privately owned FGC, were not considered officers of the United States, and
therefore not subject to the President's removal power. See MOE REPORT, supra note 608
(citing 42 Op. Att'y Gen. 165 (1962)).
615. They include: Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT); Conrail; NCCB;
Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB); and National Park Foundation (NPF). See
Craig D. Feiser, Privatization and the Freedom of Information Act: An Analysis of Public
Access to Private Entities under Federal Law, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 21 (1999).
616. The vast majority of the FGCs are subject to the APA. Those that are not include:
Comsat; Conrail; NCCB; NCHC; CPB; Legal Services Corporation (LSC) and National
Park Foundation (NPF). A detailed examination of the APA and government corporations
can be found in JACK M. BEERMANN, The Roads of Administrative Law in the United States,
in THE PROVINCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 171, 173-75 (Michael Taggart ed., 1997).
617. The Federal Financing Bank (FFB), Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation
(NRC), Comsat, CPB, Legal Service Corporation (LSC) and the National Park Foundation
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Those FGCs that enjoy exemption from these government controls are lo-
cated close to the private-ownership side of the spectrum. The ease by
which public functions can be assigned to non-governmental structures cre-
ate a structural problem for proponents of the unitary executive. Public
functions undertaken by public structures outside the executive branch have
limited executive oversight; privatized functions are under even less con-
trol. 618 The sharp break between those structures subject to the "unitari-
ness" and those that are not, reflect a theoretical break not evident in real
life.
The public corporation became integrated into our government system
during the Progressive and New Deal eras. The structure of the public cor-
poration was appreciated by Progressives who espoused theories of scien-
tific management and valued its potential for efficiency and its freedom
from partisan politics. 619 President Wilson stressed the need to bring busi-
ness principles to government and successfully compelled Congress to es-
tablish several public corporations during his years in office.620 During his
presidency, President Franklin D. Roosevelt increased the number of public
corporations, a trend which was continued throughout the New Deal.62'
President Roosevelt valued the public corporation because its structure lent
itself to experimentation. He also valued it "because he wanted govern-
ment to become more creatively active in the application of its administra-
,,622tive expertise. The public corporation form was even applauded by the
(NPF) are not subject to the GCCA. See FRANCES J. LEAZES, JR., ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE
BUSINESS STATE: THE STRUCTURE OF FEDERAL CORPORATIONS 63 (1987). FGCs that are
subject to the Act include: Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC), Federal Crop Insurance
Corporation (FCIC), Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), Overseas
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC)
and Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). See id.
618. Interestingly, while privatized functions may lack Article IlI control, corporations
that take on public functions may face judicial review with attendant liability. See Samuel
D. Walker &. N. Christopher Hardee, Perils of Privatization, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 2, 2000, at C I
(discussing §. 1983 liability).
619. See MOE REPORT, supra note 608, at 2.
620. See JERRY MITCHELL, THE AMERICAN EXPERIMENT WITH GOVERNMENT
CORPORATIONS 25 (1999) (listing congressional creation of five different government corpo-
rations during Wilson's presidency including Emergency Fleet Corporation, U.S. Grain
Corporation and Sugar Equalization Board); see also MOE REPORT, supra note 608, at 2
(noting prominent administration official's opinion that federal government should serve as
a holding company for various corporations).
621. See MITCHELL, supra note 620, at 30. The Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC),
the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)
were all created in 1933. See id.
622. Id at 32.
1230 [52:4
INDEPENDENT FEDERAL AGENCIES
Brownlow Commission, which had been so disapproving of the idea of the
independent agency.
623
Public corporations have been utilized frequently because of their unique
organizational structure. They are run by a board of directors or governors
that is only partially composed of members who are appointed by the
President, with the advice and consent of the Senate.6 24 Since they are re-
moved from the tripartite system, they operate outside the structures of
checks and balances and are exempt from many constitutional demands and
federal statutes.
Public corporations have often been used as policy or organizational ex-
periments.625 They are thought to be an ideal vehicle to address various ar-
eas of public concern. They are owned by the government, operate like
businesses and have been used to build stadiums, operate airports and man-
age mass transit systems. If a public corporation fails, a new one can easily
be created.626
Like independent agencies, public corporations have been created in an
ad hoc manner.627 Their consistency lies in their independence, which has
often been a useful tool for Congress. Politicians highlight their supervi-
sion and control over the corporations when the corporation's programs are
effective and when it is to the advantage of the politician, but they can also
distance themselves from the entities when problems materialize. 628
623. See id. at 33 (stating that government corporation was useful during emergencies
and for daily operation of various economic services).
624. In 1998, Amtrak's original Board of Directors was replaced by a "Reform" board
with seven members-all of whom are appointed by the President with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate. See 49 U.S.C. § 24302 (Supp. IV 1998). There are three Board members
for TVA and each are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.
See 16 U.S.C. § 831a (1994). The United States Postal Service is overseen by an eleven-
member Board of Governors, nine of whom are appointed by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate. See 39 U.S.C. § 202 (1994). The FDIC has five Board members,
of which three are presidential appointees. See 12 U.S.C. § 1812 (1994). Of Comsat's fif-
teen Board members, three are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate. See 47 U.S.C. § 733(a) (1994). In contrast, all eleven Board members of LSC and
the nine members of the Board for Corporation for Public Broadcasting are presidential ap-
pointees. See 47 U.S.C. § 396(c) (1994).
625. See id. at xiv (explaining government corporations as experiments in every re-
spect).
626. See id. at 32 (conveying Roosevelt's philosophy of administrative recreation).
627. See MITCHELL, supra note 620, at 47 (stating that they have been created because
of entrepreneurial activity, pressure, willingness expressed by public officials and social
benefit).
628. See id. at 95 (listing inconsistencies in practices associated with Board govern-
ance).
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2. Government Sponsored Enterprices
Government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) are even further removed
from governmental control than the public corporation. Examples of GSEs
are the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae),629 Student
Loan Marketing Association (Sallie Mae) 630 and Federal Home Loan Mort-
gage Corporation (Freddie Mac).63'
GSEs were created in an effort to provide financing for groups that could
not obtain adequate service through private credit channels. 632 These enti-
ties create secondary markets in which primary lenders' interests in ob-
taining funds are integrated with the capital markets' supply of money.633
The structure of GSEs combines the characteristics of both private and
public organizations. The GSE is under private ownership, but it operates
under government supervision and exists to serve the public interests man-
dated by Congress. Also, GSEs are governed by federal charter rather than
articles of incorporation, 634 and are not directly managed by the govern-
ment.635 The GSEs are not subject to the FOIA or SEC registration re-
629. See 12 U.S.C. § 1716 (1994).
630. See 20 U.S.C. § 1087-2 (1994).
631. See 12 U.S.C. § 1452 (1994). Other examples of GSEs include the Federal Agri-
cultural Mortgage Corporation (Farmer Mac), 12 U.S.C. § 2279aa-1 (1994); the Federal
Home Bank Loan System, 12 U.S.C. § 1421 (1994); and the Farm Credit System, 12 U.S.C.
§ 2001 (1994).
632. See Carrie Stradley Lavargna, Government-Sponsored Enterprises Are "Too Big to
Fail": Balancing Public and Private Interests, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 991, 997 n.23 (1993)
("Congress has chartered eleven enterprises to finance sectors of society that had not been
adequately served by the private credit markets, including housing, agriculture, and educa-
tion."). Congress continues to consider the creation of new enterprises to support markets
that are inadequately serviced by the public. See id. (citing Udayan Gupta, Venture Capi-
talists Raised 75% More Money Last Year, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 1993, at B2). The GSEs
purchase loans from primary lenders and create portfolios by pooling the loans. They es-
sentially convert the mortgages into tradeable securities which are sold to investors in the
capital market.
633. See Lavargna, supra note 632, at 997-98 (describing creation of secondary markets
that facilitate flow of credit to lenders).
634. This causes issues contrary to common law rules of corporate governance.
635. See Ronald C. Moe & Thomas H. Stanton, Government-Sponsored Enterprises as
Federal Instrumentalities: Reconciling Private Management with Public Accountability, 49
PUB. ADMIN. REv. 321, 323 (1989).
The federal government's control over an institution differs significantly depending
on whether that institution is an agency or instrumentality. The government manages
an agency directly through the federal management hierarchy. As a general rule, an
agency is subject to . ... federal procurement laws, and to the federal budget and other
direct federal management controls. By contrast, an instrumentality is a privately
owned institution that is supervised but not directly managed by the government.
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quirements, are exempt from the bankruptcy code, are immune from provi-
sions under the Federal Tort Claims Act, and are exempt from state and lo-
cal income taxes. They are able to borrow at lower rates than private cor-
poration, but despite the belief of many, they are not backed by the full
faith and credit of the United States.
This said, the GSE resembles the independent agency in several respects.
For example, Congress uses GSEs to insulate programs from the executive
branch, which ultimately has allowed Congress greater control over the en-
* 636tities. Although the President retains the power to appoint and remove
the directors authorized by statute,637 he does not have the ability to remove
directors that he has not appointed without specific statutory authoriza-
* 631tion.
The fact that these GSEs are privately held with public purposes has
caused intense debate as to whether or not they are making the most of the
governmental benefits that they receive. The GSEs receive an indirect
governmental subsidy since they are able to avoid many of the expenses
incurred by commercial lenders. 639 Although GSEs were originally estab-
lished to address problems in specific sections of the capital market, many
are currently seeking ways to infiltrate the primary market. This perceived
interest to expand into primary markets and the lack of congressional ac-
countability has led many commentators to believe that privatization may
be the only means by which the GSEs will be "forced to face the full costs
of competition" in the primary markets.
640
Id. at 323.
636. See Froomkin, supra note 610, at 558.
637. See id. at 613 (explaining that President's removal power derives primarily from
appointment power).
638. Seeid at613.
639. As previously stated, GSEs do not have to expend funds to comply with the SEC
registration requirements because they are exempt from local and state tax and they receive
favorable interest rates.
640. Vern McKinley, Defining the Mission, AEI Conference Summaries (visited July 25,
2000) <http://www.aei.org/cs/ca10601 .hmt> [hereinafter Defining the Mission].
The charters of the GSEs are phrased in ambiguous terms, leaving them a good deal
of latitude to expand their activities. Currently the GSEs appear to be broadening
their business through nonmortgage investments, subprime mortgages, computer-
based automated underwriting, and mortgage insurance. The GSEs argue that these
new activities are within their charters and are also beneficial to homeownership and
homeowners. Potential competitors would like to see the GSEs restricted to their
original activities....
McKinley argued that the GSEs' profit-related expansion should be held in check by
regulators such as the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Office
of Federal Housing Enterprises Oversight... Since these groups in addition to Con-
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Despite these concerns, certain properties of the government-sponsored
enterprise suggest that the existence of these quasi-governmental entities
will be guaranteed into the 21st century and beyond. Their freedom to act
with a level of autonomy outside of the normal bureaucratic channels has
allowed Congress the ability to effectuate public policy goals, through their
dominance of the secondary markets, without being directly accountable
for the actions of the entities. They have become an indispensable segment
of the American economy, providing them with a "too big to fail" status,
thus ensuring that they will continue to exist in one form or another.
641
CONCLUSION
When Attorney General Tom C. Clark gave his endorsement to the draft
legislation that was to become the Administrative Procedure Act, he con-
cluded that the bill "appears to offer a hopeful prospect of achieving rea-
sonable uniformity and fairness in administrative procedures without at the
same time interfering unduly with the efficient and economical operation of
the Government.'642  The emergence of the independent administrative
agencies reflect somewhat the same considerations. Of particular note in
this process is the development of the multi-member commissions, multi-
member supervisory agencies, and executive branch independent agencies,
and the development of their processes and their place in the administrative
state.643
The administrative process owes more to experience than doctrine. That
is especially true of the internal operations of agencies, where there is often
little more than ambiguous and incomplete legislation to govern or guide
agency practice. As in the constitutional realm, established practice is im-
gress have been unwilling or unable to limit the GSE expansion into new markets, the
Speaker proposes privatization.
Id.
641. One commentator asserts that these organizations have become such an indispensa-
ble part of our economy that "their failure would have a far worse effect on the economy
than would the cost of rescuing them." Lavargna, supra note 632, at 992 n.3 (citation omit-
ted).
642. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 6 (1947) (providing detailed analysis of each section of
the Act).
643. Professor Glen Robinson has observed that "[tihe history of important institutions
and government programs is often more one of eclectic confusion than of single-minded
purpose." GLEN 0. ROBINSON, AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY: PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW
12 (1991) (tracing evolution of bureaucracy).
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portant, although not determinative, 64 4 because it reflects an accommoda-
tion among affected interests of the way business can be conducted without
unduly infringing on the prerogatives of others. A structure or practice that
begins as a means of simply solving a problem, or asserting power, or ex-
perimentally addressing a political dilemma, can either become accepted,
or challenged and rejected. But if accepted, the approach becomes a tradi-
tion; that tradition, over time, can take on the trappings of precedent and
eventually obtain the sanction of law.
In the past few decades we have seen a resurgence of efforts by various
administrations to centralize the administrative state. In part, this reflects
resurgent visions of presidential power exemplified by the theory of the
unitary executive. Notwithstanding the constitutional underpinnings of
some theory of a unitary - that is to say centralized - executive,645 there
are structural tensions in the modem administrative state that appear to
keep the independent mode alive. The administrative state is too protean
for the executive to always desire, or indeed always be able, to patrol all its
far reaches. And, Congress is too balkanized to effectively control at all
times thorugh oversight and legislation. 646 Indeed, on occasion, both Con-
gress and the President have found it necessary to consciously forgo ac-
countability in order to advance important agendas, as evidenced by the
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990.647 Ironically, this dif-
fusion of accountability and control may serve to increase presidential
power by allowing the President to better manage political conflict.
648
The independent agency form has undergone various structural changes
644. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 967 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (ques-
tioning holding that struck down legislative veto placed in nearly 200 statutes over five dec-
ades).
645. See supra Part II.B.I.
646. See Edward J. Markey, Congress to Administrative Agencies: Creator, Overseer,
and Partner, 1990 DuKE L.J. 967, 969. "In reality, Congress can oversee, in a vigorous
fashion, relatively few of the day-to-day activities of the administrative agencies within its
oversight boundaries. Congress is a stimulus-response body, and we need a lot of stimulus
before taking action to reign in an agency .... " Id.
647. See 10 U.S.C. § 2687 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). The Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Act of 1990 was enacted to remedy the inefficiencies that had hindered Con-
gress' previous efforts to close military bases in a timely fashion. See H.R. REP. No. 101-
923, at 705 (1990); H.R. REP. No. 101-665, at 384 (1990). See generally Dalton v. Specter,
511 U.S. 462 (1994) (discussing procedures for action under the Act).
648. See Michael A. Fitts, The Paradox of Power in the Modern State: Why a Unitary,
Centralized Presidency May Not Exhibit Effective of Legitimate Leadership, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 827, 901 (1996) (arguing that on occasion, Presidents may enhance their real policy




in recent decades, and will probably experience even more changes now
that administrative agencies are charged with a "new paradigm" where "the
goals of regulation have become the promotion of competition and maxi-
mization of consumer choice." 649 The tensions that create a spur to decen-
tralization of authority and accountability will no doubt continue. It is our
view that in the next century, the function filled by the independent agency
will also be filled, from time-to time, by public corporations, GSEs, and
what the British quaintly call quangos, as Congress continues to experi-
ment with institutional arrangements. 650 This blurring of public and private
regulatory roles is reflective of a general shift toward a more porous under-
standing of the public/private distinction in American jurisprudence.
In 1835, during debates over the power of the President to remove the
Secretary of the Treasury summarily, Daniel Webster was of the view that,
as an original proposition, he would not have accorded the President that
power. Nevertheless, based on the first forty-five years of the country's
history, he conceded that the President had such power. The Decision of
1789, in his view, "has been established by practice, and recognized by
subsequent laws, as the settled construction of the Constitution. 65' The




Multi-Member Boards and Commissions
BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
Mission and General Statutory Reference: The Federal Reserve Board
(the Board) is the central bank of the United States. It conducts the na-
649. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated
Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1323, 1364-1383 (1998) (discussing institutional roles
change from "original paradigm" where agencies were charged with general regulatory
oversight of particular industries).
650. See infra Part V-D.
651. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 151 (1926).
652. In this Appendix, we have attempted to be inclusive but the lack of comprehensive
information makes the task difficult. We may have inadvertently omitted some agencies
that qualify under our definition and welcome comment on our choices. The information
contained in the Appendix was reviewed in preliminary form by the Office of General
Counsel, or other staff office, within each agency. However, responsibility for the accuracy
of the material rests entirely with the authors.
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tion's monetary policy, supervises and regulates banking institutions,
maintains the stability of the financial system, protects the credit rights of
consumers, and provides certain financial service for the United States
government, the public, financial institutions, and foreign official institu-
tions.
611
Membership: The Board consists of seven members appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate. 654 No more than one
member may be appointed from any one Federal Reserve district. The full
term of a Board member is fourteen years, and the seven terms are stag-
gered so that one expires in every even-numbered year. A member may
not be appointed after having served a full term. The President may re-
move members for cause.
Quorum and Voting Requirements: A majority of the Board members
constitutes a quorum for the purposes of taking Board action. This is not
true, however, in the following two contexts. First, Board action with re-
spect to the waiver of reserve ratio limits in extraordinary circumstances
and the imposition of supplemental reserves under section 19(b) of the
Federal Reserve Act requires the affirmative vote of five members.655 Sec-
ond, Board action with respect to advances, 656 discounts, and rediscounts
under sections 1 OA, 11 (b) and 13 respectively of the Federal Reserve Act,
requires the affirmative vote of five members. The Board has the power to
delegate any of its authority, except with regard to rulemaking and mone-
tary policy decisions.657
Disqualification and Recusal Procedure: No special procedures.
Chairman's Powers: The Chairman, subject to Board supervision, serves
as its "active executive officer., 658 The Chairman and Vice-chairman are
designated for four-year terms by the President from among the Board
members, subject to Senate confirmation, and may be redesignated as long
as their terms as Board members have not expired. The full Board, rather
than the Chairman, has the authority to appoint members of the Board's of-
ficial staff. The Board also approves the agency's budget.
653. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 241-251 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
654. See 12 U.S.C. § 241 (1994).
655. See id. § 461(b)(3)-(4)(A).
656. See id. § 347a.
657. See id. § 248(k).
658. Id. § 242.
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OMB Bypass Provisions: Under the provisions of the Federal Reserve
Act, the Board operates free from the direct control of the Executive
Branch. The Board does not submit legislation or testimony on legislation
to OMB for clearance. Under 12 U.S.C. § 250, no federal officer or agency
can require the Board to submit legislative recommendations, testimony, or
comments for approval or review prior to their submission to Congress,
provided that such communication to Congress include a statement that
views expressed therein do not necessarily reflect the views of the Presi-
dent.
Litigation Authority: The Board has independent litigation authority
with regard to enforcement, supervision, and regulation of financial institu-
tions, and the administration of Board operations.659 The Board's own
lawyers handle Freedom of Information Act cases filed in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia (and occasionally in other districts as
well), but ordinarily appear along with the U.S. Attorney's Office in other
districts.
BOARD OF VETERANS'APPEALS
Mission and General Statutory Reference: The Board of Veterans' Ap-
peals (the Board) is in the Department of Veterans Affairs and reviews
benefit claims appeals and renders decisions regarding those appeals.660
Membership: The Board is the component of the Department of Veter-
ans Affairs responsible for entering the final decision on behalf of the Sec-
retary in claims for entitlement to veterans' benefits. It consists of a
Chairman, a Vice Chairman, and an unlimited number of Board mem-
bers.66 1 The Chairman is appointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate and serves for a term of six years. The Chairman
serves at the Assistant Secretary level and may be appointed to more than
one term. At the close of fiscal year 1999, there were sixty-one members
of the Board. The Secretary designates one member as Vice Chairman.
The Vice Chairman performs functions specified by the Chairman and
serves "at the pleasure of the Secretary." 662 The Vice Chairman is compen-
sated as a member of the Senior Executive Service. Other members of the
659. See id. § 248(p).
660. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7109 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
661. See id. § 7101(a)(1994).
662. Id. § 7101(b)(4).
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Board are appointed by the Secretary, with approval of the President, based
upon the recommendations of the Chairman.663 Board members are the
only federal employees at this level who require Presidential approval for
appointment. Board members (other than the Chairman) have no limits on
their terms, but must be "recertified" at least once every three years under
performance standards developed by the Chairman with the approval of the
Secretary. Board members (other than the Chairman and the Vice Chair-
man) are paid at rates equivalent to the rates payable under 5 U.S.C. § 5372
(i.e., comparable to that of administrative law judges).
Quorum and Voting Requirements: A proceeding instituted before the
Board may be assigned to an individual member of the Board or to a panel
of not fewer than three members of the Board.664 When a proceeding is as-
signed to a panel of Board members, the decision is by the majority vote of
panel members.665 Proceedings before the Board are nonadversarial in na-
ture and less formal than court proceedings. Nevertheless, certain statutory
and regulatory prerequisites must be fulfilled before an appeal is properly
before the Board.666 However, formal procedures apply for the docketing
of appeals and hearings, 667 as well s for the conduct of hearings, motionspractice, and other procedures. 668
Disqualification and Recusal Procedure: Any Board member must re-
cuse himself or herself if he or she has participated in the matter or where
there are other circumstances that might give the impression of bias. The
Board Chairman, on his or her own motion, may disqualify a member from
acting on a particular case.669
Chairman's Powers: A Chairman, who is directly responsible to the Sec-
retary of Veterans Affairs, directs the Board's activities. 670 The Chairman
alone has the authority to select key staff officials which include Board
Members and administrative personnel without obtaining the prior approval
of the members. Pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 7101A, the Secretary of Veterans
Affairs, with approval of the President of the United States based upon rec-
663. See id. § 7101A(a).
664. See id. § 7102(a).
665. See 38 C.F.R. § 19.7(c) (1999).
666. Cf 38 U.S.C. § 7105 (1994).
667. See id. § 7107.
668. See also 38 C.F.R. pts. 19-20 (1999).
669. See id. § 19.12(c).
670. See 38 U.S.C. § 7101(a).
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ommendation of the Chairman, appoints members of the board, including
671the Vice Chairman. In practice, the Chairman often seeks the advice of
Board members when recommending the appointment of new Board mem-
bers. But that decision is purely discretionary. The Board's budget is a
component of the Department's overall budget, submitted by the Secretary
to Congress. The Chairman is responsible for forwarding budget recom-
mendations to the Secretary.
OMB Bypass Provisions: The Board's budget and legislative submis-
sions are processed through the Department of Veterans Affairs.
Litigation Authority: The Board has no authority to litigate appeals of its
decisions. The General Counsel of the Department of Veterans' Affairs
represents the Secretary before the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims.
CHEMICAL SAFETYAND HAZARD INVESTIGATION BOARD
Mission and General Statutory Reference: The Chemical Safety Board
(the Board) is an independent safety board that investigates the cause or
probable cause of any accidental chemical release resulting in a fatality, se-
rious injury or substantial property damage, establishes mandatory rules for
reporting accidental chemical releases, and conducts research and issues
reports concerning the safety of chemical production.672
Membership: Five members appointed by the President, with the advice
and consent of the Senate, for a five-year term, on the basis of "technical
qualification, professional standing, and demonstrated knowledge in the
fields of accident reconstruction, safety engineering, human factors, toxi-
cology, or air pollution regulation. 673 Members may be removed from of-
fice for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.
Quorum and Voting Requirements: A majority of the Board constitutes a
quorum.
Disqualification and Recusal Procedure: No special procedures.
671. See id § 7101A(a).
672. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(6) (1994).
673. Id. § 7412(r)(6)(B).
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Chairman's Powers: The Chairman is the Board's chief executive officer
and exercises the Board's executive and administrative functions, subject to
the Board's overall direction. When the Board was without a chairman, it
delegated some administrative responsibilities to each of its four members
but did not designate an "Acting Chairman."
0MB Bypass Provisions: Board budget and legislative proposals, testi-
mony or comments, and recommendations or studies submitted to the Ad-
ministration, must be submitted concurrently to Congress. No Board
budget estimates, legislative recommendation or testimony, or other rec-
ommendation or study is subject to review by any federal agency and no
government official may require prior approval of budget requests or esti-
mates, legislative recommendations, prepared testimony, comments, or
674recommendations or reports.
Litigation Authority: The Department of Justice represents the Board in
the federal courts.
COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION
Mission and General Statutory Reference: The Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (the Commission) is an independent agency of the
United States Government that regulates U.S. commodity futures and op-
tions markets to prevent manipulation, abusive trading practices, and
fraud.675
Membership: Five members, appointed by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate, serve staggered five-year terms. The President
"shall select persons who shall each have demonstrated knowledge in fu-
tures trading or its regulation, or the production, merchandising, processing
or distribution of one or more of the commodities or other goods and arti-
cles, services, rights and interests ' 676 covered by the statute, with appropri-
ate balance among the knowledge of the commissioners.677 No more than
three Commissioners may belong to the same political party. A member
may continue to serve until his successor is appointed and qualified but
only up to the expiration of the next session of Congress subsequent to the
674. See id § 7412(r)(6)(R).
675. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-25 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
676. 7 U.S.C. § 4a(a)(I)(i) (1994).
677. See id. § 4a(a)(1)(ii).
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expiration of his term. There are no express statutory provisions governing
removal of Commissioners from office.
Quorum and Voting Requirements: Statute contains no explicit quorum
provision except that a vacancy in the Commission "shall not impair the
right of the remaining Commissioners to exercise all the powers of the
Commission." 678 Commission regulations define a quorum simply as "at
least the minimum number of Commissioners required to take action, 679
i.e., three members. A majority of the quorum of the Commission is re-
quired for purposes of taking Commission action. However, when it is not
feasible to convene a quorum, the senior Commissioner available may take
emergency action, subject to review by the full Commission. 680 In case of a
tie, no action is taken but, in the case of review of adjudicatory matters, the
decision below is affirmed.
Disqualification and Recusal Procedure: No specific procedures. How-
ever, in one case the Commission did rule on a request that it disqualify
two of its members.68'
Chairman's Powers: The President, with the advice and consent of the
Senate, appoints a member as Chairman who serves at the President's
pleasure. The President may at any time appoint a different member as
Chairman, with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Chairman is the
chief administrative officer. The Commission appoints the General Coun-
sel and an Executive Director, both of whom report directly to the Com-
mission and serve at the pleasure of the Commission. Executive and ad-
ministrative functions are generally exercised solely by the Chairman,
according to budget categories, plans, programs and priorities established
and approved by the Commission. The Chairman's appointment of heads
of major administrative units is subject to approval of the Commission.
There is no specific statutory provision governing their removal.
OMB Bypass Provisions: Bypass of prior OMB review on both budget-
ary and legislative matters is secured by means of a concurrent transmittal
requirement under 7 U.S.C. § 4a(h)(1)(2). Additionally, section 4a(h)(2)
specifically states that the Commission is exempt from prior review or ap-
678. Id. § 4a(b).
679. 17 C.F.R. § 147.2() (2000).
680. Seeid § 140.11(a).
681. James A. Carr, CFTC Docket No. 77-6, 1977 CFTC LEXIS 76, at *7 n.8 (denying
motion to recuse the Commission member).
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proval of testimony, recommendations, or comments on legislation by any
officer or agency.
Litigation Authority: Commission attorneys are authorized to represent
the Commission "in courts of law whenever appropriate [and] assist the
Department of Justice in handling litigation concerning the Commission in
courts of law." 68 2 The Commission has an informal agreement with the
Department of Justice to refer to it those cases of common concern to all
agencies, such as Freedom of Information, Privacy Act and Sunshine Act
cases, individual damage actions against members or employees, and suits
involving personnel matters.
CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION
Mission and General Statutory Reference: The Consumer Product Safety
Commission (the Commission) is an independent regulatory commission
that issues and enforces standards to protect the public against unreason-
able risk of injury or death associated with consumer products, develops
voluntary industry standards, and, as necessary, bans products, obtains the
recall of products, or arranges for their repair.683
Membership: Five members, appointed by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate, serve staggered seven-year terms. Since fiscal
year 1987, however, Congress has funded only three commissioner posi-
tions in the Commission's annual appropriations act. In making appoint-
ments, the statute directs the President to consider "individuals who [are
qualified] by reason of their background and expertise in areas related to
consumer products and protection of risks to safety., 684 Not more than
three of the Commissioners may be affiliated with the same political party.
Commissioners may continue to serve after the expiration of their term un-
til a successor takes office, but for no more than one year. A Commis-
sioner may be removed from office by the President for "neglect of duty or
malfeasance in office but for no other cause., 685 The Commission annually
elects a Vice Chairman to act in the Chairman's absence, disability, or va-
cancy of the office.
682. 7 U.S.C. § 4a(c).
683. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2084 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).




Quorum and Voting Requirements: Three Commissioners constitute a
quorum. However, two Commissioners may constitute a quorum if there
are only three members serving. If, due to vacancies, only two members of
the Commission are serving, those two constitute a quorum for six
months. 686 Generally, the Commission issues a press release a few hours
after a Commission decision meeting or one day after a ballot vote. Com-
missioners may issue separate statements to be provided when the press
release is issued. However, announcement of the Commission's decision is
not delayed for a Commissioner's separate statement. Commissioners have
their own staffs who assist in the preparation of their statements. The
Commission has no provision for proxy voting. Many administrative func-
tions are delegated to the staff. The Commission's Directive System
(available in the Commission's reading room) sets forth procedures for
delegating authority. However, the authority to issue subpoenas cannot be
delegated.
Disqualification and Recusal Procedure: No specific procedures.
Chairman's Powers: The Chairman is appointed by the President with
the advice and consent of Senate. The Chairman serves as the principal ex-
ecutive officer with authority that includes the expenditure and use of funds
and the appointment and supervision of personnel. 687 However, budget re-
quests and appointments of senior staff (e.g., the Executive Director, the
General Counsel, and various Associate Executive Directors) require
Commission approval. No appointment of any officer or employee may be
subject to review or prior approval of anyone within the Executive Office
of the President.
Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 2053(g)(1)(A), the Chairman appoints officers
of the Commission, subject to the approval of the Commission. Section
2053(g)(1)(B)(i) further states that no individual may be appointed to such
a position on an acting basis for a period longer than ninety days unless
such appointment is approved by the Commission. Likewise, the Chairman
may not submit requests for appropriations to Congress or the OMB with-
out the Commission's prior approval.
OMB Bypass Provisions: Bypass of OMB review on budgetary and leg-
islative matters is secured by means of a requirement for concurrent trans-
686. See id § 2053(d).
687. See id § 2053(f)(1).
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mittal and a prohibition on prior executive review of the Commission's
legislative communications.
688
Litigation Authority: The Commission has limited authority to represent
itself in United States district courts.689
DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD
Mission and General Statutory Reference: The Defense Nuclear Facili-
ties Safety Board (the Board) is an independent establishment in the execu-
tive branch that provides technical safety oversight of the Department of
Energy's (DOE) defense nuclear facilities. It makes recommendations with
respect to DOE defense nuclear facilities, investigates any event or practice
that may adversely affect public health and safety, reviews designs of DOE
defense nuclear facilities and recommends to the Secretary of Energy any
necessary modifications to ensure adequate protection of the public health
and safety.690
Membership: Five members serve staggered five year terms and are ap-
pointed by the President with the advice and the consent of the Senate. No
more than three members of the Board may be affiliated with the same po-
litical party. In making appointments, the statute directs the President to
consider "United States citizens who are respected experts in the field of
nuclear safety with a demonstrated competence and knowledge relevant to
the independent investigative and oversight functions of the Board.,,69' The
President designates a Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Board from
among the Board's members. Board members may be reappointed. How-
ever, any member appointed to fill a vacancy occurring prior to the end of
the term of office for which such member's predecessor was appointed
shall only be appointed for the remaining portion of such term. Further-
more, a member may continue to serve after the expiration of his or her
term until a successor has taken office.
Ouorum and Voting Requirements: Three members of the Board con-
stitute a quorum. However, a lesser number of Board members may hold
hearings. The Board has no provision for proxy voting. With one excep-
688. See id. § 2076(k)(1)-(2).
689. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2061(e), 2071(a), 2076(b)(7) (1994).
690. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2286-2286i (1994).
691. 42 U.S.C. § 2286(b)(1) (1994).
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tion, every vote of the Board has been unanimous since the agency's crea-
tion.
Disqualification and Recusal Procedure: No special procedures.
Chairman's Powers: The Chairman serves as the chief executive officer
of the Board. Subject to the Board's overall direction the Chairman has
authority that includes the use and expenditure of funds, the appointment
and supervision of employees of the Board, and the organization of any
administrative units established by the Board.692 The Board tends to defer
to the Chairman on administrative matters but he keeps them advised and
works cooperatively. In accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 2286(c)(3), the
Chairman may delegate any of his functions to any other member or to any
appropriate officer of the Board. The Vice Chairman acts as Chairman in
the event of the absence of the Chairman or in the case of a vacancy in the
office of the Chairman.
OMB Bypass Provisions: "Whenever the Board submits or transmits to
the President or the Director of Management and Budget any legislative
recommendation, or any statement or information in preparation of a report
to be submitted to the Congress ... the Board shall submit at the same time
a copy thereof to the Congress. 693 Its annual request for appropriations is
sent to OMB for approval and inclusion in the President's budget.
Litigation Authority: The Department of Justice represents the Board in
the federal courts.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Mission and General Statutory Reference: The Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (Commission) promotes equal opportunity in em-
ployment through administrative and judicial enforcement of the federal
694civil rights laws, and education and technical assistance.
Membership: Five members, appointed by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate, serve staggered five-year terms. No more than
three of the Commissioners can be members of the same political party.
692. See id. §2286(c)(2).
693. Id. § 2286h-I.
694. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4 to 2000e-6 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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Any individual chosen to fill a vacancy shall be appointed only for the
unexpired term of the member whom he shall succeed, and all members of
the Commission shall continue to serve until their successors are appointed
and qualified, except that no such member of the Commission shall con-
tinue to serve (1) for more than sixty days when the Congress is in session
unless a nomination to fill such vacancy shall have been submitted to the
Senate, or (2) after the adjournment sine die of the session of the Senate in
which such nomination was submitted.69 5
The President designates one member to serve as Chairman of the
Commission, and one member to serve as Vice Chairman.69 6
Other Presidential Appointees: General Counsel. The General Counsel
of the Commission is appointed by the President with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate for a term of four years.6 97
Quorum and Voting Requirements: Three members of the Commission
constitute a quorum. 698 Without a quorum, the Commission cannot engage
in activities that require the approval of a majority of the Commissioners.
In case of a tie vote, a proposal fails and no action is taken. The Commis-
sion does not employ the use of dissenting opinions. If a Commissioner
disapproves a decision, but is in the minority, the decision is issued without
a dissenting opinion. The Commission does not employ proxy voting.
Any person claiming to be aggrieved can file a charge of discrimination or
request that an individual Commissioner issue a charge for an inquiry into
individual or systematic discrimination. 699 All charges are either dismissed
or investigated. If, upon completion of an investigation, the Commission
finds cause to believe that discrimination has occurred, it attempts to re-
solve the matter informally. If attempts at conciliation fail, the Commis-
sion may bring a civil action.
Disqualification and Recusal Procedure: No special procedures. How-
ever, because individual commissioners have statutory authority to initiate
investigations, the Commission's rules provide that, where a member of the
Commission has filed a Commissioner charge, he or she shall abstain from
695. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a) (1994).
696. See id.
697. See id. § 2000e-4(b).
698. See id. § 2000e-4(c).
699. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.6(a) (2000).
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participation in the Commission determination upon completion of the in-





Chairman's Powers: The Chairman is responsible for the administrative
operations of the Commission, and except as provided in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-
4(b), shall appoint such officers, agents, attorneys, hearing examiners, and
employees as he deems necessary to assist the Commission in the perform-
ance of its functions and duties. The Chairman does not usually request the
opinions of other Commission members. The Chairman must fix personnel
compensation in accordance with the provisions of chapter 51 and sub-
chapter III of chapter 53 of Title 5, United States Code, relating to classifi-
catiofi and General Schedule pay rates, provided that assignment, removal,
and compensation of hearing examiners be in accordance with sections
3105, 3344, 5362, and 7521 of Title 5, U.S.C. Agency budgets are ap-
proved by the Commission prior to submission.
OMB Bypass Provisions: The Commission must comply with all OMB
directives applicable to the Executive Branch.
Litigation Authority: The General Counsel is responsible for conducting
enforcement litigation on behalf of the Commission under the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 199 1,702 Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964,703 the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,0 and the Equal Pay Act
of 1963.705 The General Counsel has such other duties as the Commission
may prescribe or as may be provided by law and shall concur with the
Chairman of the Commission on the appointment and supervision of re-
gional attorneys. Attorneys appointed under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 may, at
the direction of the Commission, represent.the Commission. in any court,
provided, however, that the Attorney General conduct all litigation in the
Supreme Court to which the Commission is a party.
FARM CREDIT ADMINISTRA TION
Mission and General Statutory Reference: The Farm Credit Administra-
tion (FCA) is an independent agency in the executive branch of the Gov-
700. See id. §§ 1601.19(b), 1601.21(c).
701. See generally Gilbert F. Casellas, The Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion: Challenges for the Twenty-First Century, I U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. I, 4 (1998).
702. See 42 U.S.C. § 1331(d)(1) (Supp. IV 1998).
703. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(2) (1994).




ernment that is responsible for regulating and examining the banks, asso-
ciations, and related entities that constitute the Farm Credit System.7 °6 The
FCA Board (Board) may take enforcement power to obtain corrective ac-
tion if an institution violates statutes or regulations or operates in an unsafe
or unsound manner.
Membership: Policymaking is vested in a full-time, three-member Board
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.
Board Members serve staggered, six-year terms, and may not be reap-
pointed after serving a full term or more than three years of a previous
member's term. The President designates one of the members as Chair-
man.
Quorum and Voting Requirements: The Board may transact business
only when a quorum, i.e., two members, is present.70 7 There is no provi-
sion in the Farm Credit Act for the Board Members to vote by proxy. A
majority of the Board may act even if the minority delays in completing
any dissenting statements.
Disqualification and Recusal Procedure: No special procedures.
Chairman's Powers: The Chairman serves as the agency's Chief Execu-
tive Officer and may appoint the agency's staff, fix pay levels, and direct
the staff.708 The appointment of the heads of major administrative units is
subject to the Board's approval.709 In accordance with 12 U.S.C. § 2245,
the powers of the Chairman as CEO that are necessary for day-to-day man-
agement, may be exercised and performed by the Chairman through such
other officers and employees of the Administration as the Chairman shall
designate. The Chairman, however, may not delegate powers specifically
reserved to the Chairman by the Farm Credit Act without the approval of
the FCA Board.
OMB Bypass Provisions: The FCA sends its appropriation request to
OMB for inclusion in the President's budget request, but not for approval.
All legislative information, such as testimony and reports, go directly to
Congress without OMB clearance.
706. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 2241-7224 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
707. See id. § 2242(c).
708. See id. § 2245(c)(2)(A).
709. See id. § 2245(b).
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Litigation Authority: The Department of Justice represents the FCA in
the federal courts. Nonetheless, Farm Credit Administration attorneys as-
sist with the preparation of pleadings and presentation of the case and ordi-
narily prepare legal memoranda and litigation reports. Referrals to the De-
partment of Justice are handled informally or by letter. There are no
agency regulations regarding such referrals.
The Farm Credit Act also provides that, except with regard to litigation
before the Supreme Court, attorneys designated by the Chairman shall rep-
resent the Farm Credit Administration in any civil proceeding or civil ac-
tion brought in connection with the administration of conservatorships and
receiverships.710 Section 2244(c) also provides that "[a]ttorneys designated
by the Chairman may represent the Farm Credit Administration in any
other civil proceeding or civil action when so authorized by the Attorney
General under provisions of title 28."'71'
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Mission and General Statutory Reference: The Federal Communications
Commission (the Commission) regulates interstate and international com-
munications by radio, television, wire, satellite and cable.
712
Membership: Five members, appointed by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate, serve staggered five-year terms. The maximum
number of Commissioners from any party is a number equal to the least
number that would constitute a majority. A member may serve until his
successor takes the oath of office but not past expiration of the next session
of Congress subsequent to the end of the fixed term. There is no statutory
provision concerning removal of Commissioners from office.
Quorum and Voting Requirements: Three Commissioners constitute a
quorum for purposes of taking Commission action." 3 As a general matter,
so long as a quorum is present, Commission action may be taken by a ma-
jority of the members present. In case of a tie, no Commission action is
taken. If a tie occurs with respect to an application for review of action
taken by delegated authority, 1 4 or a petition for reconsideration of prior
710. See id. § 2244(c).
711. Id.
712. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-59 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
713. See id. § 154(h).
714. See id. § 155(c)(4)-(6).
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Commission action,715 the previous decision stands.716 The Commission
permits proxy voting.
Disqualification and Recusal Procedure: The Commission exercises the
right to disqualify one of its members.717
Chairman's Powers: The Chairman serves as the chief executive officer.
A Managing Director, appointed by the Chairman with the Commission's
approval, is vested with whatever administrative and executive authority
the Chairman may designate. There is no provision for a Vice Chairman.
In case of vacancy, absence, or disability, the Commission may temporarily
designate one of its members as acting chairman.7t8 The Commission's
budget and the appointment and removal of senior staff must be approved
by the Commission.
OMB Bypass Provisions: The Commission is required by 47 U.S.C.
§ 154(k) to submit an annual report to Congress that includes specific leg-
islative recommendations. This is to include, as well, all legislative pro-
posals submitted for approval to OMB. While this provision does not ap-
pear to confer a legislative bypass on the Commission, the Commission
does not ordinarily submit legislation or reports or testimony on legislation
to OMB for clearance.
Litigation Authority: The Department of Justice is responsible for the
conduct of district court litigation to which the Commission is a party.
This includes Freedom of Information Act and Sunshine Act lawsuits, em-
ployment discrimination actions and actions brought to enforce Commis-
sion orders. The U.S. Attorneys offices also bring criminal prosecutions
for violations of the Communications Act; in those cases the Commission
is technically not a party.719 In the above cases, the U.S. Attorneys repre-
sent the Commission in court while Commission attorneys ordinarily pre-
pare pleadings, legal memoranda and litigation reports. Commission attor-
neys may also appear in court to assist with the presentation of the case.
715. See id. § 405.
716. See id. § 155(c)(3); see also Newark Radio Broad. Ass'n v. FCC, 763 F.2d 450
(D.C. Cir. 1985).
717. See, e.g., WXIA-TV, 7 F.C.C.R. 925 (1992).
718. See 47 U.S.C. § 155(a).
719. See 47 U.S.C. § 401(c) (1994) (granting duty to prosecute to Attorney General); see
also 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 519 (1994).
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Referrals to the Department of Justice are handled informally or by letter.
There are no agency regulations regarding such referrals.
Appeals of district court cases are handled by the Department of Justice
with the assistance of Commission attorneys; however, the Commission
does exclusively handle appeals under section 402(b) of the Communica-
tions Act relating to radio and television licensing and Bell Operating
Company (BOC) entry into the long distance market.7 20 Appeals under
section 402(a) of the Communications Act, involving review of Commis-
sion final actions unrelated to radio and television licensing or entry of Bell
Operating Companies into the long-distance market, are governed by the
Judicial Review Act.72' While 28 U.S.C. § 2348 generally provides that the
Attorney General is responsible for and has control of the interests of the
Government in all court proceedings, the Commission, as the agency in in-
terest, appears as a respondent represented by its own attorneys. Commis-
sion counsel, maintaining a close liaison with the Department of Justice,
prepare briefs and present oral arguments in these cases.
Section 4020) of the Communications Act and section 2350(a) of the
Judicial Review Act give the Commission the right to file petitions for writ
of certiorari. Under current practice, the Commission coordinates its peti-
tions with the Solicitor General.
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION
Mission and General Statutory Reference: The Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation (FDIC) insures customer deposits at FDIC-insured de-
pository institutions, examines and supervises FDIC-insured state-chartered
banks that are not part of the Federal Reserve System, and manages receiv-
erships. The FDIC also has examination authority and back-up enforce-
ment authority for state member banks that are supervised by the Federal
Reserve Board, national banks that are supervised by the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, and savings associations supervised by the
Office of Thrift Supervision.722
Membership: The management of the FDIC is vested in a five-member
Board of Directors (the Board).723 The President with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate appoints three members of the Board for a term of six
years (Appointive Directors). At least one of these Appointive Directors
720. See also 47 U.S.C. § 154(0(1).
721. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341-2353 (1994& Supp. IV 1998).
722. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1841 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
723. See 12 U.S.C. § 1812(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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must have state bank supervisory experience.; In the event of a vacancy on
the Board, the President may appoint another Board member to fill the va-
cancy or the acting Comptroller of the Currency or the acting Director of
the Office of Thrift Supervision shall fill for the remainder of the term. An
appointive director may continue to serve after the expiration of his or her
term until successors have been appointed and qualified.
In addition to the three Appointive Directors, there are two ex officio
members of the Board: the Comptroller of the Currency and the Director of
the Office of Thrift Supervision. As ex officio members, they do not serve
specific terms. No more than three of the five Board members may be
members of the same political party.
Chairman's Powers: One of the Appointive Directors shall be designated
by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to serve as
Chairperson of the Board for a term of five years. Another of the Ap-
pointive Directors is designated by the President, with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate, to serve as Vice Chairperson. In the event of a vacancy
in the position of Chairperson, the Vice Chairperson acts as Chairperson.
Other Presidential Appointees: Inspector General. 2
Quorum and Voting Recuirements: A majority of the members of the
Board of Directors in office constitutes a quorum for the transaction of
business.7 25 In the event there are only four members in office, three of the
four members constitute a quorum. In the event there are only three mem-
bers in office, two of the three members constitute a quorum. In the event
there are only two members in office, those two members constitute a quo-
rum. In the event there is only one member in office, that member consti-
tutes a quorum. A majority vote of the Board is necessary to transact busi-
ness. In the event of a tie vote, a motion does not carry. For purposes of
determining whether there is a quorum for the transaction of business,
those Board members present "both voting and nonvoting" are counted.
The vote of the majority of the members present and voting at a meeting at
which a quorum is present is considered Board action.
Disqualification and Recusal Procedure: No specific procedures.
724. See Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101 (codified as
amended in 5 U.S.C. app. § 11, at 1397 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
725. See FDIC BYLAWS, art. IV, § 6(d).
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Chairman's Powers: The Chairperson serves as the chief executive offi-
cer. The Board has reserved to itself all authority not expressly dele-
gated.7 26 However, within the limitations of law, the Board has delegated
certain functions to standing and other special committees and to desig-
nated officers and agents of the Corporation. The Board has delegated to
the Chairperson the authority to manage the day-to-day operations of the
Corporation and the general powers and duties usually vested in the office
of the chief executive officer of a corporation. 727 However, the hiring and
removal of officers of the Corporation (i.e., Division and Office Directors)
must be approved by the Board. The Board determines the terms of such
officers and the Chairman determines their compensation. In addition to
the authority delegated by the Board, the Chairperson has statutory respon-
sibilities with regard to other narrowly defined matters.728 The Board has
delegated authority for administrative complaints to the Division of Super-
vision and the Division of Compliance and Consumer Affairs, 729 but certain
action is reserved by statute to the Board.
OMB bypass: The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is required to
submit an annual report to Congress. Under 12 U.S.C. § 250, no federal
officer or agency can require the FDIC to submit legislative recommenda-
tions, testimony, or comments for approval or review prior to their submis-
sion to Congress, provided that such communications to Congress include a
statement that the views expressed therein do no necessarily represent the
views of the President. The FDIC is funded through its administration of
two insurance funds insuring banks and savings and loan institutions, re-
spectively, and, except for the Office of the Inspector General, does not re-
ceive appropriated funds. OMB does not provide line-item review nor is
the FDIC subject to OMB apportionment control.73°
Litigation Authority: The FDIC is authorized "to sue and be sued," and
file complaints and defend, by and through its own attorneys independent
of the Department of Justice. 3  It also represents itself in FOIA and simi-
lar litigation. As a matter of practice, and largely for reasons of conven-
726. See FDIC BYLAWs, art. IV, § 5.
727. See FDIC BYLAWS, art. VI, § 4.
728. See 5 U.S.C. app. § 3(a) at 1382 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). See generally 5 U.S.C.
§ 7114(c)(1)-(3).
729. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 303 (2000).
730. See 12 U.S.C. § 1827(c).
731. 12 U.S.C. § 1819(a)(Fourth) (1994).
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ience, the local United States Attorney ordinarily participates as co-counsel
in Title VII cases.
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION
Mission and General Statutory Reference: The Federal Election Com-
mission (the Commission) administers and enforces the federal statutes
governing the financing of federal elections.
732
Membership: "Six members, appointed by the President with the advice
733and consent of the Senate," serve staggered six-year terms.  No more
than three Commissioners may be of the same political party. A member
may serve after the expiration of his or her term until a successor has been
appointed. An individual nominated after 1997 to serve as a Commissioner
may serve only a single term. There is no statutory provision governing
removal but one court's decision has construed the statute to confer "for
cause" protection on Commission members.734
Quorum and Voting Requirements: Four of the Commission's six mem-
bers must vote in the affirmative for the Commission to take action. 735 If
the Commission splits 3-3, the matter is dismissed or otherwise fails to go
forward. All decisions of the Commission must be made by a majority
vote, except that the affirmative vote of four members of the Commission
is required to: (1) participate in litigation; (2) render advisory opinions;
(3) develop forms and prescribe rules; (4) conduct investigations and hear-
ings, encourage voluntary compliance through the civil enforcement proc-
ess and report apparent violations to the appropriate law enforcement
authorities; and (5) take action to administer and enforce the public fi-
nancing statutes. A Commissioner may not delegate his or her vote or de-
cisionmaking authority.
Disqualification and Recusal Procedure: Each commissioner determines
requests for disqualification or recusal.
Chairman's Powers: The Commissioners elect a Chairman from among
their members, who serves for one year as Chairman. A commissioner
732. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 437c-437d (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); see also Presidential Election
Campaign Fund Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9013 (1994); Presidential Primary Matching Pay-
ment Account Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 9031-9042 (1994).
733. 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(1).
734. FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
735. See 2 U.S.C. § 437c(c).
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may serve as Chairman only once during his or her term. The Chairman
and the Vice Chairman must be affiliated with different political parties.
The Vice Chairman acts as Chairman in the absence of disability of the
Chairman or when there is a vacancy in the Office of the Chairman. The
Commissioners jointly select the Staff Director and General Counsel and
the Chairman plays no special role in the selection process. Choice of a
Staff Director and General Counsel requires the affirmative vote of the
Commissioners.
OMB Bypass Provisions: Whenever the Commission submits any
budget estimate or request to the President or OMB, it must concurrently
transmit a copy to Congress.736 The Commission is required to submit an
annual report to the President and each House of Congress that contains
any legislative recommendations the Commission considers appropriate.
Under 2 U.S.C. § 437d(d)(2), concurrent submission is also required when-
ever the Commission submits any other legislative recommendation, testi-
mony, or comments on legislation requested by Congress, the President, or
OMB. Section 437d(d)(2) also provides that no agency or officer of the
United States may require the Commission to submit its legislative recom-
mendation, testimony, or comments for approval prior to its submission of
such material to Congress.
Litigation Authority: The Commission has authority to initiate, defend,
or appeal any civil action to enforce the provisions of the Federal Election
Campaign Act and chapters 95 and 96 of the Internal Revenue Code
through its General Counsel.737 The General Counsel represents the Com-
mission in litigation at the District Court and Circuit Court levels, including
Freedom of Information Act litigation. He also represents the Commission
before the Supreme Court in cases arising under the Title 26 provisions but
Supreme Court litigation arising under Title 2 is handled by the Solicitor
General.738 The Department of Justice represents the Commission in cer-
tain proceedings such as tort litigation.
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
Mission and General Statutory Reference: The Federal Energy Regula-
tory Commission (the Commission) is an independent regulatory commis-
sion that is within the Department of Energy. It regulates interstate aspects
736. See id. § 437d(d)(1).
737. See id. § 437d(a)(6).
738. See 2 U.S.C. § 437c(f)(4); 26 U.S.C. §§ 9010(a), 9040(a).
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of the electric power, natural gas, oil pipeline, and hydroelectric indus-
tries. 39
Membership: Five members, appointed by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate, serve staggered five-year terms. No more than
three members may belong to the same political party. Terms expire on
June 30. However, a Commissioner may serve up to the end of the Con-
gress in which his or her term expires, unless he or she is replaced before
the end of the session. Commissioners may be removed by the President
only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.
Quorum and Voting Requirements: Three members constitute a quorum
and a majority of the quorum is required to take Commission action. The
Commission's enabling statute provides that "[a]ctions of the Commission
shall be determined by a majority vote of the members present. ' '740 The
Commission cannot undertake any official business when no quorum is
present or the membership is equally divided. In the case of a tie vote, no
action is taken. However, a tie vote on rehearing serves to leave the origi-
nal action in place. The Commission automatically takes review of all as-
pects of an initial decision as to which timely exceptions and briefs are
filed. In the absence of exceptions, the Commission has ten days in which
to decide whether to initiate review. Review may be initiated by majority
vote.74 1 The Commission has no express rule as to whether the majority
may issue a decision if the minority delays in completing any separate
statements. In practice, members are afforded a reasonable time to com-
plete a dissenting statement. If a compelling reason exists to issue a deci-
sion without further delay, the majority could issue it with a statement that
a dissent will be issued at a later time. Typically, Commissioners complete
dissents without assistance from staff other than their own personal staffs.
On the infrequent occasions when a dissenting commissioner requests as-
sistance from the Commission's advisory staff, such assistance is provided.
The Commission has no provisions for proxy voting and it is not employed.
Disqualification and Recusal Procedure: No special provisions. Regula-
tions require only that written notification of any recusal decision be pro-
vided to the Commission's ethics officer.742
739. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7171-7178 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
740. Id. § 7171(e).
741. See id. § 7171(e).
742. See 5 C.F.R. § 3401.103 (2000).
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Chairman's Powers: One member is designated by the President as
Chairman. The Chairman is empowered to designate (in advance) any
other member as Acting Chairman to act during the Chairman's absence.
The Chairman is responsible for administrative and executive functions, the
appointment of personnel, including hearing examiners and an executive
director, as he deems necessary. The Chairman has authority to distribute
business among personnel and administrative units.743 Occasionally the
Commission may delegate authority during the course of an individual pro-
ceeding, such as by authorizing Commission staff to undertake certain ac-
tions in connection with the proceeding.4 The Chairman also maintains
the authority to approve the Commission's budget.745
OMB Bypass Provisions: Bypass of prior OMB review on legislative
matters is secured by means of a statutory concurrent transmittal provi-
sion.746 The Commission sends its annual appropriation request to OMB
for approval and inclusion in the President's budget.
Litigation Authority: Unless otherwise provided by 28 U.S.C. § 518,
which relates to litigation before the Supreme Court, attorneys designated
by the Chairman may represent the Commission in civil actions brought by
or against the Commission.747 However, pursuant to its authority under 28
U.S.C. § 516, the Department of Justice conducts litigation on behalf of the.
Commission in civil suits that are not based on Commission orders, such as
suits under the employment discrimination laws and the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act.
FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE BOARD
Mission and General Statutory Reference: The Federal Housing Finance
Board (the Board) is an independent agency in the executive branch whose
primary duty is to ensure that the Federal Home Loan Banks operate in a
financially safe and sound manner.718 To the extent consistent with the
safety and soundness charge, the other statutory duties of the Finance
Board are to (1) supervise the Banks; (2) ensure that the Banks carry out
their housing finance mission; and (3) ensure that the Banks remain "ade-
743. See 18 C.F.R. § 376.105(4) (1999).
744. See, e.g., 18 C.F.R. §§ 376.201-376.208.
745. See Department of Energy Act, § 401(c), Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 582 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7171(j) (1994)).
746. See id.
747. See id. § 7171(i).
748. See 12 U.S.C. § 1422a-22b (1994).
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quately capitalized and able to raise funds in the capital markets., 749 The
Finance Board recently reorganized and renumbered its regulations.75 °
Membership: The Federal Home Loan Bank Act vests management of
the Finance Board in a five-member Board of Directors consisting of four
members appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate to serve staggered seven-year terms, and one ex-officio member, the
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development. The four appointed direc-
tors must possess "extensive experience or training in housing finance or
... a commitment to providing specialized housing credit ' 751 and at least
one appointed director must be chosen from "an organization with more
than a two-year history of representing consumer or community interests
on banking services, credit needs, housing, or financial consumer protec-
tions.' 752 The President designates an appointed director as Chair. Not
more than three of the five directors may be from the same political party.
New directors appointed to fill a vacancy before the expiration of a term
are appointed to fulfill the remainder of the unexpired term. Each director
may continue to serve until a successor is appointed and qualified. The
statute does not contain an express removal provision.
Quorum and Voting Requirements: A majority of the Board of Directors
constitutes a quorum and Board action requires an affirmative vote of a
majority of the directors voting once a quorum is established. Directors
may participate in meetings by telephone.
Disqualification and Recusal Procedure: None.
Chairman's Powers: "Management of the Board is vested by statute in
the Board ... For ease of administration and management, the Board
has adopted a delegation of authority that authorizes the Chair to effect the
overall management, functioning, and organization of the Finance Board.
The managing director is authorized to manage the agency's day-to-day
operations, including authority to appoint, remove, promote, direct, set
compensation for, and pay Finance Board personnel.754
749. Id. § 1422a(a)(3)(B)(iii).
750. See 12 C.F.R. pts. 900-970 (2000).
751. 12 U.S.C. § 1422a(b)(2)(A).
752. Id. § 1422a(b)(2)(B).
753. Id. § 1422a(b)(l).
754. See Chairman's Order No. 95-OR-6 (Oct. 10, 1995).
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OMB Bypass Provisions: Bypass of OMB review on legislative matters
is secured by means of a prohibition on prior executive review contained in
12 U.S.C. § 250. The Finance Board derives its funds, which are neither
Government funds nor appropriated monies, from assessments levied on
the Banks and from other sources.755 The funds are not subject to appor-
tionment.756
Litigation Authority: The Bank Act authorizes the Finance Board to act
in its own name and through its own attorney in enforcing the Bank Act or
Finance Board regulations and in any action, suit or proceeding in which
the Finance Board is a party that involves the agency's regulation or super-
vision of any Bank.757 The Department of Justice handles all other litiga-
tion that may involve the Finance Board.
FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS A UTHORITY
Mission and General Statutory Reference: The Federal Labor Relations
Authority (FLRA) adjudicates appeals concerning unfair labor practices
and representation petitions, disputes concerning the negotiability of col-
lective bargaining agreement proposals, and exceptions to grievance arbi-
tration awards relating to federal-sector labor-management relations.7 5
The Office of General Counsel is the FLRA's independent investigative
and prosecutorial component.759
Membership: The FLRA is composed of three full-time members ap-
pointed by the President for five-year terms, with the advice and consent of
the Senate. A member may serve until the member's successor takes of-
fice, or the expiration of the next session of Congress subsequent to the end
of the member's fixed term, whichever comes earlier.760 A member may be
removed by the President only upon notice and hearing, and only for ineffi-
ciency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office. Members shall not en-
gage in any other business or employment or hold another office or posi-
tion in the Federal government except as provided by law. Not more than
two of the members may be of the same political party. The President ap-
points one member to serve as Chair. 6
755. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1422b(c), 1438(b).
756. See id. § 1422b(c).
757. See id. § 1422b(a).
758. See 5 U.S.C. § 7104-7105 (1994).
759. See id. § 7104(f)(2)(A)-(B).
760. See id. § 7104(c)(1)-(2).
761. See id. § 7104(b).
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The Federal Service Impasses Panel (Panel) is an entity within the
762FLRA. The Panel has seven presidential appointees who serve on a part-
time basis, one of whom serves as Chair. The Panel resolves impasses
between federal agencies and unions representing federal employees aris-
ing from negotiations over conditions of employment under the statute, the
Federal Employees Flexible and Compressed Work Schedules Act, and the
Panama Canal Act of 1979.763 The FLRA also houses the Foreign Service
Labor Relations Board and the Foreign Service Impasse Disputes Panel.
These entities administer the labor-management relations program and re-
solve impasses for Foreign Service employees in the U.S. Information
Agency, the Agency for International Development, and the Departments
of State, Agriculture, and Commerce. Their composition is set out at 22
U.S.C. § 4106 and § 4110.
Other Presidential Appointees: General Counsel. The President, with
the advice and consent of the Senate, appoints a General Counsel for a term
of five years. The General Counsel is the FLRA's independent investiga-
tive and prosecutorial component. The FLRA's General Counsel investi-
gates alleged unfair labor practices and prosecutes unfair labor practice
complaints.6 The statute states that the General Counsel "may be re-
moved at any time by the President. 765 The General Counsel has unre-
viewable discretion to decline to issue unfair labor practice complaints.
The General Counsel also has direct authority over the FLRA's regional
office employees.766
Quorum and Voting Requirements: Two members constitute a quorum
for purposes of taking FLRA action. A vacancy in the Authority member-
ship shall not impair the right of the remaining members to exercise all of
the powers of the FLRA.767 In the case of a tie, no FLRA action is taken.
When exceptions to the decisions of the administrative law judges (ALJs)
are filed, the decisions may be affirmed, modified or reversed in whole or
in part by the Authority. If no exceptions are filed to an AL's decision,
the decision is adopted by the Authority and, without precedential signifi-
cance, becomes final and binding if no request for review is filed with the
FLRA within 60 days of issuance of the regional director's decision. The
762. See id. § 7119(c)(1).
763. See id
764. See 5 U.S.C. § 7104(0(2)(A)-(B).
765. Id. § 7104(0(1).
766. See id § 7104(0(3).
767. See id. § 7104(d)(1994).
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FLRA is authorized to delegate to subordinate officers the authority to per-
form such duties and make such expenditures as the FLRA may deem nec-
essary.68
Disqualification and Recusal Procedure: No special procedures.
Chairman's Powers: The Chair of the FLRA serves as its chief executive
and administrative officer. The Chair is also a member of the National
Partnership Council established by Executive Order No. 12,871769 to pro-
mote labor-management partnerships in the Federal service. The Chair also
heads the Foreign Service Labor Relations Board, and appoints the mem-
bers of the Foreign Service Impasse Disputes Panel.
OMB Bypass Provisions: The FLRA is required by 5 U.S.C. § 7104(e)
to submit an annual report to Congress, which shall include information as
to cases heard and decisions rendered. This provision does not confer a
legislative bypass on the FLRA.
Litigation Authority: Except as provided by 28 U.S.C. § 518, relating to
Supreme Court litigation, "attorneys designated by the Authority may ap-
pear for the Authority and represent the Authority in any civil action
brought in connection with any function carried out by the Authority."77
The Office of the Solicitor represents the Authority in court proceedings
before all United States Courts of Appeals and Federal District Courts. The
FLRA Solicitor represents the FLRA in the Supreme Court in appropriate
cases, by delegation of the Solicitor General and the United States Attorney
General.
FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION
Mission and General Statutory Reference: The Federal Maritime Com-
mission (the Commission) is responsible for regulating oceanbome trans-
portation between the United States and foreign countries.
77'
768. See id. § 7105(d)-(e).
769. 58 Fed. Reg. 52,201 (1993).
770. Id.
771. See Reorg. Plan No. 7 of 1961, 3 C.F.R. 875, 876 (1959-63), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
app. § 103, at 1151 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); Shipping Act of 1984, 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1701-
1721 (1994); Merchant Marine Act of 1920, § 1920, 46 U.S.C. app. § 876(1)(b) (1994);
Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1101-1126-1 (1994).
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Membership: Five Commissioners are appointed by the President with
the advice and consent of the Senate, for staggered five-year terms. No
more than three commissioners may belong to the same political party.
The President designates one Commissioner to serve as Chairman. Com-
missioners are removable by the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty,
or malfeasance in office.
Quorum and Voting Requirements: The affirmative vote of a majority of
the members of the Commission is required to dispose of any matter before
the Commission. For purposes of holding a formal meeting for the trans-
action of Commission business, the actual presence of two Commissioners
shall be sufficient. Proxy votes of absent members are permitted.772 A va-
cancy or vacancies in the Commission shall not impair the power of the
Commission to execute its functions. The Commission has the authority
"to delegate, by published order or rule, any of its functions to a division of
the Commission, an individual Commissioner, a hearing examiner, or an
employee or employee board, including functions with respect to hearing,
determining, ordering, certifying, reporting or otherwise acting as to any
work, business or matter." 773 However, the Commission shall retain a dis-
cretionary right to review any action taken as a result of the Commission's
delegation of its functions upon its own initiative or petition of a party or
intervenor to the action.7  The majority may issue its decision without the
dissenting opinion if there is a delay. Federal Maritime Commission Order
87, section 3.10 (February 6, 1981), states that reports accompanied by
concurring and/or dissenting opinions, where practicable, shall be served
no later than thirty-five (35) workdays following the Commission decision.
A deviation from this procedure can only be accomplished by majority vote
of the commission.775 Any assistance to a dissenting Commissioner would
be provided by his or her counsel.
Disqualification and Recusal Procedure: Parties may file an affidavit of
personal bias or disqualification against any "presiding or participating of-
ficer" and the Commission determines the matter as part of the record and
decision in the case.776 The term "presiding officer" includes "any one or
772. See generally 46 C.F.R. § 501.21 (1999).
773. Reorg. Plan No. 7 of 1961, § 105(a), 3 C.F.R. 875, 877 (1959-63), reprinted in 5
U.S.C. app. § 105(a) (1994 & Supp. IV); 46 C.F.R. §§ 501.21-501.30.
774. See Reorg. Plan No. 7 of 1961, § 105(b), 3 C.F.R. 877 (1959-63), reprinted in 5
U.S.C. app. § 105(b) (1994 & Supp. IV).
775. See Comm. Order No. 87, § 3.11 (Feb. 6, 1981).
776. 46 C.F.R. § 502.149.
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more of the Members of the Commission (not including the Commission
when sitting as such). 777
Chairman's Powers: The Chairman serves as chief executive and ad-
ministrative officer of the agency. The Chairman must consult with Com-
mission members before appointing key agency officials. Only after con-
sultation with other members may these key officials be appointed. The
Chairman has authority to approve the budget himself.
OMB Bypass Provisions: The Commission does not enjoy bypass of
OMB review on budgetary matters. Although there appears to be no for-
mal provision for bypass on legislative matters, one has developed in prac-
tice.
Litigation Authority: The Commission has authority to represent itself in
actions in the U.S. Courts of Appeals to review its rules, regulations, or fi-
nal orders.778 The Department of Justice is responsible for the conduct of
district court litigation to which the Commission is a party.779 However,
the Commission may represent itself in district court and appellate court
upon notice or approval of the Attorney General with regard to seeking in-
junctions.780
FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION
Mission and General Statutory Reference: The Federal Mine Safety and
Health Review Commission (the Commission) is an adjudicatory agency
that provides administrative trial and appellate review of mine safety and
health enforcement actions brought by the Department of Labor's Mine
781Safety and Health Administration. Most cases deal with civil penalties
assessed against mine owners and the Commission determines whether a
health or safety violation occurred and if the proposed penalty is appropri-
ate.
Membership: Five members serve staggered six-year terms and are ap-
pointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. There
is no provision limiting the number of Commissioners who can be affiliated
777. 46 C.F.R. § 502.25.
778. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341-2351 (1994).
779. See 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1994).
780. See 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1705(k), 1710a(h) (1994).
781. See 30 U.S.C. § 823 (1994).
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with the same political party. A member may be removed by the President
for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office. 82
Quorum and Voting Requirements: The Commission is authorized to
delegate to any group of three or more members any or all of the powers of
the Commission, and two members shall constitute a quorum of any group
designated.78 3 There is no other quorum requirement. On one occasion
when no quorum was present, the Commission simply waited until a quo-
rum was available. After a Commission AU has rendered a decision that
constitutes his or her final disposition of the proceedings, the Commission,
by an affirmative vote of two Commissioners, may direct review by either
granting a petition for discretionary review within forty days after the issu-
ance of the decision, or by directing review on its own motion within thirty
days after the issuance of the decision.8 If the Commission does not grant
review, the decision of the AU becomes a final decision of the Commis-
sion forty days after its issuance.785 After directing review, Commission
action on exceptions to the AL's decision may be taken only by a majority
vote, provided a quorum is present. When the Commission is equally di-
vided, two in favor of affirming the administrative law judge's decision and
two for vacating or reversing the decision, the decision stands as if af-
firmed.7 86 The Commission issues majority and dissenting opinions si-
multaneously. In one reported case, the majority and dissenting opinions
were issued on different dates.787 A dissenting Commissioner's opinion is
drafted by the Commissioner and/or his or her counsel. However, in some
circumstances, the Commissioner may also receive staff assistance, par-
ticularly if the Commissioner's view adopts the staff recommendation.
Disqualification and Recusal Procedure: Each Commissioner decides the
question of recusal for himself or herself. The Commission's rules provide
that "[a] party may request a Commissioner... to withdraw on grounds of
personal bias or other disqualification., 78 If a Commissioner declines to
782. See id § 823(b)(i).
783. See id. § 823(c).
784. See id. § 823(d)(I)-(2).
785. See id. § 823(d)(1).
786. See Secretary of Labor v. Pennsylvania Elec. Co., 12 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1562, 1563-65
(1990), affid on other grounds, Pennsylvania Elec. Co. v. Federal Mine Safety & Health
Review Comm'n, 969 F.2d 1501 (3d Cir. 1992).
787. See Contests of Respirable Dust Sample Alteration Citations, 17 F.M.S.H.R.C.
1819 (1995) (majority opinion); Contests of Respirable Dust Sample Alteration Citations,
17 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1883 (1995) (dissenting opinion).
788. 29 C.F.R. § 2700.81(b) (1999).
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withdraw, he or she "shall so rule upon the record, stating the grounds for
his ruling.
'7s9
Chairman's Powers: The President designates one of the members to
serve as Chairman. The Chairman is responsible for the administrative op-
erations of the Commission.79 The Chairman may appoint key staff offi-
cials without prior approval of other members of the Commission, and in
the past this authority has been exercised. Similarly, the other members of
the Commission do not approve budget requests before their submission.
OMB Bypass Provisions: The Commission does not possess a budgetary
bypass of OMB review. Legislative bypass is not particularly relevant to
the Commission because, as an adjudicatory agency, it refrains from mak-
ing legislative recommendations or offering testimony.
Litigation Authority: As a matter of discretionary policy, the Commis-
sion has left to the litigating parties who appear before it the task of de-
fending Commission decisions in the United States Courts of Appeal,
where Commission decisions are reviewed or enforced. The Commission
has an understanding with the Department of Justice that should the Com-
mission wish to file a brief or otherwise defend its decisions, the Commis-
sion would coordinate its efforts with the Department of Justice. The
Commission, however, does file routine procedural motions, through the
Office of General Counsel, in the Courts of Appeal. Under the Mine Act,
the Department of Labor has specific litigating authority in the areas of in-
junctive relief and enforcement of Commission orders and decisions.9
The Commission has subpoena enforcement authority in the United States
District Courts.7 92 Litigation involving personnel matters, although rare,
has been and would be handled by the Office of the General Counsel. The
Commission has not had occasion to be involved in Freedom of Informa-
tion Act and Sunshine Act lawsuits. In such lawsuits, however, defense
would be coordinated between the Commission's Office of General Coun-
sel and the Department of Justice.
789. Id. §2700.8 1(c).
790. See 30 U.S.C. § 823(b)(2).
791. See id. §§ 816(b), 818 & 822.




Mission and General Statutory Reference: The Federal Trade Commis-
sion (the Commission) enforces a variety of federal antitrust and consumer
protection statutes.793
Membership: Five members serve staggered seven-year terms and are
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.
Commissioners may serve until a successor is appointed and qualified. No
more than three commissioners may be from one political party. Commis-
sioners may be removed by the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty,
or malfeasance in office.
Quorum and Voting Requirements: There is no statutory quorum re-
quirement. However, under Commission rules, a quorum is a majority of
the members.794 When a majority does not form for or against a motion
within one month of the most recent vote cast, the motion fails for lack of a
majority. The Commission's rules do not authorize proxy voting but per-
mit Commissioners to direct members of their staffs to report their vote.
Review of an ALJ decision is not discretionary but is required where a
party has filed a timely notice of appeal. Commission rules permit the
Commission to place an AU decision on its own docket for review.
Disqualification and Recusal Procedure: Disqualification or recusal rests
in the first instance with each individual Commissioner. 95
Chairman's Powers: The President designates a Chairman from among
the membership. The executive and administrative functions of the Com-
mission are vested in the Chairman subject to the general policies estab-
lished by the Commission. Appointment of heads of various major admin-
istrative units is subject to approval of the Commission. The Commission
has authorization to revise budget estimates and to determine the distribu-
tion of appropriated funds. The Commission may delegate functions to di-
visions of the Commission, hearing examiners, and other employees and
retains a discretionary review authority that may be triggered by a vote of
the majority less one. The Chairman has the authority to designate which
793. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). Cf Reorg. Plan No. 8 of 1950, 3
C.F.R. 1005 (1949-53), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 1470 (1994), and in 64 Stat. 1264
(transferring functions of the Commission to the Chairman); Reorg. Plan No. 4 of 1961,
3 C.F.R. 874 (1961), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 1508 (1994), and in 75 Stat. 837 (author-
izing delegation authority to the Commission).
794. See 16 C.F.R. § 4.14(b) (2000).
795. See id. § 4.17(b)(3).
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personnel, including Commissioners, are to perform these delegated func-
tions.
OMB Bypass Provisions: The Commission has no statutory legislative
bypass provision. However, it ordinarily does not submit legislation, re-
ports on legislation, or testimony to OMB for clearance. The Commission
does submit its annual request for appropriations to OMB for approval and
inclusion in the President's budget.
Litigation Authority: Section 56 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
(the Act)796 specifically authorizes the Commission to represent itself by its
own attorneys in four categories of cases: (1) suits for injunctive relief un-
der Section 53 of the Act 797 (2) suits for consumer redress under Section
57(b) of the Act;798 (3) petitions for judicial review of Commission rules or
orders; 799 and (4) suits to enforce compulsory process under Sections 46
and 49 of the Act.800 Section 56 also provides that with respect to "any
civil action involving this subchapter (including an action to collect a civil
penalty)," the Commission may represent itself if the Attorney General
does not agree to do so after forty-five days notice.80 1 This catchall provi-
sion enables the Commission to prosecute and defend by its own attorneys
a wide variety of cases that the Department of Justice declines to litigate
(particularly civil penalty actions under Sections 5(l) and 5(m) of the Act).
The Commission is authorized to represent itself in suits to enforce civil
investigative demands.0 2 In addition, the Department of Justice may ap-
point Commission attorneys as special United States Attorneys to represent
the United States in litigation conducted by the Department of Justice.0 3
The Commission also participates as amicus curiae in cases raising impor-
796. § 16, Pub. L. No. 63-203, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 56 (1994)).
797. See 15 U.S.C. § 56(a)(2)(A).
798. See id. § 56(a)(2)(B).
799. See id § 56(a)(2)(C).
800. See id. §§ 46(a)(2)(D), 49.
801. 15 U.S.C. § 56(a)(1)(A)-(B).
802. See id. § 57b-I(e).
803. See Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act, § 9, 15 U.S.C.
§ 6107 (1994) (discussing appointment of Commission attorneys to prosecute criminal con-
tempt); Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission-Premerger Penalties, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) $ 9853, at 17,356
(Aug. 2, 1991) (discussing appointment of Commission attorneys to prosecute civil penalty
actions pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 18a for violation of premerger reporting requirements); 28
U.S.C. §§ 515, 543 (1994) (discussing appointment of special U.S. Attorneys).
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tant issues under antitrust and consumer protection laws. The Justice'De-
partment ordinarily represents the Commission in cases of common con-
cern to all agencies, such as Freedom of Information Act, tort or personnel
litigation
Separate provisions govern representation before the Supreme Court.
Section 56(a)(3), defines certain circumstances under which the Commis-
sion may appear in the Supreme Court "in any civil action in which the
Commission represented itself [in the courts below] pursuant to [Sections
56(a)(1) or (2)]." Specifically, the Commission may represent itself if it
requests authority to do so from the Solicitor General within ten days of the
lower court judgment and the Solicitor General, within sixty days after en-
try of the judgment, either authorizes the Commission's appearance, de-
clines to represent the Commission, or fails to respond to the request.
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
Mission and General Statutory Reference: The Merit Systems Protection
Board (the Board) adjudicates appeals by federal employees of major per-
sonnel actions taken against them, including removals or demotions, deci-
sions by the Office of Personnel Management in retirement matters, certain
personnel actions involving discrimination or reprisal for whistle-blowing,
and actions brought by the Office of Special Counsel involving alleged
prohibited personnel practices or violations of the Hatch Act. The Board
also reviews certain significant actions by the Office of Personnel Man-
agement, such as regulations, and conducts studies of the merit system. 04
The MSPB was established by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978.805
Membership: The Board consists of a Chairman, a Vice Chairman, and a
Member, with no more than two of its members from the same political
party. Board members are appointed by the President, confirmed by the
Senate, and serve overlapping non-renewable seven-year terms. Members
whose terms expire may continue to serve until a successor is appointed
and qualified but the extension is limited to one year. Members can be re-
moved only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.
Quorum and Voting Requirements: Two of the Board's three members
constitute a quorum. When, because of a vacancy, recusal or other reason,
the Board is unable to decide a matter, the decision, recommendation or or-
804. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1206 (1994).




der under review is deemed the final decision of the Board. When the
matter does not involve a decision, recommendation or order, the Chairman
may direct referral of the matter to an administrative judge or other official
for final disposition. When the Board itself is unable to decide a matter,
any decisions issued shall not be deemed precedential. The Board has no
provision for operation with only one member.
Disqualification and Recusal Procedure: Individual members of the
Board decide questions of recusal or disqualification.
Chairman's Powers: The Chairman serves as chief executive and ad-
ministrative officer of the Board. The Chairman has authority to appoint
senior staff and prepare the Board's budget without the approval of the
Board. The Board may delegate "the performance of any of its functions"
to a Board employee.0 6
OMB Bypass Provisions: The Board may transmit information to Con-
gress without prior OMB clearance. 0 7 Legislative recommendations, and
budget requests and proposals, are transmitted simultaneously to the Presi-
dent and Congress.808
Litigation Authority: Board attorneys may represent the Board except as
to matters in the Supreme Court. However, the Department of Justice han-
dles cases of common concern to all agencies, such as Freedom of Infor-
mation Act litigation.
NATIONAL CREDIT UNION ADMINISTRATION
Mission and General Statutory Reference: The National Credit Union
Administration (NCUA) supervises, examines and insures federal credit
unions, and those state credit unions that apply and qualify for insurance.
80 9
Membership: The NCUA Board (the Board) is comprised of three mem-
bers who are "broadly representative of the public interest," have "educa-
tion, training or experience" in financial services, and are appointed by the
President to six-year terms with the advice and consent of the Senate.10
806. See 5 U.S.C. § 1204(g).
807. See id. § 1205.
808. See id. § 1204(k)-(I).
809. See 12 U.S.C. § 1752a (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
810. Id. § 1752a(b)(l)-(2)(A) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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Not more than two members of the Board may be members of the same
political party. Not more than one member of the Board shall have recent
experience as a credit union committee member, officer, director, employee
or institution-affiliated party.81 Members may not be appointed to succeed
themselves, unless they have not served a full six-year term. Any Board
member may continue to serve after the expiration of his or her term until a
successor is qualified. The President designates a Chairman and the Board
may designate one of its members as Vice Chairman.
Quorum and Voting Requirements: A majority of the Board constitutes a
quorum. 8 12 The agreement of two of the three members is required for
Board action. There is no statutory or regulatory provision that prohibits a
majority of the Board from issuing its decision if the minority delays com-
pleting a dissenting statement. Although a Board member who disagrees
with a decision may state such disagreement at a meeting, written dissent-
ing statements are not issued. Proxy voting is prohibited.
Disqualification and Recusal Procedure: No special procedures.
Chairman's Powers: The Chairman is the spokesman for the Board, rep-
resents the Board and the NCUA in its official relations with other
branches of government, determines each member's area of responsibility
and reviews such assignments biannually. The Chairman is the presiding
officer at meetings and makes procedural rulings, although, upon appeal, a
majority decision by the Board determines any disputed ruling.
The authority to appoint senior staff, with the exception of each board
member's personal staff, is reserved to the Board. However, the Chairman
does have the authority to select the Executive Director given the prior
agreement by the Board. The Chairman also maintains the authority for all
Board human resource decisions in the event of an emergency. Any such
actions taken by the Chairman will remain effective for thirty days or until
the next closed Board meeting. Budget approval authority is reserved to
the Board. The Executive Director, reporting to the Chairman, may ap-
prove the reprogramming of up to $150,000 of budget amounts per quarter
under powers delegated by the Board, given that all necessary circum-
stances are met.
811. See id. § 1752a(b)(2)(B).
812. See 12 U.S.C. § 1752a(d) (1994).
2000] 1271
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW
OMB Bypass Provisions: Bypass of OMB review on legislative matters
is secured by means of a prohibition on prior executive review.813 The
NCUA is funded through assessments leveled on Credit Unions and does
not receive appropriated funds.
Litigation Authority: NCUA engages in litigation without the Depart-
ment of Justice only when it acts as liquidating agent or conservator for a
credit union. Otherwise, the Department of Justice is responsible for the
conduct of federal court litigation brought by or against the NCUA in its
capacity as a federal agency.
NATIONAL INDIAN GAMING COMMISSION
Mission and General Statutory Reference: The National Indian Gaming
Commission (NIGC) is an independent agency established within the De-
partment of the Interior and administers a comprehensive system of regula-
tion of gambling activities on Indian lands. Among other things, it moni-
tors gaming operations, approves all contracts for the management of such
operations by non-tribal parties, conducts background investigations on
management company officials and principal investors, audits the books
and records of gaming operations, and brings enforcement action to ensure
compliance with the statute and regulations.814
Membership: Three members serve three-year terms. Members may
serve until a successor is appointed. The Chairman is appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The two remaining
Commissioners are appointed by the Secretary of the Interior. Two mem-
bers must be enrolled in an Indian tribe. No more than two Commissioners
can be of the same political party. The Commission selects its own Vice
Chairman.
Quorum and Voting Requirements: Two members are required to con-
stitute a quorum. The effect of a tie vote depends on the particular matter
before the Commission. For example, if the Commission were voting on
whether to promulgate a rule, a tie vote would result in no rule being prom-
ulgated. In other circumstances, however, a tie vote may allow a Chair-
man's decision to stand or require the Chairman to take different actions to
obtain the desired results. There is no proxy voting; however, members
may participate in meetings via telephone. The Commission is responsible
813. See 12 U.S.C. § 250 (1994).
814. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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for numerous overall activities including approval of the budget, adoption
of regulations, establishment of the gaming fee rate, issuance of subpoenas
and final closure orders. Staff assistance is available to dissenters upon re-
quest. The Commission's manual delegates certain authorities. Addition-
ally, the Chairman delegates by memorandum.
Disqualification and Recusal Procedure: No special procedures.
Chairman's Powers: The Chairman may issue orders temporarily closing
gaming activities; levy and collect civil fines for violations of the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act, its implementing regulations; and tribal gaming
ordinances, approve tribal gaming ordinances; and approve gaming man-
agement contracts.81 5 The Chairman is also responsible for appointing and
supervising Commission staff. The Commission, upon recommendation by
the Chairman, has power to approve the Commission's annual budget.
81 6
The Commission also has authority to establish fees to be paid to the
Commission by certain gaming activity.
817
OMB Bypass Provisions: Any request for appropriations is subject to the
approval of the Secretary of the Interior and is included as part of the
budget request of the Department.
818
Litigation Authority: The Department of Justice represents the Commis-
sion in the federal courts.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Mission and General Statutory Reference: The National Labor Relations
Board (the Board) conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether
employees want union representation and investigates and adjudicates
claims of unfair labor practices by employers and unions.
819
Membership: Five members serve staggered five-year terms and are ap-
pointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The
statute is silent on party membership but by tradition two of the five seats
on the Board have been reserved for individuals who are not members of
815. See 25 U.S.C. § 2705(a) (1994).
816. See id. § 2706(a)(1).
817. See 25 U.S.C. § 2717(a)(1)(1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
818. See 25 U.S.C. § 2717(b)(3) (1994).
819. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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the President's party. There is no provision for members to serve after
their terms expire pending the appointment of a new member, although
members are eligible for reappointment. The President may remove a
member, upon notice and hearing, for neglect of duty or malfeasance in of-
fice, but not for any other cause.
Other Presidential Appointees: General Counsel. The President also ap-
points a General Counsel with the advice and consent of the Senate, for a
term of four years. The General Counsel has final authority to investigate
charges and institute complaints involving unfair labor practices.8 20 He
also exercises general supervision over all attorneys employed by the
Board (other than ALJs and legal assistants to Board members) and the of-
ficers and employees of the thirty-three regional offices.8 2' He also has
such other duties as may be delegated by the Board. Appeals from deci-
sions of regional directors for the failure to institute an unfair labor practice
complaint are of right and go to the General Counsel or his or her designee.
Appeals of a regional director's decision not to proceed on a representation
petition are discretionary and lie with the Board.
Quorum and Voting Requirements: Three members constitute a quorum
for purposes of taking Board action and two members constitute a quorum
of three-member panels. 822 In those instances where the Board has fallen
below three members, the Board has declined to rule on pending contested
matters until a third member has been appointed. Inasmuch as the statute
provides for five Board members with three constituting a quorum, tie
votes generally occur only when there is one vacancy on the Board or when
a member is disqualified from participating. The Board members do not
vote on whether to take review of a decision by an ALJ because an appeal
from such a decision is a matter of right.8 23 Since 1976 the Board has had a
procedure that permits majority decisions to be issued without awaiting a
dissenting opinion in the event that the dissenting opinion was not circu-
lated in a timely manner (generally four weeks from approval of the major-
ity draft). However, this procedure has never actually been implemented in
any case. The statute provides that each member shall have his or her own
staff of attorneys to review cases and prepare drafts of opinions, and mem-
bers routinely rely on their staffs for assistance in drafting both majority
and dissenting opinions. The statute permits the Board to delegate any or
820. See 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1994).
821. Id.
822. See id. § 153(b).
823. See id. § 160(c).
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all of its powers to a panel of three of its members, and such delegations
are made routinely in deciding unfair labor practice and representation
(election) cases. 824 In addition, the Board has delegated limited authority to
its Executive Secretary to rule on procedural motions respecting the filing
of formal documents, such as requests for extensions of time. Board pro-
cedures assure personal participation of the Board members in the decision
of all other contested issues, and subordinates are not issued general prox-
ies with respect to such matters.
Disqualification and Recusal Procedure: Individual Board members de-
cide questions of recusal or disqualification.825
Chairman's and General Counsel's Powers: The President designates
one member to serve as Chairman. The statute is silent as to the Chair-
man's authority. As a practical matter, all key decisions, such as approval
of the budget and the appointment and removal of some senior staff, are
made by the Board collegially. The General Counsel investigates alleged
unfair labor practices and prosecutes unfair labor practice complaints.826
The General Counsel has unreviewable discretion to decline to issue unfair
labor practice complaints. The General Counsel also has direct authority
over NLRB regional office employees.
827
OMB Bypass Provisions: The Board does not assert a budgetary or leg-
islative bypass of OMB review.
Litigation Authority: The Board enjoys independent litigating authority
under its statute.828 The Board also handles its own FOIA and EAJA liti-
gation. The Department of Justice is involved in Supreme Court litigation
and non-program litigation, such as tort claims and other suits for damages.
NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD
Mission and General Statutory Reference: The National Mediation
Board (the Board) is an independent agency in the executive branch of the
Government that mediates disputes for the airline and railroad industries.
Strikes, lockouts and other forms of self-help in these industries may occur
824. See id. § 153(b).
825. See Caterpillar Inc., 321 N.L.R.B. 1130, 1132-34 (1996) (statements of Chairman
Gould and Member Browning).
826. See 29 U.S.C. § 153(d); see also 5 U.S.C. § 7104(f)(2)(A)-(B) (1994).
827. See 5 U.S.C. § 7104(f)(3).
828. See id. §§ 154(a), 160(e) & 161(1)-(2).
2000] 1275
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW
only after the Board has determined that further mediation would not be
successful and after a cooling-off period of thirty days following the
Board's release from mediation. The Board also certifies employee repre-
sentatives in the airline and railroad industries.
829
Membership: Three members appointed by the President with advice
and consent of the Senate to three-year terms. No more than two members
may be of the same political party. Individuals appointed to fill a vacancy
may only serve for the unexpired portion of the term. Members may serve
after expiration of their term until a successor is qualified. Members may
be removed by the President for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, malfeasance
A,30in office, or ineligibility, but for no other cause.
Quorum and Voting Requirements: Two members constitute a quorum.
Disqualification and Recusal Procedure: No specific procedures.
Chairman's Powers: The Board annually selects its own chairman. 3'
The Board may delegate "any portion of its work, business, or functions" to
an individual Board member or staff member.
8 32
OMB Bypass Provisions: The Board sends its annual appropriation re-
quest to the OMB for approval and inclusion in the President's budget.
The Board also submits testimony and legislative recommendations to
OMB for clearance.
Litigation Authority: The Department of Justice represents the Board in
the federal courts.
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Mission and General Statutory Reference: The National Transportation
Safety Board (the Board) is an independent establishment of the United
States Government that investigates all civil and most public aircraft acci-
dents and significant accidents in other modes of transportation. It also
serves as an adjudicatory body providing administrative trial and appellate
review of decisions by the Federal Aviation Administration, assessing civil
penalties, and reviewing decisions by the Federal Aviation Administration
829. See45 U.S.C. §§ 154-155 (1994).
830. Id. § 154(First).
831. See id. § 154(Second).
832. Id. § 154(Fourth).
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or the U.S. Coast Guard affecting the certificates of any carrier, airman,
mechanic, or mariner.
33
Membership: The Board is composed of five members, who serve stag-
gered five year terms and are appointed by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate. No more than three Board members may be of
the same political party. 34 At any given time, no fewer than three members
of the Board must be individuals who have been "appointed on the basis of
technical qualification, professional standing, and demonstrated knowledge
in accident reconstruction, safety engineering, human factors, transporta-
tion safety, or transportation regulation." 835 Any individual appointed to
fill a vacancy occurring on the.Board prior to the expiration of the term of
office for which his predecessor was appointed is appointed for the remain-
der of that term. Upon the expiration of his term of office, a member shall
continue to serve until his successor is appointed and shall have qualified.
Any member of the Board may be removed by the President for ineffi-
ciency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.
Quorum and Voting Requirements: Three members of the Board con-
stitute a quorum for the transaction of any function of the Board, 36 and of-
ficial action can be taken by a majority of a quorum. Although the Board
permits proxy voting, a proxy may not be used to establish a quorum for a
Board meeting. Official action can be taken at a Board meeting or by no-
tation. Items discussed at a meeting are usually adopted or disapproved by
voice vote at the meeting. However, a member who will be absent from
the meeting may request that the Chairman hold the record open for his or
her later vote, and in such cases adoption or disapproval would not occur at
the Board meeting. An absent member may vote by proxy. The proxy
must include the member's voting intent and the holder of the proxy deter-
mines whether any changes to the item at the board meeting has not af-
fected the item that the proxy should not be voted. Any member can
change his or her vote, or "recalendar" an item for discussion within
twenty-four hours of the Board's vote. When the Board is equally divided,
no official action can be taken. Where official action is taken, a member
can file a dissenting or concurring statement. The member's special assis-
tant or the Board's staff are available to assist in its drafting. 37 The Board
833. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1155 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
834. See 49 U.S.C. § 1111(b) (1994).
835. Id.
836. Seeid. § IIlI(f).
837. See generally 49 C.F.R. § 800.21-800.27 (1999) (explaining delegations of author-
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has also delegated the investigation of certain aircraft accidents to the Fed-
eral Aviation Administration, although the Board retains ultimate responsi-
bility for the investigation and makes all "probable cause" determina-
18tions.
Disqualification and Recusal Procedure: The Board's rules provide that
motions seeking to disqualify a member be filed with the Board. 839 How-
ever, the prevailing practice appears to leave the decision over disqualifi-
cation or recusal exclusively in the hands of the individual member.840 In
one somewhat unusual case, the Board itself ruled on a motion seeking to
disqualify "any Board member" who had any association with certain labor
associations.
841
Chairman's Powers: The President designates, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, an individual to serve as the Chairman of the
Board. The President, without Senate confirmation, also designates an in-
dividual to serve as Vice Chairman. The term of Chairman and Vice
Chairman is two years. The Chairman is the chief executive and adminis-
trative officer of the Board. When necessary, the Vice Chairman is
authorized to act as Chairman.842 The Chairman of the Board selects key
staff officials. Such selections are not subject to the approval of the other
Board members, although in practice, the Chairman often consults with
senior career employees before making his selections. Although the
Chairman alone approves the final budget before it is transmitted to OMB,
a draft is sent to the other Board Members.
OMB Bypass Provisions: Whenever the Board submits or transmits any
budget information, recommendations, comments, or testimony regarding
legislation to the President or the Office of Management and Budget, it is
required to concurrently submit a copy of the material to Congress. No of-
ficer or agency of the United States has any authority to require the Board
to submit its budget requests or estimates or its legislative comments or
ity from the Board and the Chairman to office directors).
838. See id. § 800(a), (c)-(d) (1999).
839. See id. § 821.15.
840. See generally Air East, Inc., 2 N.T.S.B. 929 (1974) (finding no grounds for dis-
qualification).
841. See Daschle v. Taylor, NTSB Order No. EA-4509, at 3 n.4 (Dec. II, 1996) (hold-
ing that "a potential bias does not warrant disqualification").
842. See 49 U.S.C. § I I 1I(d).
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recommendations for approval or review prior to the submission of that
material to Congress. 43
Litigation Authority: The Department of Justice is responsible for the
conduct of civil litigation to which the Board is a party. District Court liti-
gation includes cases that the Board brings to enforce its subpoena author-
ity,844 removal of actions against the agency brought by private litigants in
state courts, and tort claims. Court of Appeals cases include petitions for
review of Board orders. 845 By an express delegation of authority on a case
by case basis from the Attorney General through the Director of the Civil
Division's appellate staff, the Federal Aviation Administration is responsi-
ble for the defense of Board orders affirming the FAA's action in certifi-
cate enforcement appeals. Referrals to the Department of Justice are han-
dled informally or by letter in cases involving District Court litigation.
Petitions for Court of Appeals review of Board orders are transmitted to the
Administrator, who is, by statute, a named respondent.846
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Mission and General Statutory Reference: The Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) is an independent regulatory commission that regulates
commercial nuclear power reactors, nonpower research, test and training
reactors, fuel cycle facilities, medical, academic and industrial uses of nu-
clear materials, and the transport, storage and disposal of nuclear materials
and waste. Among other things, the NRC licenses the construction and op-
eration of nuclear reactors and other nuclear facilities, and the possession,
use, processing, handling and export of nuclear material.847
Membership: Five members serve staggered five-year terms and are ap-
pointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. No
more than three commissioners may belong to the same political party. 48
There is no provision for members to sit after their term has expired. The
President may remove any member for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or
malfeasance in office. The President designates one member as Chairman,
who serves at the pleasure of the President.
843. Seeid. § 1113(c).
844. See id. § 11 13(a)(4).
845. See id. § 1153(a).
846. See 44 U.S.C. § 44709(f) (1994).
847. See 42 U.S.C. § 5841 (1994); see also 5 U.S.C. §§ 901-912 (1994).
848. See id § 5841(b)(2).
2000] 1279
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW
Other Presidential Appointees: Inspector General. 49
Quorum and Voting Requirements: Three members constitute a quo-
rum.85° Action may be taken by a majority of those present.
Disqualification and Recusal Procedure: Individual commissioners de-
cide questions of recusal or disqualification.
851
Chairman's Powers: By the Reorganization Plan No. I of 1980,52 the
Chairman appoints certain heads of major administrative units, subject to
the approval of the Commission, and the Chairman or a member of the
Commission may initiate an action for removal, subject to the approval of
the Commission, of a number of heads of major administrative units and
panels, including the Executive Director for Operations. Others are named
by the Chairman, after consultation with the Executive Director, subject to
the approval of the Commission. The function of appointing, removing,
and supervising the staff of various offices, such as the General Counsel,
are delegated by the reorganization plan to the respective heads of these of-
fices. All Commission functions pertaining to an emergency at a requested
facility are specifically vested in the Chairman. Development of budget
estimates for Commission consideration lies with the Chairman but the
Commission must approve budget proposals for submission to OMB. 53
OMB Bypass Provisions: The Commission asserts a legislative bypass,
which describes the Commission as an independent regulatory agency. 54
However, the Commission does submit its authorization and appropriations
legislative proposals for clearance. It does not acknowledge clearance
authority by OMB in any other matters, including bills, supporting testi-
mony and legislative reports.
Litigation Authority: The Commission has litigation authority to repre-
sent itself in the Courts of Appeals.8 55 The Commission works with the
849. See 5 U.S.C. app. § 11, at 1397 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
850. See 42 U.S.C. § 5841(a)(!).
851. See, e.g., Yankee Atomic Elec. Co., 43 N.R.C. 53, 56 n.3 (1996) (stating that
Commissioners Jackson and Rodgers decided the motion to recuse themselves from the
case).
852. 45 Fed. Reg. 40,561, reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 5841 (1994).
853. See 42 U.S.C. § 584 1(a)(5).
854. See id. § 584 1(a)(1).
855. See 28 U.S.C. § 2348 (1994).
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Department of Justice and the local U.S. Attorneys Office in any case liti-
gated in federal District Court.
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION
Mission and General Statutory Reference: The Occupational Safety and
Health Review Commission (the Commission) is an adjudicatory agency
that provides administrative trial and appellate review of workplace safety
and health enforcement complaints brought against employers by the De-
partment of Labor's Occupational Safety and Health Administration.
85 6
Membership: Three members serve staggered six-year terms and are ap-
pointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Mem-
bers are chosen from among persons who are qualified by reason of train-
ing, education, or experience to carry on the functions of the Commission.
A vacancy caused by death, resignation, or removal of a member prior to
the expiration of the term for which the member was appointed shall be
filled only for the remainder of the unexpired term. A member of the
Commission may be removed by the President for inefficiency, neglect of
duty, or malfeasance in office. The President shall designate one of the
members as Chairman. There is no provision for a Vice Chairman.
Ouorum and Voting Requirements: Two of the Commission's three
members constitute a quorum. Official action can be taken only on the af-
firmative vote of at least two members. An ALJ, appointed by the Com-
mission, decides proceedings instituted before the Commission. The deci-
sion of the ALJ becomes the final order of the Commission within thirty
days, unless any individual Commissioner directs, within that period, that
the ALJ's decision be reviewed by the full Commission. An ALJ's decision
goes into effect if a Commissioner does not specify review of the ALJ's
decision. The Commission has no regulations governing proxy voting.
Disqualification and Recusal Procedure: The question of disqualification
of a Commission member is left to the member concerned. 57
Chairman's Powers: The Chairman is responsible for the administrative
operations of the Commission. The Chairman appoints ALJs and other
employees as she deems necessary to assist in the performance of the
Commission's functions, and fixes their compensation according to law.
856. See 29 U.S.C. § 661 (1994).
857. See, e.g., National Mfg. Co., 8 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1435 (May 30, 1980).
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OMB Bypass Provisions: The Commission does not have a provision for
bypass of legislative or budgetary review by OMB.
Litigation Authority: The Department of Justice represents the Commis-
sion in the federal courts.
POSTAL RATE COMMISSION
Mission and General Statutory Reference: The PRC is an independent
establishment of the executive branch of the Government of the United
States that issues formal recommended decisions regarding proposed
changes by the Postal Service in postal rates, fees, and mail classifica-
tion.858
Membership: Five members serve staggered six-year terms and are ap-
pointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Com-
missioners are chosen on the basis of professional qualifications and may
be removed only for cause. No more than three commissioners may be af-
filiated with the same political party. 59
Quorum and Voting Requirements: The Commission follows the rule
that a majority constitutes a quorum and that action may be taken by a ma-
jority of the quorum. There are no statutory provisions governing the con-
duct of meetings. No decisions are delegated to staff offices. The Com-
mission, which employs no ALJs or other subordinate hearing officers, sits
en banc in cases set for hearing and issues its decision directly following
briefing and oral argument. Additionally, the Commission has authority to
make rules and regulations and to establish procedures, subject to the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, and take any other action necessary and proper
to perform its functions, free of supervision by the Postal Service. 6° When
the membership is equally divided, a positive action may not ensue. Com-
mission decisions are governed by strict statutory time limits and, by prac-
tice, the Commission puts primary emphasis on publishing all its decisions
within these time frames. In theory, a dissent may issue after a majority
decision, but this has not occurred. A dissenting member may get staff as-
858. See 39 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3604 (1994). PRC determinations evaluate nine ratemaking
criteria set out in 39 U.S.C. § 3622(b) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
859. See 39 U.S.C. § 3601(a).
860. See id. § 3603.
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sistance in preparing his or her dissent. Proxy voting is permitted but not
frequently used.
Disqualification and Recusal Procedure: No special procedures.
Chairman's Powers: The Chairman is designated by the President and
serves at the pleasure of the President. The Commission annually elects a
Vice-Chairman from among its members. 861 The Chairman is the principal
executive officer of the Commission. He is responsible for the appoint-
ment of personnel, except heads of major administrative units whose ap-
pointments must be approved by a majority the Commission, the supervi-
sion of personnel, the assignment of work, and the use and expenditure of
funds. 862 The Chairman may appoint all other employees, generally does
not seek the advice of the Commission prior to hiring these individuals, and
may assign responsibilities to employees within the agency. Each commis-
sioner is consulted during the internal process of developing a draft budget
and the budget is considered and approved at a public meeting.
OMB Bypass Provisions: The Commission is not subject to normal
budget procedures because all its operating expenses are obtained from the
Postal Service Fund.863 It does not submit budget requests to OMB or
Congress. Rather, it submits all budget requests to the Governors of the
United States Postal Service for approval and receives payment from the
Postal Service Fund. The Commission participates in OMB review as a
matter of long standing practice, though such review is not binding on the
Commission. Thus, the Commission supplies reports on legislation as re-
quested by OMB and submits its draft reports on legislation to OMB when
they are requested by members of Congress.
Litigation Authority: The Commission has no special statutory litigation
authority, and is, in the absence of special arrangements, represented by the
Attorney General. Referrals to the Department of Justice are handled in-
formally. Commission legal personnel prepare or help prepare pleadings
and otherwise assist the Department of Justice. Special arrangements have
been made where the Commission and the Postal Service were on opposite
sides of a controversy. In one such case, the Department of Justice decided
to present the Postal Service position, but attached a memorandum giving
the Commission's opposite view. In another situation, the Department of
861. See id § 3601(d).
862. See id. § 3604(a).
863. See id. § 3604(d).
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Justice allowed both the Commission and the Postal Service to represent
themselves.
RAILROAD RETIREMENT BOARD
Mission and General Statutory Reference: The Board is an independent
agency in the executive branch that administers a retirement, unemploy-
ment and sickness benefit program for railroad workers and their fami-
lies.864 Because the Board is made up of representatives of the parties to
the disputes determined by the Board, it is not an agency within the mean-
ing of the Administrative Procedure Act. 865 Therefore, it is not subject to
statutes such as the Regulatory Flexibility Act or the Federal Advisory
Committee Act. However, the Board is subject to the Sunshine Act and the
Freedom of Information Act.
Membership: Three members serve staggered five-year terms and are
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. One
member is appointed based on the recommendations of railway labor; one
member is appointed based on the recommendations of railway manage-
ment; and one, the Chairman, is appointed without recommendation from
either railway labor or management. The Chairman must not be in the em-
ployment of or be financially or otherwise interested in any railroad em-
ployer or railroad labor organization. A member serves until a successor
has been appointed and confirmed.
Other Presidential Appointees: Inspector General.866
Quorum and Voting Requirements: A quorum of the Board consists of a
majority of those members in office.867 However, all rules, regulations or
decisions of the Board require the approval of two members.8 68 The ma-
jority will generally permit a dissenting member to prepare any dissenting
statement before issuing the majority opinion. A Board member can obtain
staff assistance in drafting any dissent. Authority is delegated to subordi-
nate officials of the Board by Board Order.
Disqualification and Recusal Procedure: No specific provisions.
864. See 45 U.S.C. § 231f(1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
865. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(l)(E) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
866. See Inspector General Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. app. § 11, at 1397 (1994 & Supp. IV
1998).
867. See 45 U.S.C. § 231f(a).
868. See id. § 231f(b)(5).
[52:41284
INDEPENDENT FEDERAL AGENCIES
Chairman's Powers: No statutory provisions. Appointment and removal
of senior staff officers is by the Board collegially. The Chief Financial Of-
ficer prepares a draft budget that is reviewed by a staff panel but must be
approved by the Board as a whole.
OMB Bypass Provisions: Whenever the Board submits any budget esti-
mate, budget request, supplemental budget estimate, or other budget infor-
mation, legislative recommendation, prepared testimony, or comment on
legislation to the President or the Office of Management and Budget, the
Board sends a concurrent copy of the submission to the Congress.8 69 The
Board sends its regulations to OMB for review under Executive Order No.
12,866.70
Litigation Authority: Judicial review of decisions of the Board is avail-
able by the filing of a petition for review in the appropriate United States
Court of Appeals.871 The Department of Justice has delegated to the Board
the authority for representing the Board in these cases. These appeals are
handled by the legal staff of the Board.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Mission and General Statutory Reference: The Securities and Exchange
Commission (the Commission) administers the federal securities laws, and
regulates firms engaged in the purchase or sale of securities, investment
companies, and people who provide investment advice. 72
Membership: Five members serve staggered five-year terms87 3 and are
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. No
more than three Commissioners can be of the same political party. In
making appointments, members of different political parties are to be ap-
pointed alternately as nearly as is practicable. A member may serve until
his or her successor is appointed and has qualified up to the expiration of
the next session of Congress subsequent to the expiration of the term. No
provision is made for a member's removal.
869. Seeid. §231f(f).
870. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601, at
557 (1994).
871. See 45 U.S.C. §§ 231g, 355(f).
872. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d-78d-2 (1994); see also Reorg. Plan No. 10, 3 C.F.R. 1006
(1949-1953), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 1471 (1994); 5 U.S.C. § 901 (providing authority
for the reorganization).
873. See 15 U.S.C. 8 78d(a) (1994).
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Quorum and Voting Requirements: The Exchange Act does not define a
quorum of the Commission. In 1995, the Commission adopted a rule that
provides that a quorum consists of three members; provided, however, that
if the number in office is less than three, a quorum consists of the number
of members in office; and provided further that on any matters of business
as to which the number of members in office, minus the number of mem-
bers who are disqualified to consider such matter, is two, then two mem-
bers constitute a quorum for purposes of such matter.8 74 The effect of a tie
vote depends on the particular matter before the Commission. For exam-
ple, if the Commission were voting on whether to promulgate a rule or
bring an enforcement action, a tie vote would result in no rule being prom-
ulgated and no action being brought. However, if the Commission were
reviewing a sanction imposed by an AU in an administrative proceeding, a
tie vote would result in the dismissal of the proceeding.
Disqualification and Recusal Procedure: Each commissioner decides the
question for himself or herself. The Commission's rules provide that a
Commissioner "should disqualify himself in the event he obtained knowl-
edge prior to becoming a member of the facts at issue before him in a
quasi-judicial proceeding, or in other types of proceeding in any matter in-
volving parties in which he has any interest or relationship directly or indi-
rectly.
'8 75
Chairman's Powers: There is no statutory reference to the selection of a
Chairman. However, under section 3 of the Reorganization Plan No. 10 of
1950,876 the function of the Commission with respect to choosing a Chair-
man from among the members was transferred to the President. The Reor-
ganization Plan also transferred to the Chairman from the Commission the
administrative and executive functions of the Commission, including the
appointment and supervision of personnel, the distribution of business, and
the use and expenditure of funds. Appointment by the Chairman of the
heads of major administrative units is subject to the approval of the Com-
mission. The Chairman is to be governed by general policies established
by the Commission and by regulatory decisions, findings, and determina-
tions as the Commission may by law make. The Commission retains its
874. See 17 C.F.R. § 200.41 (1999). Two federal courts have upheld the validity of the
new quorum rule. See Falcon Trading Group, Ltd. v. SEC, 102 F.3d 579, 582 (D.C. Cir.
1996); SEC v. Feminella, 947 F. Supp. 722, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
875. 17 C.F.R § 200.60.
876. 3 C.F.R. 1006 (1949-1953), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 1471 (1994).
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functions as to revising budget estimates and determining the distribution
of appropriated funds according to major programs and purposes. The
Commission has been delegated functions and has been provided a timely-
requested right of review for any party adversely affected in certain re-
spects.8" The vote of any one member of the Commission is sufficient to
bring any delegated matter to the Commission for review.
OMB Bypass Provisions: Bypass of OMB review on legislative matters
is secured by means of a prohibition on prior executive review contained in
12 U.S.C. § 250. The SEC submits its appropriations request to OMB for
approval.
Litigation Authority: The Commission has independent litigation
authority and handles litigation with its own attorneys at both the trial and
appellate levels. 818 In the Supreme Court, the Commission participates
through the Office of the Solicitor General. The Commission's litigation
authority is contained in a number of statutes. For instance, section 21(d)
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, authorizes the Commission to
initiate actions in Federal court to obtain injunctions and other regulated
entities.8 79 In administrative proceedings, the Act authorizes the Commis-
sion to issue cease and desist orders to enforce the requirements of the Se-
curities Act, the Securities Exchange Act, the Investment Company Act,
and the Investment Advisors Act. The act also provides for temporary or-
ders that are designed to prevent the dissipation or conversion of assets or
significant harm to investors.80  The Commission also defends actions
brought against it or its current or former members and employees for acts
arising from the performance of their duties.
The Commission has authority to seek remedies for violations of the
Act. The Commission is also authorized to seek writs of mandamus and
other orders, and to enforce its subpoenas. 881 The Securities Enforcement
Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990,882 authorizes the Commis-
sion to seek civil money penalties in district court actions and to impose
money penalties in administrative proceedings brought against broker deal-
ers, investment advice. The Commission does not have a memorandum of
877. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d-I(a)-(b).
878. See SEC v. Robert Collier & Co., 76 F.2d 939, 940 (2d Cir. 1935).
879. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(1).
880. See id. § 78u-3(c)(1).
881. See id § 78u(c)-(e).
882. See Pub. L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (1990) (codified in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.).
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understanding with the Department of Justice, but, in specific cases, the
Commission staff and the Department of Justice may exchange letters.
SURFACE TRANSPORTATION BOARD
Mission and General Statutory Reference: The Surface Transportation
Board (the Board) is an independent agency established within the Depart-
ment of Transportation and is responsible for the economic regulation of
interstate surface transportation, primarily railroads. 83
Membership: Three members serve staggered five-year terms and are
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. No
more than two commissioners may belong to the same political party. A
member may continue to serve no more than one year after the term of of-
fice ends, and no more than two terms. At least two members must have a
professional background in transportation and at least one member shall
have professional or business experience in the private sector. The Presi-
dent may remove a member for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfea-
sance in office.
Quorum and Voting Requirements: A vacancy in the membership of the
Board does not impair the right of the remaining members to exercise all of
the powers of the Board. When the membership is equally divided, no ac-
tion may be taken by the Board. A majority agency decision may be issued
prior to the release of any dissenting statement. If requested, a dissenting
member may obtain staff assistance in preparing his or her dissent. The
Board does not provide for proxy voting but does allow absentee voting.
Authority is delegated within the agency generally by a notice published in
the Code of Federal Regulations and/or the Federal Register.
Disqualification and Recusal Procedure: Issues of disqualification or re-
cusal are for each affected member to consider and determine himself or
herself.
Chairman's Powers: The President shall designate one member to serve
as Chairman. The Board may designate a member to act as Chairman dur-
ing any period in which there is no Chairman designated by the President.
The Board annually selects a Vice Chairman who serves as acting Chair-
man in the absence of the Chairman. The Chairman appoints and super-
vises the officers and employees of the Board, except that appointment of
the heads of major administrative units requires the approval of the Board
883. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 701-706, 721-727 (Supp. IV 1998).
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pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 701(c)(2)(A)-(B). Under 49 U.S.C. § 701(c)(2)(D),
the Chairman prepares requests for appropriations but they require prior
approval of the Board. The Chairman supervises the expenditure of such
funds. 84 Subject to the general policies, decisions, findings, and determi-
nations of the Board, the Chairman is responsible for administering the
Board.
OMB Bypass Provisions: The Board is decisionally independent and not
subject to Executive Branch supervision or review. 8 5 Bypass of prior
OMB review on budgetary and legislative matters is secured by means of
concurrent transmittal under 49 U.S.C. § 703(g) and 31 U.S.C. § 1108(f).
Additionally, those provisions establish that no officer of an agency may
impair communications between the Board and Congress concerning
budget estimates or requests.
8 6
Litigation Authority: The Board has the right to represent itself in any
civil action involving any function carried out by the board. Moreover, un-
der the so-called Hobbs Act, the Board is authorized to appear as a party in
its own right in any proceeding involving the validity of any Commission
order or requirement. 887 The Board also has authority to initiate and litigate
enforcement actions in courts independently of the Department of Justice,
pursuant to 49 U.S.C. §§ 11702, 14702 and 15902.
UNITED STATES INTERNA TIONAL TRADE COMMISSION
Mission and General Statutory Reference: The United States Interna-
tional Trade Commission (ITC) determines the impact of imports on U.S.
industries and directs actions against certain unfair trade practices, such as
patent, trademark and copyright infringement.88 It investigates and pub-
lishes reports on U.S. industries and publishes and updates the Harmonized
Tariff Schedule of the United States.
889
Membership: Six commissioners serve staggered nine-year terms and are
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. No
more than three of the commissioners may belong to the same political
884. See id. § 701(c)(2)(E).
885. See id. § 703(c).
886. See id. § 703(g).
887. See 28 U.S.C. § 2323 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
888. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1330-1341 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).




party. Members of a different political party are to be appointed "alter-
nately as nearly as may be practicable." A person who has served for more
than five years may not be reappointed. A member may continue to serve
until his successor is appointed and qualified.
Quorum and Voting Requirements: A majority of the Commissioners in
office constitutes a quorum and the Commission may function notwith-
standing vacancies. Unless otherwise provided for by statute, a tie vote is
the same as a "no" vote; the motion or other attempted action fails for lack
of majority. However, by statute, one half the number of Commissioners
voting can authorize the institution of an investigation and, in the case of an
equally divided Commission, under sections 201 and 406 of the Trade Act
of 1974, the President may consider the determination of either group of
Commissioners to be the determination of the Commission. In antidump-
ing and countervailing duty cases, by statute, an evenly divided Commis-
sion vote shall be treated as an affirmative determination. By published
Commission rule, a vote in favor of review by only one Commissioner is
all that is necessary to require review by the full Commission of all or part
of an initial determination of an ALJ in matters under section 337 of the
Tariff Act of 1930. The Commission majority may issue its determination
even if the minority delays in completing any dissenting statements. A dis-
senting Commissioner can obtain staff assistance in preparing any dissent-
ing views. There is no statutory provision for voting by proxy. The Com-
mission's organic statute contains no specific provision for the Commission
to delegate its functions; the Commission delegates responsibilities gener-
ally through the use of directives and other internal rules.
Disqualification and Recusal Procedure: No special procedures.
Chairman's Powers: The President shall designate a Chairman and Vice
Chairman for two year terms. He may not designate for Chairman (1) a
Commissioner who has less than 1 year of continuous service as a commis-
sioner as of the date the designation is being made, or (2) a Commissioner
who is a member of the same political party as Chairman for the immedi-
ately preceding term. He may not name as Vice Chairman a member of the
same political party as the Chairman. If the President does not appoint a
Chairman by the beginning of the term, the Commissioner with the longest
period of continuous service as a commissioner who is of a different party
from the Chairman for the immediately preceding term will serve as
Chairman until a presidentially-designated Chairman takes office. If a
Commissioner does not complete a term as Chairman or Vice Chairman
due to certain specified causes, the president shall designate a Commis-
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sioner of the same political party to serve the remainder of the term. The
Vice Chairman acts as Chairman in case of the absence or disability of the
Chairman. During any period in which there is no Chairman or Vice
Chairman, the Commissioner having the longest period of continuous
service as a commissioner shall act as Chairman.
The Chairman of the Commission is authorized to "appoint and fix the
compensation of such employees of the Commission as he deems neces-
sary."'8 90 However, the Chairman's decisions in this regard "shall be sub-
ject to disapproval by a majority vote of all the commissioners in office."
891
The Chairman's appointment powers do not extend to the personal staff of
each Commissioner. The Chairman formalizes an annual budget that is
subject to the approval of a majority of all the commissioners.
892
An Executive Resources Board (ERB) within the Commission recruits
and evaluates candidates for senior staff positions and makes recommenda-
tions to the Chairman who makes the final hiring decisions.893
OMB Bypass Provisions: The Commission is specifically excluded from
the provisions of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 and directs that
the Commission's estimated expenditures and proposed appropriations be
included without revision in the President's budget.894 Moreover, the
Commission asserts an informal legislative bypass and does not, conse-
quently, clear testimony or comments through OMB. Assertion of an in-
formal legislative bypass is based on 19 U.S.C. § 2232 which, besides pro-
viding the Commission with a budgetary bypass, states that the
Commission shall not be considered to be a department or establishment
for purposes of the Budget and Accounting Act.
Litigation Authority: Section 333(g) of the Tariff Act of 1930 authorizes
the Commission to represent itself in judicial proceedings through its own
attorneys. Alternatively, the Commission can request that the Attorney
General represent it in such proceedings.
890. 19 U.S.C. § 1331(a)(l)(A)(i) (1994).
891. Id. § 1331(a)(I)(C).
892. See id. § 133 1(a)(2)(B).
893. See 5 U.S.C. § 3393(b) (1994).




SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRA TION
Mission and General Statutory Reference: The Social Security Admini-
stration (SSA) is an independent agency in the executive branch of the
Government that administers the Old Age and Survivor Insurance Program,
the Disability Insurance Program, and the Supplemental Income Program.
It issues Social Security numbers, processes claims and determines eligi-
bility, maintains beneficiary rolls covering nearly forty-four million people,
and dispenses benefits totaling nearly $29 million monthly.
8 95
Appointment and Removal Provisions: The Commissioner is appointed
by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate to a six-year
term. A successor appointed to fill an unexpired term serves only for the
remainder of the term. A Commissioner whose successor does not take of-
fice immediately after the Commissioner's term may continue in office un-
til the successor assumes office. The Commissioner may be removed by
the President only for "neglect of duty or malfeasance in office." 896 A
Deputy Commissioner is also appointed by the President to a six-year term
with the advice and consent of the Senate but there is no provision for re-
moval. 897 The Chief Actuary is appointed by the Commissioner but does
not have a fixed term, and may be removed only "for cause."
Other Presidential Appointees: Inspector General.8 98 Deputy Commis-
sioner.899 Two of the members from the public who serve on the Board of
Trustees of the Trust Fund.900 Three of the seven members of the Social
Security Advisory Board. 901
OMB Bypass Provisions: The Commissioner's budget must be submit-
ted to Congress by the President without revision together with the Presi-
dent's annual budget for the Administration. 902 Legislative matters are
subject to OMB clearance and approval.
895. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 901-913 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
896. Id. §902(a)(3).
897. See id. § 902(b)(1)-(2).
898. See id. § 902(d).
899. See id. § 902(b).
900. See 42 U.S.C. § 401(c) (1994).
901. See id. § 903(c)(1)(A).
902. See id. § 904(b)(1).
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INDEPENDENT FEDERAL AGENCIES
Litigation Authority: The Social Security Administration does not have
independent litigation authority.
OFFICE OF SPECIAL COUNSEL
Mission and General Statutory Reference: The Office of Special Counsel
(OSC) investigates and prosecutes allegations of prohibited personnel
practices, with an emphasis on protecting federal government whistle-
blowers. It is authorized to file complaints with the Merit System Protec-
tion Board seeking corrective action remedies, such as reinstatement and
back pay, and disciplinary action against individuals who commit prohib-
ited personnel practices. It also provides a secure channel through which
federal workers may disclose information about workplace improprieties,
misuse of funds, fraud and abuse, and substantial dangers to the public
-health or safety. OSC also provides advisory opinions on the Hatch Act
dealing with political activities by federal employees, and enforces the
Hatch Act before the MSPB.9 °3
Appointment and Removal Provisions: The Special Counsel is appointed
by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate to a five-year
term. The Special Counsel may continue to serve for up to one year after
the date the term would otherwise expire if a successor has not yet been
appointed and confirmed. A successor appointed to fill an unexpired term
serves only for the remainder of the term. The successor must be "an attor-
ney who, by demonstrated ability, background, training, or experience, is
especially qualified to carry out the functions of the position."90' The Spe-
cial Counsel may be removed by the President only for inefficiency, ne-
glect of duty, or malfeasance in office.
OMB Bypass Provisions: Freedom from OMB review is secured by a
provision for concurrent transmittal of reports and testimony to Congress
and the President or other executive branch agencies. 9°5 However, as a
matter of practice, the Special Counsel has not used its OMB bypass
authority and, instead, sends its budget to OMB for inclusion in the Presi-
dent's budget.
903. See 5 U.S.C §§ 1211-1219 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
904. 5 U.S.C. § 1211(b).
905. See id. § 1217.
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Litigation Authority: The Office of Special Counsel does not have inde-
pendent litigation authority.
